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Set against the backdrop of increasingly polarized and dysfunctional political discourse 
within western democratic nations, this dissertation aims to consider the ways in which 
critical sociology can contribute to, and potentially expand, emergent accounts of an 
alternative radical democratic politics premised on productive contest. While the 
mainstream of democratic theory remains dominated by notions of deliberation, 
compromise, and consensus; a challenge has emerged out of a small but important 
paradigm of social and political theory - one that conceptually re-prioritized the political 
ideal of agon. Rejecting notions of post-political compromise or consensus, contemporary 
scholars of agonal democracy propose perpetually open contest, legitimated struggles, 
and irresolvable tensions as the proper and desirable content of ‘the political.’ Yet as 
richly as these varying accounts have mapped the political character of such agonal 
principles, very little attention has been paid to their implicit or explicit social 
dimensions. Through the creative adaptation of certain sociological perspectives of Max 
Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, and Jürgen Habermas; this project attempts to 
rethink the social in the context of radical agonistic democracy.  Taking up the work of 
Chantal Mouffe as an exemplar of this agonal paradigm, this project challenges the often-
shallow accounts of the social, ultimately suggesting an alternative, though 
complimentary, theoretical vocabulary through which to explore the important, but 
consistently underexplored, social dimensions of a (re)turn to the political ideal of agon. 
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Let us assume.  It is with these words that, just over a half century ago, that American 
moral philosopher John Rawls set the context for his now seminal treatise on justice and 
democracy in A Theory of Justice.  Let us assume, Rawls suggested, that society is, more or less, 
a self-sufficient association of persons who recognize certain binding rules of conduct that 
govern their interactions, and, more or less, adhere to them.  Let us assume, he continued, that 
these rules specify a system of cooperation designed to advance the good of those taking part in 
such democratic societies.  Let us assume that society, here a moniker for modern wester 
democratic societies, is a cooperative venture oriented towards mutual advantage, and that 
conflict is not oriented towards whether to continue such cooperation, but rather focused on the 
quality and quantum of benefits distributed to each participant. Let us assume, in short, that the 
trajectory of modern western democracy is sound, and that the question of justice can be 
answered through the abstraction of interests and reasonable justifications amongst the imagined 
signatories to an essentially functional and well-ordered social contract. (Rawls, 1999: 4) 
Although some twenty years later, in his second most influential work - Political 
Liberalism, Rawls begins by accepting that his assumptions regarding a ‘reasonably well-ordered 
society’ might have been too generous, the underpinning premise - that western democratic 
societies are essentially well founded, maintained, and functional – continued to haunt the 
mainstream of political and social theories of democracy. This is because, far from creating such 
assumptions, those notions Rawls asked us all to assume in A Theory of Justice were 
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articulations of the something deeper and older – an underpinning confidence, perhaps to the 
point of arrogance, that the institutions and structures of modern western democracies, and with 
them, certain fundamental philosophical assertions about the nature and potential of conflict and 
consensus within them, were essentially good, and sound, and stable. Of course, in the decades 
since, many have challenged elements of Rawls’ work.  Indeed, for over five decades, the 
majority of academic engagement with notions of democracy and justice, have positioned 
themselves for or against Rawls, and subsequently as time passed, vis a vis his most famous 
advocates and critics. Yet, for the most part, and even in the face of mounting evidence to the 
contrary, the underlying assumption that democracy is premised on consensus has remained 
woefully unchallenged.  
One very notable exception takes the form of radical (agonal) democratic theory.  A 
small, but vibrant, subset of political theory – drawing heavily from political philosophy – 
radical democratic theorists fundamentally rejected the central role of consensus and stability 
underpinning the mainstream of post-Rawlsian democratic theory, instead prioritizing conflict 
and perpetual tension as the essential defining character of democracy, and politics more broadly. 
Building on a core distinction between antagonistic (destructive) and agonistic (productive) 
conflict within the body politic, these radical democratic theorists offered a new vision for 
western democratic societies – one which challenged and disrupted the stale confidence of the 
old guard.   Yet, despite its many promises, the agonal democratic vision has not, I argue, lived 
up to its full potential.  Narrow ontological accounts of the political, have overshadowed and 
shackled the transformative potential of a new democracy premised on an ideal of political agon 





 But for this pervasive dismissal of the social, or at its extreme, reduction of the social to 
mere sediment of ‘real’ political outcomes; the critical normative commitments underpinning 
agonal democratic accounts could well have made radical democratic theorists natural allies to a 
range of critical sociologist. Both groups focus on illuminating systemically obscured 
inequalities, injustices and power imbalances, and both are equally committed to opening new 
spaces – both conceptual and real – through which diverse perspectives and positions can be 
better recognized and considered.   This is, I believe, a missed opportunity. Despite its 
shortcomings, I contend that the radical agonal democratic challenge represents an essential 
conceptual trajectory for anyone interested in equality, justice, and democracy. Though this body 
of writing has become trapped within a myopic and anemic conception of the social, the 
transformative potential of the agonal (re)turn and the possibilities it offers to expand the 
contemporary democratic imaginary are too important to abandon.   
To this end, this project looks to inject these radical democratic accounts with selected 
critical sociological insights to better consider and map what such accounts might offer both 
disciplines were they to take seriously their own obscured assumptions and necessary 
foundations vis a vis a more robust understanding of the social.   Concurrently challenging the 
predominant logic of determinism in agonal democratic theory – under which the social is 
understood to be byproduct of political struggle – and exploring and expanding nascent 
assumptions and conceptions of the social within and around such accounts, I will aim to 
reprioritize a lost, but essential, question: what are the underlying social conditions of possibility 
for a radically emancipatory democratic order premised on the ideal of political agon? However, 
as opposed to traditional critique, I am proposing a different approach. Through a process of 
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creative adaptation, I am proposing to introduce selected classical and contemporary 
sociological insights, alternative understandings and conceptual vocabularies through which to 
reimagine and transform elements of agonal democratic theory while supporting, and potentially 
advancing, the normative aims and underlying commitments of the radical democratic critique. 
To this end, this project is organized into four chapters.  First, I begin with an exploration 
of Chantal Mouffe’s radical democratic perspective – taken as an exemplar of the agonal (re)turn 
- with an emphasis on her conceptual foundations, from her early work with Ernesto Laclau to 
her selective deployment of Carl Schmitt.  Here I will examine both the intended and unintended 
consequences of Mouffe’ post-Marxist recovery of Schmitt’s pro-fascist political theology, as 
well as her overarching frameworks and distinctions between the ontic and the ontological.  In 
the following chapters, I will introduce and propose adapting selected insights from certain 
classical and contemporary sociological perspectives.  Specifically, I will explore selected 
insights from Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, and finally, Jürgen Habermas,  
aiming concurrently to contextualize these thinkers vis a vis the political and intellectual 
landscape that enabled Schmitt; and to identify and deploy certain foundational elements of how 
these seminal thinkers understood the social, and at times its relationship to the political, in order 
to expand and nuance Mouffe’s self-described ‘purely political’ account of agonal democracy.  
Through this critical and creative adaptation of these various sociological perspectives, I 
not only aim to rethink the social in the context of radical agonistic democracy, but also to 
demonstrate the lasting importance and applicability of classical sociology – both directly, and 
through its contemporary interpretation.  At the same time, throughout this project, I will 
consider the relationship between political and moral associations and intellectual commitments 
– implicitly exploring the boundaries between creative adaptation and selective memory – asking 
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what can be gained, or possibly lost, when taking on intellectual heritages steeped in normative 
commitments antithetical to one’s own.  Both in terms of Mouffe’s deployment of Schmitt, and 
the contrasting perspectives I wish to inject from Weber, Tönnies, Simmel and even Habermas, 
this project also cannot help but touch on the implicit parallels between the current socio-
political challenges radical democrats are seeking to address, and those that seminal thinkers 
grappled with throughout the rise, reign, and fall of Germany’s infamous National Socialist 
German Workers’ Party.  History here, it would seem, demands a certain amount of recognition.  
Taken together, throughout the following four chapters I hope to offer a path from an 
essentially one dimensional, or ‘purely-political’, account of the radical agonal challenge to 
Rawls – and the still dominant assumptions about well-ordered, consensus centered, western 
democracy that his work exemplifies - to a fuller, more vibrant, multi-dimensional conceptual 
framework that allows us, in equal measure, to consider both the political and the social breadth 
and depth of agonal democracy.  Or indeed, of any vision for a radically emancipatory 
democratic order premised on perpetual productive, and not toxic or destructive, tension and 












Chapter 1  




While the most mainstream of democratic theory remains dominated by notions of 
deliberation, compromise, and consensus (Habermas, 1998 & 1999; Rawls, 1999 & 1996; 
Giddens, 2000; and Beck, 1997), that vision has also been challenged as part of an alternative 
paradigm - one that conceptually re-prioritized the political ideal of agon. As a small but 
prominent subset of Western social and political thought, agonal democratic theory contends that 
it is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate genuine conflict from the realm of politics 
(Connolly, 1991 & 1995; Honig 1993 & 2009; Tully, 1995 & 2006; and Hatab, 2002, Mouffe 
2005a & 2005b).  Challenging the mainstream of democratic theories which posit one or another 
form of social consensus or balance of interests among rational agents as the central ideal of the 
political, proponents of agonal democracy contend that such visions not only misunderstand the 
core character of ‘the political’ in both its present and historical forms, but “put in jeopardy the 
[very] future of democratic politics.” (Mouffe, 2005a: 7)   Instead, drawing on the ancient Greek 
term agon - productive conflict between mutually respecting adversaries - agonal democratic 
theorists advocate an alternative vision of democracy constituted by and through perpetually 
open contest, and legitimate, though irresolvable, struggle. Yet, while considerable attention has 
been paid to this interest in agonal democracy (for example - Deveaux, 1999 or Schaap, 2009), 
existing scholarship has predominantly focused on the ethical, philosophical and broadly 
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‘political’ dimensions of such scholarship. Notwithstanding the importance that concepts such 
ethos, demos, pluralism, and even society have occupied in these emergent perspectives, the role 
of the social has largely been ignored, and where it has been considered, the social dimensions of 
agonal democracy are generally relegated to a sort of sedimented by-product of the political.  
Belonging to the broad genre of critical theory, agonal democratic theory shares with a 
critical sociological approach the normative emancipatory aim of exposing and overturning 
existing systems of inequality and domination.  At the heart of a call for agonal democracy, is a 
normative commitment to concurrently defend core democratic principles, and to expand notions 
of inclusivity to new, at times quite radical, heights.  Despite the problematic treatment of the 
social, the agonal-democratic turn in political theory contains significant normative and analytic 
capacities worth exploring. Understood in the broad context of the ongoing expansion of a 
neoliberal capitalist economic logic into the political sphere, engaging with the under-theorized 
social dimensions of agonal democratic theory offers a unique opportunity to consider an 
alternative orientation to the neo-liberal conception of competition and conflict that dominates 
the contemporary socio-political spectrum. By challenging the logic of determination in political 
theory’s consideration of agonal democracy under which the social is essentially determined by 
the political, and ultimately expanding the nascent conceptualizations of the social underpinning 
this proposed agonal (re)turn, we are able to begin to ask a distinctive, hitherto ignored, and 
deeply important sociological question, namely: what are the underlying social conditions of 
possibility for a radically emancipatory democratic order premised on the ideal of political agon? 
That said, before one can address the question of underlying social conditions of 
possibility for a normative agonal democratic ideal, one must consider the theoretical 
understanding of the social in such perspectives. This task offers its own set of challenges. 
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Despite an overarching orientation towards a democratic ethos that privileges productive contest 
over antagonistic conflict, and, less productively, a shared tendency to neglect the implicit social 
dimensions of their work, agonal democratic theorists offer a diverse range of perspectives, an 
exhaustive summary of which would be impractical. Instead, I propose to begin our engagement 
with this important sub-field through a more detailed consideration of analytic and philosophical 
foundations underpinning the work of one of its more well-known contributors. Specifically, this 
chapter considers and interrogates the concept of the social embedded in the agonal democratic 
theory of Chantal Mouffe, taken as emblematic of this contemporary agonal (re)turn, by 
exploring its origins in both Mouffe’s early writings as well as the intended and unintended 
consequences of drawing on a certain, somewhat infamous, anti-liberal liberal thinker to found 
her radical democratic vision.  
Like much of the contemporary scholarship around agonal democracy, Mouffe’s recent 
work oscillates between conspicuous silence and problematic reductionism in relation to ‘the 
social.’  Marking a considerable shift from the elusive and complex conception of the social in 
Hegemony and Social Strategy (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001), her work on agonal democracy 
describes the social as a collection of sedimentary “[...] practices that conceal the originary acts 
of their contingent political institution and which are taken for granted [...]” (Mouffe, 2005a: 17). 
The social here is reduced to little more than its most doxic qualities, multitudes and 
complexities summed up in terms of the wool that has been pulled over our collective eyes.  
Though perhaps more explicit than many of her fellow agonal democratic theorists, Mouffe’s 
anemic conceptualization of the social remains representative of a broader tendency to neglect 
any meaningful consideration of the social when exploring agonal democratic possibilities.  At its 
core, this neglect represents both an ideological and methodological gap.  For Mouffe, the social 
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is the ‘naturalized’ byproduct of the political – of interest only in so far as a potential outcome of 
purely political contests.  Since, according to this view, the social is not a meaningful ground of 
contestation, but the continual, and unreflexive, project of articulating an imaged space where all 
such contests are already resolved; any normative commitments to strong critical theory 
condemn it to near irrelevance.  A critical sociological perspective explicitly rejects these 
assumptions, asserting instead that not only can the social be a site of important contestation, 
challenge and change, but that it is a conceptual precondition of the political. It is from such a 
perspective that I seek to engage with the notion of a radical democratic order premised on the 
ideal of political agon. 
To these ends, this chapter is organized in terms of four interrelated tasks.  First, the 
chapter begins by considering the philosophic and ratiocinative context in which Mouffe outlines 
her ontological account of 'the political,' its significance for a symmetrical account of 'the social,' 
as well as the implications of such an account given contemporary sociological debates on the 
analytic validity and practical usefulness of the notion of 'society' itself. Second, the significantly 
different account of society and ‘the social’ as proposed in Laclau & Mouffe’s Hegemony and 
Socialist Structure is examined.  This considerably more detailed account is taken up in terms of 
both a conceptual background to, and an implicit trajectory toward, Mouffe’s later orientation to 
‘the social’ as presented in more recent works. Third, I turn to Mouffe’s ‘purely political’ account 
of agonal democracy, aiming to explore its key theoretical foundations, with an emphasis on the 
central role of her partial adaptation of the political theory of Carl Schmitt. Here Schmitt’s work 
is also explored in its own right, with an eye to identifying both the elements Mouffe explicitly 
borrows and adapts, as well as the possibility that there may be further conceptual inheritances 
which are neither desirable nor acknowledged.  Finally, this chapter concludes by critically 
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engaging with the explicit and implicit assumptions underlying the conceptualization(s) of the 
social across Mouffe’s work, both in their own right, and as emblematic of a broader under-
conceptualization of the social across agonal democratic theory writ large.  Arguing for the 
creative adaptability of classical sociological thinking1, I propose an alternate path for agonal 
democratic theory – one which continues to emphasize the political, without reducing or 
abandoning the social.  Such a path offers a chance to reconsider the social through an alternative 
conceptual vocabulary; ultimately attempting to deploy a more robust conceptualization in order 
to strengthen this radical democratic vision by exposing the social conditions of possibility 




At the outset of On the Political, Mouffe begins by distinguishing between ‘politics’ – the 
empirical field of political activity, and ‘the political' – the core essence or primary 
conceptualization of that field. Specifically, Mouffe suggests that: 
Politics refers to the ‘ontic’ level while ‘the political’ has to do with the ‘ontological’ one.  
This means that the ontics has to do with the manifold practices of conventional politics, 
while the ontological concerns the very way in which [political] society is instituted. 
(Mouffe, 2005a: 8) 
 
This distinction, borrowed from Heidegger2, is central to Mouffe’s overall project, and important 
 
1 The notion of creative adaptability is premised on the two-fold assumption that, first, classical sociological ‘canon’ 
is neither immutable nor infallible, and, second, that the true value of these lasting intellectual contributions – and 
indeed all such works across any discipline – is achieved through their ongoing adaptation, evolution and application 
to ever changing social inquiry; as discussed in the introduction to the edited collection: Interrogating the Social: A 
Critical Sociology for the 21st Century. (Kurasawa, 2017: 20) 
 
2 Though not identical, Mouffe's ontic/ontological differentiation is drawn from Heidegger's distinction between 
dasein-ontological (essence of being) and dasein-ontical (existence of being). (Heidegger 1962: 32) 
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for agonal democratic theory writ large.  The basic argument is that in order to understand and 
critically engage with the manifold practices of day-to-day politics, the ontic, one must first 
correctly understand what the political is at its essence, the ontological. The problem with much 
of mainstream contemporary democratic theory, according to Mouffe and other theorists of 
agonal democracy, is that it fundamentally misunderstands and misrepresents the ‘true’ 
ontological character of the political.  
Of course, the language of 'ontics' and 'ontologies' can be problematic. Following 
Heidegger, 'ontological' implies the essence or essential character of a thing in objective terms.  
The ontological character of something is its 'true' essence, risking a conception that appears both 
acultural and ahistorical. However, Mouffe’s discussion of the ontological character of ‘the 
political’ is less about asserting an objectively true ‘essence,’ and more about illuminating an 
essential character as it has been instituted, practiced, and replicated in specific cultural contexts 
– a sort of contingent ontology. Implying more than a broad generalization, but less than an 
immutable essence, the notion of a contingent ontology suggests a reference to a core character, 
which, though historically and culturally produced, none the less represents a constituting 
element of a thing as it has been instituted and practiced. Though Mouffe does not herself use the 
language of contingency directly with regards to her deployment of ‘ontology,’ her account of the 
character of the political suggests neither the eternality nor the immutability of a classical 
ontological claim. Further, read in the context of her earlier work on hegemony, upon which I 
will reflect further on below, a non-essentialist deployment of ‘ontological’ seems, however 
counterintuitive, to be necessary.  Indeed, the critical normative bent of Mouffe's work on radical 
democracy hinges on the potential mutability of the political; first identifying the essential 
character of the political, and then immediately suggesting the need for its transfiguration.  
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Building on this notion of contingent ontology, I contend that a critical sociological 
perspective can similarly distinguish between the multiplicity of interactions, practices and 
institutions which constitute any given society, and the core – though historically contingent and 
politically contestable – 'essence' of the social. Just as Mouffe claims that “[...] the origin of our 
current incapacity to think in a political way […]” (2005a: 9) is our misunderstanding of the 
ontological dimension of the political, I argue that the failure to critically consider the myriad 
social underpinnings of an agonal conception of democracy fatally impoverishes the inherent 
critical capacities of such perspectives, and obscures the fact that any ontological account of the 
political, however contingent and mutable, relies on a similar, and a priori, account of the social.  
That said, it is important to distinguish a historically and culturally contingent ontological 
account of the social from the call for a consolidated corpus of sociological theory – a 
normalizing collection of research procedures, conceptualizations, and acknowledged meanings 
'unifying' the discipline as a whole, which could include a single standardized account of the 
social. (Caillé, 2007: 179) Nor should it be confused with what Anne Sophie Krossa describes as 
the attempt to overcome the complexities of contemporary concepts of society by normative 
means (Krossa, 2009: 256), leveraging a particular theoretical understanding of the essence of the 
social to constrain or modify sociological study.  The goal here is not to provide a unifying 
account of society, but rather to provide a theoretical lens through which to render visible the 
obscured social dimensions of the political ideal of agon. It is precisely because sociology is 
constantly navigating its own theoretical pluralism with regard to its object of enquiry, what 
Laurent Thévenot described as the result of the founding discordance between the social and the 
science of social sciences (Thévenot, 2007: 242), that it is uniquely qualified to contribute to 




Origins of a perspective – Laclau & Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
 
The introduction of a critical sociological perspective into the field of radical democratic 
theory is not merely a matter of addressing a gap; to varying degrees, many of the political 
philosophers and theorists who forward perspectives around agonal democracy do not only 
neglect, but in some cases actively oppose the notion that a critical study of society can be well 
served by taking ‘society’ or ‘the social’ as its object of inquiry.  While Mouffe’s more recent 
work on political agonism may appear to arbitrarily dismiss ‘the social,’ her orientation towards 
sociological insights in this regard is not without significant foundation. To trace the trajectory of 
Mouffe’s contemporary lack of regard for what I am proposing to call the social dimensions of, 
and the conditions of possibility for, a radical democratic order premised on an ideal of agonal 
contest, it is useful to map Mouffe’s agonal democratic theory from its nascent presence in her 
earlier, and perhaps most famous, work – Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. 
Originally published in 1985 with co-author Ernesto Laclau, Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy presents both a thorough exploration of Marxism(s)’ various attempts to overcome what 
the authors describe as an inevitable crisis, and a compelling vision for a nuanced and 
theoretically rigorous path beyond the limitations they see as inherent in any traditional Marxist 
approach – aptly described at the time as post-Marxist theory.  Simultaneously deeply committed 
to, and vigorously critical of, the various streams of Marxist theory and practice that inspired the 
majority of socialist action for the better part of century, Laclau and Mouffe move beyond 
obvious critique and offer a brilliant opportunity to rescue and adapt some of the central 
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objectives of this tradition.   Exploring a wide range of Marxist theorists responding to the crisis 
of more contemporary Marxism/Socialism, the authors, through a sort of discursive archeology, 
unearth and consider the earliest seeds of what they see as the only path forward for any viable 
socialist strategy: a politically oriented conception of hegemony. Yet even more crucially for our 
purposes here, Mouffe and Laclau also present a clear and conceptually rich understanding of 
society and social relations. Although doubtless the theoretical foundation from which Mouffe’s 
later, and by my assertion problematic, unique emphasis on ‘the political’ is borne; I propose that 
the rich and nuanced understanding presented in this earlier work - itself partially drawn from 
critical perspectives with deep sociological currents - neither requires, nor need desire, such a 
dismissal of ‘the social’ as a useful object of inquiry.   
In order to properly consider the conceptualization of society and ‘the social’ as presented 
by Laclau and Mouffe, it is key to locate it within the specific project as part of which it is 
presented.  As clear in its very title, Laclau and Mouffe’s work had a very particular objective.  
As they themselves describe in the introduction to the second edition of Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy (2000), their original project had been to reread, or reactivate, Marxist theory in light of 
the myriad of social conditions, crisis, and contemporary problems which the traditional field 
had been unable to respond to.  To this effect Laclau and Mouffe present their original project in 
terms of: 
…[a] reactivation [which] had to show the original contingency of the synthesis that Marxist 
categories attempted to establish. Instead of dealing with notions such as ‘class’, the triad of 
levels (the economic, the political, and the ideological) or the contradiction between forces and 
relations of production as sedimented fetishes, we tried to revive the preconditions which make 
their discursive operation possible, and asked ourselves questions concerning their continuity or 
discontinuity in contemporary capitalism. (Laclau and Mouffe, 2000: viii)  
 
Mouffe and Laclau chart a path away from what they understand to be the problematic 
essentialism underpinning even a Gramscian inspired Marxism to a new theoretical landscape 
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that fully appreciates the contingent and discursively constituted character of social relations.  
Given this radical break from even the most generous re-imagining of the historical materialism 
contained in nearly every Marxist perspective, Laclau and Mouffe work hard to establish what 
they call ‘the process of articulation’ as not merely necessary to understanding why essentialist 
conception of class identity and interests no longer function, but as the primary constituting 
process for every dimension of what one could refer to as society itself.  Drawing on the likes of 
Althusser, Wittengenstein, and Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe chart a course for their vision of 
socialist strategy beyond Marxist notions of base/superstructure, historical necessity, class 
unification, and even hegemony (in the Gramcian sense) by presenting a view of society 
understood as wholly the product of this discursive articulation.  
The core of Mouffe and Laclau’s notion of the discursive constitution of social relations, 
while certainly radical when initially published, is not particularly controversial in a 
contemporary context.  Armed with the early ‘postmodern’ and poststructuralist insights of 
Foucault, they propose that “society and social agents lack any essence, and their regularities 
merely consist of the relative and precarious forms of fixation which accompany the 
establishment of a certain order.” (98) Society, and every social identity is not described via 
discourse, which would imply a primary plane of existence prior to such a mediated presentation, 
but rather exists only through and by the process of articulation.  Yet such discursive composition 
is neither ever complete nor symbolically ‘clean.’  Such processes have as their necessary 
character elements of perpetual modification and symbolic remainders.   As Laclau and Mouffe 
specifically outline: 
Society never manages to be identical to itself, as every nodal point is constituted within an 
intertextuality that overflows it. The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction 
of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds 
from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every 




This perspective of course is by no means alien to contemporary sociological inquiry.  Indeed, 
the relationally constituted nature of social identities and structures has been a topic of debate 
and refinement for some time. Indeed, one could even argue that while most clearly articulated in 
the (post)modern theory aiming to move beyond traditional structuralist accounts of society, the 
core insight that social identities and relations are, to varying degrees, constituted via a 
multiplicity of social interactions, has been a thread of sociological inquiry dating back to 
classical perspectives. 
There is not, and can never be according to Mouffe and Laclau, a fixed or even 
momentarily ‘sutured’ instance of a unified society. The social is by its very nature perpetual 
movement, and therefore any conception of a unified whole can only be understood as an 
artificial, and political, attempt at discursive domination.  Specifically, they conclude: 
The incomplete character of every totality necessarily leads us to abandon, as a terrain of 
analysis, the premise of ‘society’ as a sutured and self-defined totality. ‘Society’ is not a valid 
object of discourse. There is no single underlying principle fixing – and hence constituting – the 
whole field of differences. The irresolvable interiority/exteriority tension is the condition of any 
social practice: necessity only exists as a partial limitation of the field of contingency. It is in this 
terrain, where neither a total interiority nor a total exteriority is possible, that the social is 
constituted. (111) 
 
Armed with this radically contingent understanding of the social and society, Mouffe and Laclau 
are able to return to their central question – how to comprehend and forward socialist struggle in 
a field, which can never truly be fully constituted, of constant partial articulations?  Their answer, 
as somewhat evident from Mouffe’s later work, is to (re)turn to the political.  While not 
explicitly or thoroughly defined in this early work, Laclau and Mouffe present the political as the 
field of antagonisms, understood as the external limits on the social preventing its 
objectification. In this sense “the constitution of the very identities which will have to confront 
one another antagonistically, becomes now the first of all political problems.” (134)  
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This is the crux of Laclau and Mouffe’s attempt to reorient a socialist project beyond the 
limits of a historical materialist Marxist philosophy. Social relations are understood as constant 
and incomplete articulations, while society itself is the ever incomplete and impossible 
unification of those constant articulations. More importantly, antagonisms, understood as the 
necessary limitations of any discursive articulation, are presented as equally contingent and 
transitory boundaries of possibility of society and the social.  “…[I]f society is never transparent 
to itself because it is unable to constitute itself as an objective field, neither is antagonism 
entirely transparent, as it does not manage totally to dissolve the objectivity of the social.” (129) 
Because society and social relations are infinite and incomplete discursive articulations in 
constant motion with the antagonisms which represent their ever-shifting limits, the only viable 
direction for a socialist agenda is through political struggle – wherein the boundaries and limits 
of such articulations are, to some extent, more openly contested.  Revolution is thus replaced 
with, or transposed to, the political struggle for discursive domination, the establishment of a 
new, although always contingent, partial hegemonic order. 
Without any need or interest in debating the extent to which the ever shifting discursively 
constituted dimensions of any ‘society’ is such that there is no other dimension before, beyond or 
adjacent which might be worthy of analytic consideration, it remains unclear why such a 
viewpoint necessarily means abandoning ‘society’ or ‘the social’ as a valid, and particularly rich, 
object of inquiry. Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of the materiality of discursive articulation 
would seem to provide ample theoretical space to explore a rich and nuanced social field – 
without any need to disprove or dissemble a perspective that sees such an object of inquiry as 
both symbolically constituted and materially ‘real.’  Nor is it clear from why a perspective 
accepting the infinitude of discursive nodes which can never completely create any unitary 
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symbolic object of the social outside a hegemonic projection in any way insulates the field of 
‘the political’ from a similar set of insights.   Surely if we understand that all social identities and 
relations are articulations, so too must we understand that any and all political identities or 
relations are equally such.   Indeed, it would seem that the thin basis for the move to the political 
here could only be premised on the rhetorical move to distinguish the two by means of asserting 
a sort of self-reflexivity as more inherent in one – that is to say if we were to consider the 
political as more useful as a field of study, and as a space for action, in so far as we contend that 
it is more acutely aware of its discursively constituted nature.   An assertion that would seem 
difficult, at best, to forward.  
    
A New Agonal Imaginary 
 
As noted at the onset of this chapter, there is a significant distance between the 
conceptualization of society and ‘the social’ as initially laid out in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy, and how that vision is summarized and distilled in Mouffe’s later works on radical 
pluralist democracy. The social gradually shifts from an incompletable attempt to present 
perpetual contingent articulations of identity as a unified ‘society,’ to the veiled sediment of past 
political struggle – the passive product of hegemonic deployments.  That said, understanding the 
theoretical explorations and propositions deployed in her previous work with Laclau, a clear 
trajectory can be mapped. The starting point for Mouffe’s ‘purely political’ account of agonal 
democracy, and the emphasis of a (re)turn to the political, is an explicit conceptual move away 
from the perceived burdens and limitations of Marxism(s).  It is an alternative to the ‘objective’ 
analysis of a materially determined society, class structure and identity, power relations, and 
19 
 
‘necessary’ character of inevitable revolution. Mouffe’s proposed ‘radical and plural democracy’ 
is presented as a “…reformulation of the socialist project that avoids the twin pitfalls of Marxist 
socialism and social democracy, while providing the left with a new imaginary…”  (Mouffe, 
2005b: 10 – emphasis added) 
At the core of this new imaginary is the proposed decentering of society and return to ‘the 
political’ as the chief object of study and landscape for social action. Mouffe proposes that it is 
the political, in both its ontic and ontological dimensions, which must become the focal point of 
any normative project to promote a new conception of democracy. From this basis, Mouffe takes 
on what she, and many other agonal democratic theorists, see as the imminent and eminent 
failures of modern liberal democratic theory through an analysis of how such perspectives 
(mis)understand the essential character and content of politics and the political. As mentioned 
above, this misunderstanding relates primarily to how many contemporary democratic theorists 
conceptualize antagonism and conflict within the political. However, it extends beyond these 
elements to the conceptualization of identity and difference, the nature of collective human 
existence or ‘civilization,’ as well as the appropriate objectives and ideals underpinning a vision 
of a just democratic social order. Let us consider each of these in turn.  
Chief among the claims that theorists of radical pluralist democracy reject from the 
mainstream of liberal democratic theory, is the notion that conflict and social antagonisms 
eventually will, or even can be, overcome. For Mouffe and other theorists of agonal democracy, 
the crisis in contemporary Western politics is not about a failure to establish new consensus-
based national or international orders with which to contest and replace the hegemony of 
neoliberal capitalism, but rather the pressing need to establish the conditions for a continuing 
interplay with, and productive conflict between, a multiplicity of new identities and differences 
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constantly forming and reforming throughout the social world as well as the various collectivities 
and interests to which they give rise.  All identities in this sense are deeply political, as are 
differences.  As another agonal democratic theorist, William Connolly, explains:  
An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially 
recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it 
would not exist in its distinctiveness and solidity. Entrenched in this indispensable relation is a 
second set of tendencies, themselves in need of exploration, to congeal established identities into 
fixed forms, thought and lived as if their structure expressed the true order of things. When these 
pressures prevail, the maintenance of one identity (or field of identities) involves the conversion 
of some differences into otherness, into evil, or into one of its numerous surrogates… …Identity 
stands in a complex, political relation to the difference it seeks to fix. (Connolly, 1991: 64) 
 
It is in a comparable sense that Mouffe contends that, by their nature, collective identities always 
entail a we/they distinction or discrimination. (Mouffe, 2005a: 5) In relation to such identities 
and differences, agonal democratic theorists contend that the task of democratic politics “is not to 
overcome them through consensus but to construct them in a way that energizes the democratic 
confrontation.” (6)  
It is, at least in part, from this perspective that agonal democratic theorists so vehemently 
reject consensus as a viable ideal for democracy or politics. Consensus, in the context of identity 
formation, inherently both political and confrontational, implies nothing less than the domination 
of the field by one or few congealed, or normalized, we/them discriminations. Spaces for new 
identities to emerge, fight for recognition, and ultimately articulate themselves and the collective 
interests they bring to the fore, cannot be guaranteed under a conception of politics that 
privileges agreement and unity.  As Mouffe explains: 
The new rights that are being claimed today are the expression of differences whose importance 
is only now being asserted, and they are no longer rights that can be universalized. Radical 
democracy demands that we acknowledge difference – the particular, the multiple, the 
heterogeneous, in effect, everything that had been excluded by the concept of Man in the abstract. 
(13) 
 
 Yet this is not the exclusive reason why democratic theories proposing politics can overcome 
conflict so concerns proponents of radical pluralist democracy.  Beyond any reference to 
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identity/difference, Mouffe also invokes the insights of psychoanalytic tradition, and suggests 
that any viable conception of politics must “…acknowledge that ‘the state of nature’ in its 
Hobbesian dimension can never be completely eradicated but only controlled…” (6) Conflict, 
violence, and antagonisms are, according to Mouffe, more channeled than mitigated by 
democracy – and can never be completely resolved or eliminated.  They are inherent and 
inescapable elements of collective human existence, and where democracy fails to provide a 
viable channel for such tensions, they may find expression in far more destructive articulations 
of “confrontations between non-negotiable moral values and essentialist identities.” (6)  
From this perspective, democracy as a political order is neither necessary nor safe.  For 
Mouffe, the democratic project is inherently fragile.  One of any number of permutations of 
collective human existence; an organized attempt to order, contain or control the immutable 
realities of perpetual tension and conflict.  Mouffe’s project, and indeed the aim of most agonal 
democratic theorists, is to deepen and strengthen contemporary democracy so as to ensure its 
continuation as the principle means by which more vicious alternatives remain suppressed, while 
harnessing the (literally) creative power of human contest.  
This is by no means to suggest that agonal theorists generally, nor Mouffe specifically, 
promote radical pluralistic democratic social orders only in so far as they constrain or contain 
other more violent alternatives.  On the contrary, Mouffe proposes that a radically pluralistic 
democracy represents the clearest path to promoting the objectives and ideals of a so-called just 
society.  In conversation with the likes of John Rawls, several agonal democratic theorists equate 
the need to protect the role of conflict in political orders with the principles of justice.  However, 
whereas Rawls famously offered a political theory capable of proposing such core principles, 
agonal democratic theorists focus on the need to keep such contestations forever open.  As 
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Mouffe notes in direct response to Rawls’ Theory of Justice: 
Political philosophy in a modern democratic society should not be a search for foundations but 
the elaboration of a language providing us with metaphoric redescriptions of our social 
relations… …It should therefore be possible to combine the defence of pluralism and the priority 
of right characteristics of modern democracy with a revalorization of the political understood as 
collective participation in a public sphere where interests are confronted, conflicts resolved, 
divisions exposed, confrontations staged, and in that way – as Machiavelli was the first to 
recognize – liberty secured. (57) 
 
In this way, far from being detached from empirical considerations, most theorists of agonal 
democracy pursue a deeply critical normative commitment to the transformation of the manifold 
practices of conventional politics in various (predominantly Western) social and cultural 
contexts. Agonal democratic theorists do not demand a particular set of values, but rather aim to 
make clear that all values must be understood as contingent and contestable – and that the 
strengthening and deepening of democracy depends not on congealing and insulating certain 
foundations, but rather acknowledging and productively channelling the inevitable tensions and 
conflicts that will, and must arise around any and all values.  It is this, for Mouffe, that 
constitutes a return to the political.  
 
Against Consensus  
 
As noted above, agonal democratic theory fundamentally opposes the idea that consensus 
can be a viable aim of politics. While this can certainly be seen as a direct response to certain 
explicitly ‘post conflict’ theories of democracy, it is more broadly a philosophical position taken 
in contrast to some of the most influential contemporary political theorists, specifically:  John 
Rawls and Jürgen Habermas.  Indeed, many agonal democratic theorists locate their positions 
explicitly in contrast to Rawls, Habermas, and the various communitarian, liberal, and libertarian 
23 
 
critiques of their writings.  In this way, like a large portion of political philosophy touching on 
matters of democracy or justice, agonal democratic theory emerges, at least in part, in terms of an 
alternative perspective vis-à-vis decades of debate and conversation surrounding John Rawls’ 
seminal A Theory of Justice, and its subsequent modification in Political Liberalism.  
 Originally published in 1971, John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice has been widely 
understood to represent a renewal of contemporary moral and political philosophy in North 
America. Building on several decades of disparate ideas regarding justice as fairness, distributive 
justice, liberty, civil disobedience, and deliberation, A Theory of Justice aimed to articulate a 
comprehensive philosophy of justice.  As Rawls himself noted of the original project’s ambitious 
objective: 
My ambitions for the book will be completely realized if it enables one to see more clearly the 
chief structural features of the alternative conception of justice that is implicit in the contract 
tradition and points the way to its further elaboration. Of the traditional views, it is this 
conception, I believe, which best approximates our considered judgements of justice and 
constitutes the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society. (Rawls, 1999: xviii)  
 
While the work inspired a generation of adulation, agreement, rejection, critique and counter-
critique across the social sciences, few would argue against its importance.  Though perspectives 
vary, many, including Mouffe, have noted that Rawls’ early work represented an important step 
forward for a liberal conception of justice. As Mouffe notes, A Theory of A Justice is noteworthy 
to agonal theorists for three key reasons:  1) it attempts a defence of political liberalism 
independent of economic liberalism; 2) it tries to provide an alternative to the ‘hegemonic’ 
utilitarian thought dominating the mainstay of liberal moral philosophy; and 3) it begins to move 
away from the idea of a universalistic theoretical framework, in favour of a more ‘situated’ or 
contingent perspective. (Mouffe, 2005b: 42-43) Of these three elements, it is Rawls’ attempt to 
move beyond a universalistic moral framework that Mouffe believes is most important; an 
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attempt which Rawls continued in his restatement of his principles of justice in his later work - 
Political Liberalism.  In this way, understanding Rawls’ work, at least in its barest outline, is a 
useful point of reference for understanding the ways in which agonal democratic theorists both 
built upon and rejected the theoretical landscape it helped to shape.     
 In A Theory of Justice Rawls sets out to determine the principles of justice which could 
be agreed to by reasonable members of a liberal democratic society. Rawls proposes a core 
conception of justice as fairness, representing two core principles of justice:  
[First, that] each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. [Second, that] social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (Rawls, 1999: 266)  
 
From a sociological perspective, one of the most interesting elements of this account is that, 
explicitly building on the theoretical tradition of the social contract, Rawls considers the question 
of justice as fairness from the perspective of principles which not only provide the basis for 
political, social, and economic institutions; but that also belie a basic social unity as agreed upon 
by reasonable members of a liberal democratic society – a social contract. In this way, the 
principles of justice laid out in A Theory of Justice are less interesting than the conditions under 
which Rawls’ contends they can be extrapolated.   
 For Rawls, the key question for A Theory of Justice was to determine which traditional 
conceptions of justice, or variants thereof, were the best principles for realizing liberty and 
equality?  Assuming society could be viewed as a fair system of cooperation, how are the ‘fair 
terms of cooperation’ to be determined? (Rawls, 1996: 22) The answer, argues Rawls, is in 
adapting the doctrine of the social contract, specifically: 
…the fair terms of social cooperation are conceived as agreed to by those engaged in it, that is, by 
free and equal citizens who are born into the society in which they lead their lives. But their 
agreement, like any other valid agreement, must be entered into under the appropriate conditions. 
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In particular, these conditions must situate free and equal persons fairly and must not allow some 
person greater bargaining advantages than others. Further, such things as threats of force and 
coercion, deception and fraud must be excluded. (23)  
 
This leads Rawls to propound on his most well-known conceptions – the ‘original position’ 
under a ‘veil of ignorance.’  Under this abstract construction, persons do not know their social 
positions or their particular beliefs/views, what Rawls later describes as their comprehensive 
doctrines.  Similarly, the hypothetical participants have no knowledge of their ethnic origins, sex, 
gender, sexual preferences, or any of what Rawls describes as their ‘native endowments’ – 
intelligence, health, strength, etc. Thus the principles of justice are those principles which one 
could reasonably imagine all participants in a hypothetical original moment of deliberation 
would reasonably agree to, assuming that all notions of identity and difference could be 
temporarily veiled.(25) These principles could be imagined to remain relatively stable, assuming 
what Rawls’ described as a ‘well ordered society.’ 
 Of course, both the notion of a well-ordered society, and a hypothetical agreement 
between participants veiled from nearly every potential source of disagreement, is problematic 
from a sociological perspective.  Indeed, while an undeniably seminal and central piece of work, 
A Theory of Justice drew as much critique as it did acclaim.  Notably many argued that Rawls 
had fallen short of his goal of providing a non-universalist account of justice – instead ‘veiling’ 
his views of human nature, natural law, or psychology under his complex thought experiment.  
Responding to nearly two decades of critiques and contributions, Rawls made the rare move of 
amending many of his original conceptions through his subsequent restatement in Political 
Liberalism.   As Mouffe points out, one of his important developments was to clarify his 
intentions vis-à-vis the contingent nature of society. Rawls makes explicit that he never intended 
to define universal principles of justice, but rather historically contingent ones. As Mouffe points 
out of this shift: 
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Now, he also emphasizes that the task of articulating a public conception of justice is primarily a 
practical social task, not an epistemological one, and that ‘what justifies a conception of justice is 
not its being true to an order antecedent and given to us, but its congruence with a deeper 
understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the 
tradition embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (Mouffe, 2005b: 
43) 
  
Rawls himself characterizes the essential change in his thinking between A Theory of Justice and 
Political Liberalism as recognizing what he describes as the fact of reasonable pluralism.   
Justice as fairness as originally outlined, admits Rawls, was, at least in part, conceived in terms 
of a comprehensive doctrine. (Rawls, 1996: xviii) The problem is that a modern democratic 
society, in contrast to a community3 centred around a single unifying comprehensive doctrine.  
Instead, Rawls argues that liberal democratic societies are, in their contemporary context, 
characterized by what he calls the fact of reasonable pluralism.  Specifically, he says: 
A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should 
one expect that in the foreseeable future on of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever 
be affirmed by all, or nearly all citizens. (xviii) 
 
The fact of reasonable pluralism, Rawls argues, leads one to realize that the conception of a well-
ordered society – as laid out in A Theory of Justice – is unrealistic.  Instead, the question of 
stability over time requires a vision of justice that can be accepted by a society which operates 
under the ever-present conditions of a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible world views. As 
such, Rawls recasts justice as fairness as a purely political conception of justice – one which he 
then aims to show can be justified and remain stable in a contemporary democratic context. To 
do this, Rawls introduces the concept of an overlapping consensus.  As he explains: 
In such a consensus, the reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception, each from its own 
point of view. Social unity is based on a consensus on the political conception; and stability is 
possible when the doctrines making up the consensus are affirmed by society’s politically active 
citizens and the requirements of justice are not too much in conflict with citizens’ essential 
 
3 The distinction Rawls makes between a contemporary society and a traditional ‘community’ is particularly 
interesting in relation to the work of Ferdinand Tönnies, which we explore in greater detail in chapter 3. 
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interests as formed and encouraged by their social arrangements. (134) 
 
Rawls is also careful to be clear that this overlapping consensus is more, or ‘thicker,’ than a 
simple modus vivendi.  In order for an overlapping consensus amongst reasonable but 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines to serve as the basis for a public justification of principles 
of justice, such a consensus cannot be mere compromise.  Indeed, assuming such an overlapping 
consensus is feasible, Rawls posits that it, and the principles it endorsed, would become the 
foundation for a stable public reason – the criteria by which key questions of justice are weighed 
and by which the power of the state is exercised. (139)  
 Despite recognizing the fact of reasonable pluralism and attempting to recast justice as 
fairness in purely political terms, for many, Rawls does not go far enough.  Indeed, for Mouffe, 
Rawls cannot escape certain core assumptions he carries throughout his work.  Mouffe argues 
that Rawls’ perspective as a moral philosopher sabotages his attempts to think politically. 
Specifically, Mouffe charges: 
As far as politics is present in Rawls, it is reduced to the ‘politics of interest,’ that is, the pursuit 
of different interests defined prior to and independently of their possible articulation by 
competing alternative discourses. The aim of his theory is to regulate that pursuit by establishing 
agreed-upon, neutral rules. (Mouffe, 2005b: 48)  
 
The problem is, for Mouffe and all agonal democratic theorists, there can be no ‘neutral rules’ 
outside of the political process of establishing, supporting, or contesting them.  This is why, 
while Mouffe is sympathetic to many of Rawls’ aims, she ultimately rejects his theoretical 
trajectory.  The core of the call for a democratic ethos premised on political agon, is precisely the 
belief that any ‘rules’ can never be understood as neutral. As Mouffe concludes on this point: 
Rawls’ claim that he has found the rational solution to this question has to be rejected outright. 
For there cannot be such a solution, providing an undisputed and ‘publicly recognized point of 
view from which all citizens can examine before one another whether or not their political and 
social institutions are just.’ It is the very characteristic of modern democracy to impede such a 
final fixation of the social order and to preclude the possibility for a discourse to establish a 
definite structure. Different discourses will, indeed, attempt to dominate the field of discursivity 
and create nodal points through the practice of articulation, but they can only succeed in 
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temporarily fixing meaning. (52-53) 
 
In this way, Mouffe, and agonal democratic theorists writ large, reject the core of Rawls’ attempt 
to account for the fact of reasonable pluralism.  To believe that principles of justice, organizing 
and stabilizing principles for society’s social and political institutions, the very basis of what is 
considered ‘reasonable’ in a public sphere, could be fixed and determined outside of the 
perpetual contestation and power relations of the political not only threatens to present an 
apolitical conception of society, but an anti-political one.    
 
Carl Schmitt and the ‘nature’ of the Political 
 
If one cannot overstate the importance and impact of John Rawls’ work on the 
(re)emergence of a liberal theory of justice in contemporary western moral and political theory, it 
is likewise difficult to understate the more recent effects of the (re)discovery and popularity of 
Carl Schmitt’s political writings by a number of contemporary political philosophers, including 
Mouffe, which have propelled Schmitt’s previously academically censured materials (back) into 
the mainstream.   Though much of his work would seem naturally at odds with any 
contemporary pluralistic theory of society or politics, his conceptualization of the political, as 
well as his incisive critique of liberal economic-centric political orders, has found resonance 
among many left leaning scholars, and is at the heart of Mouffe’s proposed ‘purely political’ 
account of agonal democracy.  That said, prior to exploring the ways in which Mouffe, and 
others, have been selectively inspired by, and have creatively adapted, many of Schmitt’s core 
insights, it is worth considering Schmitt’s perspectives in their own right. Specifically, it is 
important to understand Schmitt’s core arguments, both those taken and those rejected by 




While there has been considerable recent work which has focused on Schmitt’s contributions 
and their merits, for our purposes this chapter considers Schmitt in terms of five of his core 
assertions about: 1) human nature; 2) pluralism and liberalism, 3) relatively independent 
endeavors of human thought and action,’ 4) the state as ‘sovereign,’ and 5) the distinctions 
between friends, enemies, and monsters. That said, before exploring these five pillars, it is 
necessary to take a moment to consider Schmitt’s contemporary re-emergence, the various 
perspectives on the relevance of his Nazi heritage, as well as the ethical and practical 
implications of drawing on his work.    
An influential political theorist leading up the rise of the Third Reich in Germany, Carl 
Schmitt’s personal and intellectual legacy has become inextricably intertwined with his decision 
to join and support (many argue both practically and intellectually) the National Socialist party. 
Yet even the degree to which Schmitt influence should and has been limited by his infamous 
political orientations is hotly debated.  While many continue to express concerns about the 
continued (re)emergence and influence of Schmitt’s legal and political writings, others accuse 
recent Schmitt scholars of having “uncritically bought into a questionable German tradition that 
since the 1950s has sought to checkmate Schmitt out of any legitimate political discourse.” 
(Piccone and Ulmen, 2002: 3) While it is not necessary to explore all the contours of this debate, 
it is important to at least consider some key points.   First, Carl Schmitt did, as a matter of 
historical fact, choose to align himself with the Nazis party on March 23rd 1933. (Mehring, 2014: 
282) More to the point, this was not the passive defensive ‘joining’ the party that characterized a 
necessary survival mechanism for so many under Hitler’s oppressive regime4, this was, while no 
 
4 Schmitt’s alignment with and intellectual support of the Nazis regime as an already established and influential 
political theorist and legal scholar needs to be properly distinguished from many other German intellectuals who had 
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doubt a complicated decision, an active commitment. As Reinhard Mehring writes in his detailed 
biography of Schmitt: 
Schmitt put his collaboration into the context of a general decision and general responsibility: he 
did not delude himself over the fact that he had crossed the Rubicon, leaving the bourgeois 
Rechsstaat behind, and he knew that there was no way back into bourgeois scholarship 
[burgerliche Wissenchaft]. From the very beginning, Schmitt saw the National Socialist state as 
also an anti-Semitic state.  There were very few others who saw politics from the perspective of 
fundamental conflicts and battles to quite the same degree.  That Schmitt had entered the ‘Reich 
of the nether demons’, as Ernst Niekisch put it, and cooperated with a gang of vandals, robbers, 
murderers, and madmen, would soon become apparent.” (285) 
 
Schmitt’s involvement with the Nazis party was also not minimal.  As another matter of 
historical fact, Schmitt was identified as a ‘significant figure’ at the end of the second world war 
and was incarcerated as a potential war criminal for a year and a half (from September 1945 to 
March 1947) by American and German authorities. (Piccone and Ulmen, 2002: 14) 
 Of course, many, including Mouffe, argue that Schmitt’s keen insights into democracy, 
politics and liberalism should not be ignored on the basis of his questionable political 
allegiances. As Mouffe argues: 
Though Schmitt’s criticisms were developed at the beginning of the century, they are, in fact, still 
pertinent and it would be superficial to believe that the writer’s subsequent membership of the 
National Socialist Party means that we can simply ignore them.  On the contrary, I believe it is by 
facing up to the challenge posed by such a rigorous and perspicacious opponent that we shall 
succeed in grasping the weak points in a the dominant conception of modern democracy, in order 
that these may be remedied (Mouffe, 2002b: 118) 
 
Others go further still, and characterize resistance to accepting Schmitt in terms of a mainstream 
liberal ‘campaign’ to delegitimize radical critiques that are viewed as potentially dangerous to 
modern capitalist-liberal-democratic regimes.  On the far side of this perspective, Piccone and 
Ulmen suggest that: 
…[H]ostility toward Schmitt’s work is so intense that it spills over onto what anti-Schmittians 
smear as “Schmitt apologists” – those who view Schmitt as someone more interesting and 
relevant than a mere Nazi ideologue.  This intensity cannot be explained solely in terms of 
 
little choice but to join the party.  Notably Jürgen Habermas ‘joining’ the Hitler Youth in 1940 (at age 10) and brief 
time on the Western Front in 1945 (at age 15) would serve as a counterexample on the far other end of the spectrum.    
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differences of scholarly opinion. It is rooted in more subtle political issues. While the motivation 
seems to be clear, i.e., that the “apology” somehow is related to a diabolical conservative attempt 
to re-habilitate fascist or Nazis ideology by de-Nazifying Schmitt and legitimating his dangerous 
ideas, the charge makes no sense and is a typical result of the confusion of European and 
American political realities. (Piccone & Ulmen, 2002: 11)  
 
Interestingly, many of those who feel Schmitt is unduly discounted by some for his involvement 
with and support of the Nazis regime, including, to some extent, Mouffe, implicitly present 
Schmitt the political theorist as analytically distinguishable from Schmitt the Nazi whose legal 
scholarship supported many of the changes that enabled the Third Reich.  As another matter of 
historical fact, while being interrogated during his incarceration at Nuremberg, it is clear that 
post-war authorities were equally interested in Schmitt’s practical and intellectual support of the 
National Socialist Party.   As the following except from an interrogation of Schmitt by Robert 
Kempner on April 11th 1947 clearly demonstrates:  
Kempner: It concerns the theoretical foundation of aggressive warfare. You surely know that it 
was an aggressive war? 
Schmitt: I wrote a work on the discriminatory concept of war. 
Kempner: You can assume that everything you have written is well known and these demonstrate 
that you have theoretically established the foundations for war crimes, wars of aggression. 
Schmitt: No, that is not correct. 
Kempner: Would you not admit that your influence in this area is much more significant and 
much more dangerous than when, on the basis of your work, some members of the SS ultimately 
invade foreign countries and shoot people en masse? 
Schmitt: That is taking things too far. I would very much like to address that matter. That is a 
complicated subject.  (as republished in Telos 2007(139) 35-43) 
 
It was, as a point of historical fact, very much Schmitt’s political philosophy, as much as his legal 
scholarship, which Kempner and others in Nuremberg believed made Schmitt responsible if not 
culpable for much of the wars’ atrocities.  Schmitt maintained, throughout his interrogations, that 
his writings did not explicitly legitimize Nazis activities and often reiterated his support for free 
academic expression.  While this ultimately was accepted, in so far as Schmitt was not eventually 
released and not charged with any war crimes, Kempner made his thoughts clear on this subject 
near the end of this interview noted above “We are the last ones who would deny that right. But 
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we will not allow democracy attacked with the apparent means of democracy and have men 
murdered.” (43) 
 There is of course no easy way to navigate this fundamental disagreement as to whether 
Schmitt’s insights can or should be disentangled from the Nazis party he helped legitimize and 
support.  Though Mouffe draws primarily from Schmitt’s writings which predate his affiliation 
with the National Socialist party, the intrinsic pragmatic amorality of Schmitt’s understanding of 
conflict, enemies, war and the very essence of the political remains difficult ground to navigate. 
At the same time, there is a logic and symmetry to Mouffe’s desire to face Schmitt’s critiques of 
liberal democracy head on; as an agonal theorist, it only stands to reason that Mouffe would look 
to generate productive tensions from oppositional points of view. From a critical sociological 
perspective, what is important to recognize is both the promise and the potential pitfalls of the 
rich theoretical terrain Schmitt presents.  While Mouffe explicitly aims to creatively adapt 
Schmitt’s work to her own purposes while explicitly rejecting significant elements of his 
theoretical trajectory – there remains a significant possibility that even a selective adoption of 
Schmitt’s conceptual vocabulary may bring with it significant if subtle theoretical assumptions 
and implications.   
 With this is mind, we turn our attention to the first of five pillars of Schmitt’s thought as 
noted above: his view of human nature, and his assertions regarding the impact of such views on 
political theory. Though not necessarily one of the insights contemporary scholars have 
emphasized, Schmitt writes clearly and passionately about his assumptions regarding human 
nature, and, perhaps more importantly, how such assumptions are necessary to any viable 
understanding of politics or the political. Human nature can for Schmitt, without question, only 
be understood in negative terms.  Furthermore, Schmitt contends that recognizing the ‘negative’ 
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nature of humanity is essential to being able to grasp, in any useful manner, the essence of 
politics and the political.  Near the end of The Concept of the Political, Schmitt concludes that: 
What remains is the remarkable and, for many, certainly disquieting diagnosis that all genuine 
political theories presuppose man to be evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a dangerous 
and dynamic being. This can be easily documented in the works of every specific political 
thinker. Insofar as they reveal themselves as such they all agree on the idea of a problematic 
human nature, no matter how distinct they are in rank and prominent in history. (Schmitt, 2007: 
61) 
 
Schmitt supports this assertion by way of reference to a range of political thinkers, most notably: 
Machiavelli, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Hobbes, and Hegel – although he grants that the last “to be 
sure, at times also shows his double face.” (61)  Each, in their own way, demonstrates this 
essential recognition of humanity’s nature by reference to either the concept of evil, the 
construction of a violent ‘state of nature,’ or both. Of course, any student of the theorists above 
will be quick to note the problems with attempting to group such figures together – even in the 
most general sense.   To suggest that Hobbes’ view of human nature and the nasty, brutish and 
short character of life outside the social contract is equivalent to Nietzsche’s contention that man 
nature is a rope strung between man and overman above an abyss – is trite at best.   That said, 
taken at its most generous reading, Schmitt’s claim is that all truly ‘political’ theorists have a 
view of human nature that acknowledges humankind as “dynamic and dangerous.” (61)    
In contrast, Schmitt argues that those who hold that human nature is, at its core, noble and 
‘good,’ cannot ever come to any viable articulation of politics or the political.   This is because, 
as noted above, Schmitt defines the political in terms of the ever-present possibility of war – 
which he does not, contra a shallow reading, have any delusions about its ignoble character.  War 
is authorized murder for Schmitt, necessary at times, but never ‘good.’ For Schmitt, a starting 
point which, in his view mistakenly, takes the essential character of humankind to be noble or 
good, cannot help but emphasize society over politics.  As he contends: 
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Without being actually anarchist they are polemically directed against the intervention of the 
state. Ingenuous anarchism reveals that the belief in the natural goodness of man is closely tied to 
the radical denial of state and government. One follows from the other, and both foment each 
other… …This means that society determines its own order and that state and government are 
subordinate and must be distrustingly controlled and bound to precise limits. (60)   
 
Leaving aside the problematically totalizing and reductionist tendencies of Schmitt’s argument, 
the position he advances raises an interesting sociological question: namely, does an 
understanding of conflict as productive, or even constitutive, of a sphere of human endeavour as 
important as the political necessitate a view of human nature as, to use Schmitt’s implied 
simplification, ‘bad?’ The answer, from a sociological perspective, is quite clearly: no.  Indeed, 
many canonical and classical sociological thinkers posit complex and productive roles for social 
and political conflict, even violent crime and unrest, without relying on a conception of human 
nature as inherently violent or aggressive.   Several examples of such influential sociological 
conceptions we will explore later in this work, including political and sociological thinkers Max 
Weber, Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel and Ferdinand Tönnies. This is not, however what 
Schmitt concludes.    For Schmitt, the folly of those who cannot recognize the dangerous nature 
of the human animal is that they promote unpolitical or anti-political conceptions of the political 
which subordinate or dissolve politics in favour of amorphous or disingenuous notions of society.  
This, of course, ties in directly with the far more prominent second pillar of Schmitt’s thought: 
his deep distrust and critique of liberal pluralism. 
 The radical rejection of the political and government is, according to Schmitt, 
proportional to the degree to which one believes in “the goodness of man’s nature.” (61)  
Quoting Thomas Paine, Schmitt reminds us that “society is the result of our reasonably regulated 
needs, government the result of our wickedness.” (61) Liberalism, for Schmitt, is one of the most 
dangerous examples of such non-political theories.  Schmitt’s critique of Liberalism is twofold.  
First, Schmitt fundamentally believes that liberals’ focus on pluralism, as expressed through the 
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relatively autonomous liberal individual, privileges society over politics and represents 
conditions which necessarily weaken and ultimately destroy the sovereign state, demos, and the 
political itself.  Specifically, he contends that: 
A pluralist theory is either the theory of state which arrives at the unity of state by a federalism of 
social associations or a theory of the dissolution or rebuttal of the state. If, in fact, it challenges 
the entity and places the political association on equal level with the others, for example, religious 
or economic associations, it must, above all, answer the question as to the specific content of the 
political. (44) 
 
 Liberalism, Schmitt charges, deploys this latter form of a pluralist conception of the state, which 
lowers the sovereign state to the level of other societal associations.  This, he contends, 
effectively reduces the sovereign government to “a mere servant of the essentially economically 
determined society” (44) either as one of many equal associations, or as the head of a 
conglomerate of diverse, but relatively equal, associations. For a state to function, according to 
Schmitt, there can be no challenge to its sovereign power – that is to say its monopoly on the 
political.    
The second major charge Schmitt levels against liberalism is that it is, in effect, a 
fraudulent political ideology.  While, according to Schmitt, liberalism is necessarily oppositional 
to the sovereign state, he charges that it neither produces any meaningful plan to repair or reform 
the state, nor advances any positive theory of the state.  Instead, Schmitt accuses liberalism of 
substituting the essential character of the political (the friend/enemy distinction) with the logic of 
another sphere of human activity.  He argues that: 
Liberalism in one of its typical dilemmas […] of intellect and economies has attempted to 
transform the enemy from the viewpoint of economics into a competitor and from the intellectual 
point into a debating adversary. In the domain of economics there are no enemies, only 
competitors, and in a thoroughly moral and ethical world perhaps only debating adversaries. It is 
irrelevant here whether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant of barbaric 
times that nations continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy, or hopes that the 
antithesis will one day vanish from the world, or whether it is perhaps sound pedagogic reasoning 
to imagine that enemies no longer exist at all. The concern here is neither with abstractions nor 




This critique of a liberal understanding of the political, or the lack thereof, is, alongside other of 
Schmitt’s historical critiques of liberal parliamentary democracy, at the heart of what Mouffe 
believes should be considered and partially recovered from Schmitt.  According to Mouffe, 
Schmitt was absolutely correct in his charge that liberalism instrumentalizes politics in terms of 
intellectual and especially economic logics.  As she notes: 
While not accepting the consequences Schmitt draws, we can nevertheless acknowledge that he 
has to be taken seriously when he points up the deficiencies of liberal parliamentary democracy. 
To the extent that its institutions are perceived as mere instrumental techniques, it is improbable 
that it can be assured of the type of adherence which would guarantee effective participation. The 
‘political virtue’ Montesquieu regarded as indispensable to democracy and which he identified 
with ‘the love of laws and the fatherland’ cannot develop in such a context. (Mouffe, 2002b: 120) 
   
This brings us to the third and fourth pillars of Schmitt’s concept of the political, that human 
endeavours of thought or action can be understood in terms of relatively independent ‘spheres’ 
(in the Habermasian sense) which have their own distinct logics, and that the essential logic 
underpinning the political absolutely necessitates the sovereignty of a single political entity – the 
state.  
 While Schmitt’s clear focus is on the essential character of the political, he frames the 
core distinction upon which the political rests – the friend/enemy distinction – in contrast to 
similarly core distinctions all other spheres of human endeavours are based.  While Schmitt does 
not go into great detail as to why the core of any of these realms can be understood in terms of 
the final distinction they render, he offers several as examples.  In the realm of the moral, 
Schmitt points to the distinctions between good and evil.  In the aesthetic and economic spheres, 
he points to the distinction of beautiful/ugly and profitable/unprofitable as core. This is an 
important assumption within Schmitt’s work, one which is simultaneously seductive and 
potentially problematically essentializing.  The emphasis on core distinctions provides Schmitt 
with a vehicle to offer ontological (albeit potentially and problematically essentialist) accounts of 
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these spheres via a core binary opposition around which each is organized.  There are of course 
interesting parallels here with Hegel (although Schmitt is clear that he is not proposing a 
dialectic tension); and with Habermas’ description of the dangers of allowing the logic of one 
sphere (the economic for Habermas) to colonize and dominate other distinctive spheres (most 
notably the civil or public sphere). Indeed, very much in a way that resonates with some of 
Habermas’ early work, Schmitt notes that the overlap or deployment of the non-political 
distinctions into the sphere of the political can have significant consequences.  Liberalism, as we 
have seen, makes such a move according to Schmitt, by prioritizing the core distinctions or 
logics of the economic sphere and consequently weakening and potentially dissolving the 
sovereign state.  At the same time, Schmitt also notes that the logics of other spheres can be 
deployed, either organically or strategically, to intensify otherwise purely political distinction.  
He concludes this point, however, by cautioning us: 
A war need be neither something religious nor something morally good nor something lucrative. 
War today is in all likelihood none of these. This obvious point is mostly confused by the fact that 
religious, moral, and other antitheses can intensify to political ones and can bring about the 
decisive friend-enemy constellation. If, in fact, this occurs, then the relevant antithesis is no 
longer purely religious, moral, or economic, but political. (Schmitt, 2007: 36) 
 
By this Schmitt means that, regardless of what he describes as the ‘human motivations,’ these are 
always translated into a distinctive political antithesis, and deployed by a sovereign state to make 
the ultimate decision – the waging of war.  Indeed, the state must be sovereign according to 
Schmitt entirely because it necessarily holds the monopoly on two key decisions – to identify 
enemies and defend against them with all necessary means up to and including physical violence, 
and to ask one’s own people (demos) to both do that violence and risk being killed in the process.  
That said, and somewhat counter-intuitively, Schmitt makes it clear that he does not valorize war 
in this context.   In fact, for Schmitt, the irrationality of such armed conflict reinforces his 
assertion that it can only be seen as justifiable in political terms.  As he explains: 
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There exists no rational purpose, no norm no matter how true, no program no matter how 
exemplary, no social ideal no matter how beautiful, no legitimacy nor legality which could justify 
men killing each other for this reason. If such physical destruction of human life is not motivated 
by an existential threat to one’s own way of life, then it cannot be justified. Just as little can war 
be justified by ethical and juristic norms.  If there really are enemies in the existential sense as 
meant here, then it is justified, but only politically, to repel and fight them physically. (49) 
 
For Schmitt, there can be no just wars.  No noble principles that elevate organized murder to the 
realm of good and evil, right and wrong, profitable or unprofitable.  War only functions as the 
extreme pragmatic necessity of the political.  The continuation of the political entity.  Of course, 
in the same philosophical movement, Schmitt denies the existence of unjust wars.  By so 
thoroughly insisting on the autonomy of the political monopoly on the friend/enemy distinction 
and the mobilization against it, up to and including asking the people of one sovereign state to 
kill the people of another, Schmitt’s account concurrently insulates the sovereign state from 
extra-political critique (economic, moral, legal) and places with it the absolute responsibility and 
accountability for such decisions.  It is the sovereign state alone, as the decisive political entity, 
which is responsible and accountable for rendering the essential political distinction between 
friend and enemy – “it implies a double possibility: the right to demand from its own members 
the readiness to die and unhesitatingly kill enemies.” (46) 
This leaves us with the fifth and most leveraged pillars of Schmitt’s conception of the 
political – the autonomous antithetical distinction between friend and enemy which uniquely is 
rendered within, and indeed defines and organizes, this sphere of human thought and action. 
Schmitt has a very particular understanding of both friend and enemy in the political sense.  As 
noted earlier, Schmitt is adamant that the antithetical binary distinction between friend/enemy is 
not reducible to any other distinction, be it economic, moral or aesthetic. Both friend and enemy 
for Schmitt are composed and understood at the level of nation states and peoples.  The friend is 
not the close personal acquaintance, any more than the enemy is the individually despised. With 
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reference to Plato’s Republic, Schmitt cautions that the enemy in this context is hostis not 
inimicus.  “An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people 
confronts a similar collectivity.”(28) In a parallel tract, the collectivity of ‘friend’ also exists and 
makes sense only in the context of a plurality of other distinctive political entities, with which, at 
least potentially, antagonistic relations (culminating in war) may arise. More so, the demos, 
collectivity, people, must be a united and homogeneous force.  As strongly alluded to above, for 
Schmitt, the integrity of the state depends upon the unity of the collectivity and its superiority 
over any other form of (as)sociation.  As he warns: 
If the political power of a class or some other group within a state is sufficiently strong to hinder 
the waging of wars against other states but incapable of assuming or lacking the will to assume 
the state’s power and thereby decide on the friend-and-enemy distinction and, if necessary, make 
war, then the political entity is destroyed. (38)  
 
Though not discussed explicitly in terms of cultural pluralism, it is here that Schmitt’s 
contemporary deployment by democratic theorists runs into certain challenges.  For Schmitt, 
political identity cannot be fractured, and he implies rather heavily that a politically 
homogeneous demos must subsume, repress, or outright eject any diversity of association 
(ethnic, religious, class based, or other) which grows strong enough to challenge supremacy of 
the political collectivity.  
The true ontological character of the political, for Schmitt, can only be understood in 
these terms and is antagonistic in nature. As Schmitt clearly asserts: 
The political is the most intense and extreme antagonism, and every concrete antagonism 
becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of the 
friend-enemy grouping. (29)   
 
The political is defined by and through the sustained conflict between friend and enemy, 
culminating in the ever-present possibility of open war, understood as the ultimate negation of 
the enemy. That said, Schmitt is not entirely consistent in describing the enemy as the ‘most 
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extreme’ antagonistic figure.  Though mentioned only once in The Concept of the Political, and 
not taken up by contemporary agonal theorists like Mouffe, Schmitt does very briefly introduce 
the idea that – in cases where the political category of the enemy becomes intermingled with 
other ‘non-political’ distinctions – another (potentially political?) category of radical antagonism 
can emerge.   
 
Friends, Enemies and Monsters  
 
 For Schmitt, “nothing can escape the logical conclusion of the political.” (36) The 
political distinction between friend and enemy, is, by virtue of its monopoly on grand scale 
killing, the most intense of the binary oppositions distinguished between in other fields. No 
matter what the distinction being rendered, it culminates in the friend/enemy distinction should 
human motives be sufficiently strong to make it political. This is equally true for what he see’s as 
liberalism’s attempts to replace the political enemy with the economic competitor or intellectual 
debating partner, as it is for what he describes as the “pacifist hostility toward war.” (36) Yet in 
the same breath, Schmitt acknowledges that some motivations can essentially transcend the 
normal boundaries of the political – as when the enemy becomes intermixed with categorizations 
normally reserved for the moral or another field of human thought.   As he explains: 
If pacifist hostility toward war were so strong as to drive pacifists into a war against non-pacifists, 
in a war against war, that would prove that pacifism truly possesses political energy because it is 
sufficiently strong to group men according to friend and enemy… … Such a war is necessarily 
unusually intense and inhuman because, by transcending the limits of the political framework, it 
simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categorizations and is forced to make 
him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed. In other words, he is an 
enemy who no longer must be compelled to retreat into his borders only. (36 – emphasis added)    
 
Schmitt puts very little emphasis on the notion of the monster and does not expand on or return 
to any potential implications a conception of a hybrid categorization, something at the 
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intersection of two or more binary oppositions from distinctive spheres of human endeavor, 
might have for his concept of the political. Nor does Schmitt offer any additional consideration 
of the plausibility or consequence of this ‘monstrous enemy’ outside the specific example he 
provides.  Yet despite the relatively minor appearance of the monster in The Concept of the 
Political, its potential implications, both to Schmitt’s overarching conceptual framework and to 
his contemporary interpretation and deployment, are considerable. 
 The introduction of the monster into the friend/enemy binary concurrently represents 
three ‘openings’ in Schmitt theoretical landscape.  First, it represents the only place where 
Schmitt explicitly complicates one of the antithetical binary oppositions through which he 
defines the distinctive spheres of human thought and action.  For a moment, the binary 
opposition of friend/enemy becomes the triad of friend/enemy/monster – fundamentally altering, 
albeit only for a moment, the essentialist binary logic upon which Schmitt insists.  Secondly, the 
notion of the monster, or ‘monstrous enemy’ opens a space within Schmitt’s field of core 
distinctions for a discussion of degree or intensity.  Everywhere else, Schmitt speaks of a single 
distinction, a binary opposition between one or another category – friend or enemy.  Yet with the 
introduction of the possibility of a radical enemy, an ultimate or penultimate enemy greater or 
treated to a more intense antagonistic relation to the collective unified demos; Schmitt opens up 
the possibility of degrees of political friendliness or enmity – a nuance that extends beyond 
pragmatic action to the core conceptual landscape.   Finally, and, from a sociological perspective, 
perhaps most interestingly, Schmitt’s conception of the monster as resulting in the crossing of 
boundaries between purely political and other types of core distinctions – in his example the 
moral distinction between good and evil – opens a space in his theoretical landscape to consider 
the overlap of, interplay between, and liminal conceptions or figures betwixt these otherwise 
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discrete fields and logics.     
 This having been said, although Schmitt introduces the concept of the monster into his 
work, he offers little with which to chart its content or character.  As noted above, a more 
thorough consideration of a monstrous enemy in Schmitt offers certain possibilities within his 
broader conceptual framework, but such openings remain relatively modest.   To consider the 
three implications of the monstrous enemy more fully, it becomes necessary to build on such a 
concept by drawing outside of Schmitt’s work.   Very much in parallel to the broader objective of 
this project, here I propose to supplement Schmitt with certain sociological insights in order to 
more thoroughly explore what the notion of the monster may offer Schmitt or the contemporary 
adaptations of his work.    From a sociological perspective, the monster represents only one of a 
myriad of liminal figures with which the discipline has been traditionally concerned.  From 
Erving Goffman's stigmatized, to Renee Girard's scapegoats, to Georg Simmel's strangers (the 
latter conception being one to which we will return in Chapter 3), the study of social outsiders 
and borderline figures has been, and continues to be, a central theme in sociology. However, the 
study of the monster, or more specifically the human monster, while narrower in scope, has also 
been considered within the discipline.  Most notable of these is the attention paid to the human 
monster by Michel Foucault.  One of the most influential contemporary considerations of the 
human monster, Foucault consideration of the monster is located in two of his published works:  
Lectures at the College de France on The Abnormal (Foucault, 1999), and, to a lesser degree, 
The Order of Things (Foucault, 1994).     Of course, Foucault’s understanding of the monster did 
not emerge in a vacuum.   Much of Foucault’s account of the human monster drew from the 
earlier work of his teacher and advisor, George Canguilhem. For Canguilhem the monster 
represented simultaneously the antithesis and valuation of ordered life.  As he contends:  
By demonstrating how precarious is the stability to which life has accustomed us - yes , only 
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accustomed, but we made a law out of its custom - the monster gives an all the more eminent 
value to the specific repetition, to morphological regularity, to successful structure; it makes us 
realize that these are not necessary.  It is monstrosity, not death, that is the counter-value to life. 
(Canguilhem, 1964: 29) 
 
The monster, Canguilhem posited, must be understood in terms of the distinctive but 
interrelated elements of monstrosity and monstrousness. For Canguilhem, these are “a duality 
of concepts with the same etymological root,” (30) which “are at the service of two forms of 
normative judgement, the medical and the legal…” (30)   
 Through Canguilhem, Foucault inherits what, to use Schmitt’s language, amounts to an 
overlapping binary representation of the socially constructed human monster.  The monster, 
from this perspective, is produced when there is both an overlap, and a remainder, in the 
negative valuations according to the central (antithetical) distinctions rendered in two fields of 
human endeavor.  This presents a conception of the human monster as a double breach, 
understood as a liminal figure both intermixing and challenging the boundaries of the bio-
medical and the juridical. Following this view, the human monster is understood as a figure 
whose existence breaches the accustomed regularities of two separate but interrelated spheres 
of normative judgement, or what Schmitt would describe as logics of distinction: the bio-
medical distinction between health/illness, and the juridical distinction between 
innocence/guilt. The monster in this sense is the concurrent ‘degrading’ (to use Schmitt’s 
language) of the pathological to the criminal, and the criminal to the pathological.  This can be 









It is with this dualistic account of the human monster that Foucault begins his contemplation 
of this liminal figure, and its eventual ‘giving way’ to other more modern conceptions. 
However, while Foucault upholds this two-part conceptualization throughout his discussions, 
he also, despite not acknowledging the fact, brings into sharp relief an error within this 
conceptualization. The dualistic account of the human monster errs in so far as it conflates 
two distinctive fields of normative judgement, or what Schmitt would call autonomous fields 
of human thought and action.  While the bio-medical functions as an autonomous field of 
normative judgement with its own unique core antithetical distinction, Foucault’s description 
of the juridical, at times, implies a third field subsumed within or conflated with the second.  
This, I contend, is evident in Foucault’s account of the form of human monster that emerges in 
the middle of the 18th century – the moral monster.   
 Until the end of the end of the seventeenth century, monstrosity, argues Foucault, can be 
understood in terms of “...the natural manifestation of the unnatural…” (Foucault, 1999: 81) 
Though the monster was nearly always seen as an indication of potential criminality, the 
unlawful or immoral behaviours themselves were understood as consequences not causes of 











As Foucault explains: 
…starting in the nineteenth century, the relationship is reversed and monstrosity is 
systematically suspected of being behind all criminality.  Every criminal could well be a 
monster, just as previously it was possible that the monster was a criminal. (81)  
 
Though previously an aberration of nature might have been inscribed as a transgression of 
law, even extreme transgressions of law were considered in terms of abhorrent natures. (81)  
Yet as Foucault maps his account of the slow interweaving of juridical and medical power, he 
contends that the punitive and the pathological become more and more conjoined – giving rise 
the extremity case of the moral monster. 
 For Foucault, the moral monster is a transient category that emerges as an initial liminal 
or limit case in the application of the medical distinction between healthy and pathological to 
criminal activity.  According to Foucault, the figure of the human monster will ultimately be 
subsumed within the emergent modern category of the abnormal.  Foucault’s argument, to use 
Schmitt’s terminology, is that a new binary antithetical distinction – between 
normal/abnormal – overtakes and subsumes previous categorizations as traditional logics of 
the juridical and medical merge to form new techniques and technologies of power – what he 
describes as discipline. 
 That said, Foucault’s conceptualization of the moral monster offers interesting insights 
in the context of Schmitt’s (brief) use of the term. For Foucault, the extreme breach of the 
moral monster is understood in the previously mentioned dualistic framework of human 
monstrosity.  What is different about the moral monster, for Foucault, is that a legal breach 
becomes capable of implying an underlying medical breach, whereas this relationship was 
almost always previously reversed.   Foucault draws our attention to a key shift, from the 
embodied monster to the monstrous mind.  Unlike many of the previous types of monsters 
Foucault and others considered, the moral monster bears no physical mark of his or her 
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monstrosity.  The moral monster therefore also can be seen as the first human monster to 
break with the tradition of teratology - the aberration of the body is here replaced with an 
aberration of the soul or self. Yet despite Foucault’s commitment to the language of a ‘double’ 
breach in the formation of the monster, his conceptualization, and indeed his very taxonomy, 
strongly insinuates that the moral monster is formed at the centre of three distinctive fields of 
human thought and action as opposed to two: the medical, the juridical, and the moral.  
 Foucault draws on rather compelling (and morbid) examples of the sorts of extreme 
criminality that mark the first moral monsters of the 19th century.  Jean-Pierre Peter, who 
murdered, butchered, and ate her own daughter. A solitary shepherd, named Léger, who killed 
a young woman, then raped her body and cut out her sexual organs.  Bertrand, a French 
soldier, caught digging up the corpses of freshly buried women, then having sex with and 
disemboweling the bodies. (102) It is ultimately the insufficiency of the initial normative 
strength of this cross-disciplinary cooperation between juridical punishment and medical 
pathologizing that necessitate the overflow category of monstrous criminal illness.  Though 
Foucault strongly implies that a collective reaction of shock, and explicitly describes the need 
for the sovereign powers to manage and reassure society that such extreme acts can be 
understood, classified and properly dealt with; he does not identify this element with an 
autonomous field of human thought.  Still, the third breach, or the third autonomous 
distinction being rendered, remains clearly present: a breach of what a society might 
collectively understand as right or good, a categorization along the antithetical binary 
opposition of good and evil.  Therefore, while a collective social morality, materialized by and 
through various social and cultural institutions and discourses, penetrates and permeates the 
bio-medical and juridical fields – as they do it, the moral concurrently persists as a distinctive 
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field of individual and collective normative judgement, both culturally specific and 
historically contingent. 
 With this in mind, through Foucault’s analysis of the historical emergence of the moral 
monster, and by considering, independently, the three normative judgements fields (logics of 
human thought and the core distinctions rendered within them) a new conceptual diagram can 
be considered. Taken together the bio-medical, the juridical, and the moral form a tripartite 





By disentangling the third dimension of the moral from its subsumed position within the 
juridical, the conceptual framework gains considerable depth.   As with the dualistic 
conception, the moral field is populated by its primary negative signifier.  Drawing on the 














value conception in each field; what Schmitt would describe as part of each fields’ core 
antithetical binary opposition through which its defining distinctions are drawn.  To the 
pathological and criminal of the bio-medical and juridical fields, we add the evil in the moral 
field. Moreover, we can locate three distinctive categories of not-quite-monsters in the three 
related dual breaches.  At the intersection of the juridical and the medical we can locate 
Foucault’s famous conception of the individual to be corrected – the notion of abnormality.  
Similarly, at the intersection of the moral and the juridical we can identify the evil criminal or 
the conception of villainy, and at the intersection of the bio-medical and the moral the hybrid 
conception of repugnance and illness or perversité.5 
How then, to return to the question of friends, enemies and monsters, does such a 
conceptualization help understand and develop the monstrous enemy as introduced by 
Schmitt?  In the majority of Schmitt’s account, any field of human thought or action – when it 
becomes sufficiently strong as to establish its negative pole as ‘enemy’ – becomes political 
itself.   In this sense, we can depict the general account the manner in which these distinctive 
distinctions interplay as illustrated below in figure 1.3: 
 
5 The French term ‘perversité’ has been intentionally chosen over the English word ‘perversity’ in so far as the latter 
tends to carry a sexual connotation, though not formally included in its meaning, while the former remains 





The political, argues Schmitt, is not defined by the concept of war per se, instead it is to be 
understood in terms of a mode of behaviour which is formulated by the ever-present possibility 
of war – the real and ‘concrete’ need to be able to correctly distinguish between enemies and 
friends. (37)  Other spheres are therefore subsumed within the political when they themselves 
become sufficiently ‘political.’  “Every religious, moral, economic ethical or other antithesis 
transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively 
according to friend and enemy.” (37)  
That said, and as noted above, Schmitt’s account here is not entirely consistent.  In 
introducing, however briefly, the notion of a hybrid moral/political category that is different in 
context and character from the typical categorization, and treatment, of the enemy; Schmitt, 






friend               enemy moral  
              evil        good 
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extreme case of a ‘war against war,’ Schmitt allows that the political framework can be 
transcended, resulting in a hybrid categorization which  “…simultaneously degrades the enemy 
into moral and other categorizations and is forced to make him a monster…” (Schmitt, 2007: 36 
– emphasis added). Not only does Schmitt admit the possibility of a different ‘type’ of political 
enemy (the morally monstrous enemy), but he also alludes to the ability for other relatively 
autonomous fields to potentially affect the core political distinction as well.   Such possibilities 




The possibilities opened by the distinction of enemy and monster are two-fold.  First, the mere 
possibility of a hybrid between antithetical distinctions provides a significant space to consider 
the implications of Schmitt’s concept of the political in the context of other logics, including but 
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not limited to, the social.  Secondly, though not completely independent of the first point, the 
explicit discussion of a condition, however rare, under which non-political logics (be they moral, 
economic, or other) are capable of changing the otherwise immutable character and treatment of 
the political enemy offers theorists of agnostic democracy generally, and Chantal Mouffe 
specifically, an interesting point of departure from which to consider an alternative form of the 
enemy.  Both such possibilities will be revisited and further considered in chapter 4.    
 
Conceptual Inheritances: the acknowledged and unacknowledged consequences of drawing on 
Schmitt’s theoretical foundations  
 
Mouffe is careful to note that she does not take on Schmitt’s work without reservation.  
Yet, despite her explicitly selective appropriation of Schmitt and open rejection of certain 
consequences of his thinking, I contend that Mouffe inherits certain core conceptual implications 
alongside those she intentionally selects. Specifically, Mouffe’s selective reading of Schmitt’s 
core conceptualization of ‘the political’ in terms of an autonomous realm of human endeavour 
characterized by the core antithetical distinction drawn between friend and enemy, brings with it 
three unavoidable inheritances. First, though like Mouffe, Schmitt spends little time discussing 
‘the social’ as a distinctive sphere, his account of the political strongly implies an ontological 
distinction between the ‘political’ and the ‘social.’ Second, Schmitt’s conceptual vocabulary 
depends heavily on a theoretical assumption that politics and the political, in both their ontic and 
ontological dimensions, assumes a multiplicity of sovereign ‘states’ or ‘nations.’ Finally, the 
third, and only conceptual inheritance Mouffe explicitly addresses, is Schmitt’s fundamental 




First, Schmitt’s conceptualization strongly implies a distinction between the ontological 
category of ‘the political’ and that of ‘the social.’  This point is made clear in his clarification of 
the ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ monikers. Specifically, following a distinction emphasized in The 
Republic, and as noted above, Schmitt emphasizes that: 
An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a 
similar collectivity.  The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a 
relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue 
of such a relationship.  The enemy is hostis, not inimicus in the broader sense […]. (Schmitt, 
2007: 28) 
 
That the public enemy must be distinguished from any other private antagonisms makes clear the 
fact that: a) there is a distinction between political and social relations; and b) antagonistic 
relations are possible in both spheres. Were antagonistic relations resulting in personal ‘enemies’ 
or inimus not possible, there would be no need for Schmitt to so directly distinguish between 
them.  Indeed, Schmitt goes on to point out that misunderstanding the unique nature of the 
political enemy, or confusing it with other forms of non-political antagonistic relations, can be 
exceedingly problematic. As Schmitt takes pains to explain: 
As German and other languages do not distinguish between the private and political enemy, many 
misconceptions and falsifications are possible. The often quoted “Love your enemies” (Matt. 
5:44; Luke 6:27) reads “diligete inimicos vestros,” [greek text removed], and not diligite hostes 
vestros. No mention is made of the political enemy. Never in the thousand-year struggle between 
Christians and Moslems did it occur to a Christian to surrender rather than defend Europe out of 
love toward the Saracens of Turks. The enemy in the political sense need not be hated personally, 
and in the private sphere only does it make sense to love one’s enemy, i.e., one’s adversary. (29)   
 
Schmitt goes on to say that the antagonism in the political sphere, that which renders the 
distinction between friend and enemy, represents the most intense of all possible antagonisms. 
Indeed, “every [other] concrete antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it 
approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping.” (29) 
 This is of course intuitive from a sociological perspective.  Even if one grants that i) the 
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‘true’ ontological character of the political is to be understood in terms of the antagonism 
between friend and enemy, and ii) that this particular antagonism and grouping represents the 
most intense form of conflict possible – it does not by any means follow that there are not other 
similar or even foundational forms of conflict conceptually possible in other spheres of human 
thought or endeavour.  This point is particularly important in so far as I contend that the 
transformation from antagonistic political relations to agonistic political relations which Mouffe 
and other agonal theorists propose, may well depend on a comparable reorientation to an 
underlying antagonism within a parallel antithetical distinction rendered within the social.   
Secondly, Schmitt’s understanding of the political emphasizes its international, or at least 
inter-state, character.  For Schmitt, politics occurs firstly between sovereign ‘nations’ or ‘states.’  
What he describes more broadly, between ‘fighting collectivities.’  “The political entity 
presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political 
entity.  As long as a state exists, there will thus always be in the world more than just one state.” 
(53) This ‘pluralistic’ character of politics, which is tied to Schmitt’s understanding of the 
friend/enemy dichotomy, is also reinforced through his understanding of war.  While Schmitt 
clearly states that “[w]ar is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics” 
(34), he also contends that the political – specifically understood in terms of the friend/enemy 
distinction – depends on the ever-present possibility of war.   Schmitt goes as far as to contend 
that “[a] world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely pacified globe, 
would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without 
politics.” (35) Since the political is only to be understood in terms of oppositional collectivities, 
the practice of politics, according to Schmitt, occurs almost entirely between states.6   
 
6 While Schmitt certainly envisioned politics as occurring between nation-states, in theory his conceptualization of 
‘the political’ necessitates only war between collectivities or between different demos. It is certainly plausible, as 
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Finally, the third conceptual implication inherited from Schmitt is perhaps his most well-
known theoretical contribution to political theory, and also the only one that Mouffe explicitly 
addresses.  For Schmitt, in open hostility to liberal conceptions of plurality, any stable political 
order absolutely depends on a homogeneous ‘people’ as demos. While the external category of 
the ‘enemy’ is constituted through political will, the ‘friend’ category is only possible given a 
homogenous demos. For Schmitt, then, liberal pluralism represents nothing less than a 
fundamental attack on the stability of political collectivities.   Mouffe acknowledges this third 
inheritance, but seeks to shift the trajectory of its conclusions, choosing to:  
[…] refuse Schmitt’s dilemma, while acknowledging his argument for the need of some form of 
‘homogeneity’ in a democracy.  The problem we have to face becomes, then, how to imagine in a 
different way what Schmitt refers to as ‘homogeneity’ but that – in order to stress the differences 
with his conception – I propose to call, rather, ‘commonality’; how to envisage a form of 
commonality strong enough to institute a ‘demos’ but nevertheless compatible with certain forms 
of pluralism: religious, moral and cultural pluralism, as well as a pluralism of political parties. 
(Mouffe, 1998: 55) 
  
This move allows Mouffe to propose a direction for radical democracy that follows Schmitt’s 
core conceptualization of the political, while rejecting its third implication/claim – that a 
functional demos must be ethnically, religiously, and ultimately ‘culturally’ homogeneous. 
However, I contend that her work remains subject to the two prior implications: that politics 
occurs between ‘fighting collectivities’ (sovereign states or nations built around a ‘people’ for 
Schmitt), and that ‘the political’ is ontologically distinct from ‘the social.’ 
By contrast to her Schmitt-inspired account of the political, Mouffe attempts no similar 
conception of the social.  Instead of positing a parallel conception of the social in terms of some 
core antithetical distinction upon which it relies, Mouffe describes the social in terms of 
sedimented practices that conceal taken-for-granted originary acts of its own political 
 
with the Nazi treatment of Jews and other minorities, to construct an enemy people within the state, yet such a 
construction, for Schmitt, would ultimately rest on the understanding of those collectivities as other ‘peoples’ 
illegitimately present within a sovereign state. 
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constitution (Mouffe, 2005a: 17). Whereas the political (in a hegemonic sense) involves “the 
visibility of acts of social institution” (17), the social is presented as a) the inert consequences of 
past political struggles, and b) a process through which the outcomes of such struggles are 
obscured into doxa. While clearly built on the far more complex conception of society as a 
constant incomplete and incompletable contest of discursive articulations, it is, I contend, also a 
problematically shallow conception of the social.  Agree as one might that every society “is the 
product of a series of practices attempting to establish order in a context of contingency” (17), or 
that the hegemonic character of every social order needs be recognized, it does not necessarily 
follow that the social is a purely dependent variable simultaneously determined by and obscuring 
past political struggles.  Nor, I contend, does one need to accept the implication that all 
meaningful conflict with regards to competition for the partial hegemonic dominance of a 
particular discursive articulation is purely ‘political’ in nature. 
 It is with these conceptions of the political and the social that Mouffe theorizes radical 
democracy beyond hegemony.  Just as the appropriation of Schmitt's concept of the political lies 
at the heart of Mouffe's critique of the mainstream of democratic theory, her call for its 
transfiguration rests at the centre of her own normative project.  In order to move beyond late 
modern capitalist liberal democracy, towards what she describes as a radically pluralistic politics 
of partial hegemonies, the core antagonistic character of the political must be changed. The 
enemy of antagonistic politics must be transformed into the adversary of agonistic politics. This 
proposed transfiguration of the core antithetical distinction rendered by, and constitutive of, the 
political represents simultaneously one of the most interesting and ambitious elements of 




(Re)Turning to the Social – Challenges and Opportunities 
 
Despite the problematic weight that Mouffe grants to the political vis-à-vis the social, I 
want to argue that both agonal democratic theory broadly, and Mouffe’s contributions 
specifically, can make substantial contributions to a critical sociology interested in democracy, 
inclusivity, and justice.  Indeed, perspectives that call into question the character and quality of 
conflict in democratic political orders can be considered particularly fruitful at a time when “in 
style, as well as substance, the whole idea of political debate in North America is getting 
polarized — a forum with no middle ground.” (Delacourt, 2012) That said, the limitations of a 
purely political articulation of agonal democracy are considerable.  Having reduced the social to 
a mere sediment reflecting and obscuring past political struggles, Mouffe is left to articulate the 
notion of an ethos of productive contest in purely political terms. Couched in this way, the 
pivotal transformation from the enemy to the adversary appears to rest solely on a relatively thin 
concept of legitimacy. Whereas the challenges stemming from the enemy are considered 
inherently destructive and dangerous, those from the adversary are seen as legitimate and 
necessary.  The implied shift is from the goal of annihilation to that of overcoming. The enemy, 
outside of, and dangerous to, the unity of the demos, must be destroyed; the adversary, 
understood as part of a heterogeneous demos, need only be contested and potentially overcome.  
To put this another way, while the enemy is a homogenous representation of opposition to the 
demos, the adversary is more of a hybrid figure.  The adversary is simultaneously a genuine 
opponent and a legitimate participant – a notion we shall revisit later on.   
This simultaneous call to think beyond conventional pluralism and re-imagine the very 
nature of the political in terms of productive legitimated contest lies at the heart of all critically-
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oriented agonal democratic theory. That said, articulated in purely political terms, the 
transformative potential of the ideal of political agon appears problematically shallow. While the 
normative aspirations supporting such a shift in political ethos are clear enough, the processes by 
which this transfiguration might be possible are not well explored.  Certainly, the aim of a more 
inclusive democratic order presents a degree of incentive in and of itself, but the underlying 
conditions of possibility remain, in both Mouffe’s work specifically and agonal theory more 
broadly, systematically under-theorized.   
It is, I contend, in the realm of the social that one can explore these underlying conditions 
of possibility, and consequently, it is the failure to take the social seriously that hinders the 
contemporary field of agonal democratic theory. That said, agonal democratic theory does 
provide a range of interesting insights into the nature of antagonistic and agonistic tensions 
within the social body, even if it theorizes them as purely political constructs.  The foundational 
distinctions between productive and destructive conflict, enemies and adversaries, and 
legitimated opposition as opposed to required ‘consensus’ that agonal theorists draw upon 
simultaneously offer fresh perspectives on, and resonate with, some of the core questions of 
sociology.  A fuller account of agonal democracy, one that considers both its explicit political 
expression and its implicit social foundations, has much to offer critically oriented sociological 
and political theorists alike.  With this in mind, chapters 2 and 3 of this work consider a selection 
of classical sociological perspective, both canonical and more marginal, in order to draw forth 
alternative conceptualizations of society, conflict, and ‘the social’ which are both complimentary 
and supplementary to those deployed by Mouffe.  Armed with creative adaptations and selective 
insights offered in these classical sociological texts, I return to agonal democratic theory broadly, 
Mouffe’s vision thereof specifically, and to the question with which we began: what are the 
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underlying social conditions of possibility for a radically emancipatory democratic order 













































Chapter 2  
 







To fully consider the underlying conditions of possibility for a democratic ethos premised 
on a (re)turn to an ideal of political agon, one must, I contend, understand and consider ‘the 
social’ alongside ‘the political.’    While agonal democratic theorists offer a range of interesting 
insights into the nature of antagonistic and agonistic tensions within the social body, these 
conceptions are predominantly explored in terms of ‘purely political’ constructs.  As noted at the 
end of Chapter 1, the foundational distinctions deployed by agonal theorists - between productive 
and destructive conflict, enemies and adversaries, and legitimated opposition as opposed to 
required ‘consensus’ - simultaneously offer fresh perspectives on, and resonate with, some of the 
core questions within the field of sociology.  However, agonal theorists generally, and Chantal 
Mouffe specifically, have, for the most part, abandoned any serious consideration of ‘the social’ 
as a distinct element of their political theories.  For Mouffe, this is very much grounded in a need 
to move beyond the constraints of Marxism.  Yet while Marx may be considered one of the 
founding fathers of contemporary sociology, his conceptions of society and ‘the social’ are far 
from monolithic. Indeed, Marx occupies a place in the classical canon of sociology alongside a 
very different ‘founding father’ – Max Weber.  Considering this alternate ‘pillar’ of classical 
sociological thinking, this chapter begins to explore how one might expand and nuance Mouffe’s 
account of ‘the political’ in order to (re)open a conceptual space in which to offer a more robust 
conception of ‘the social’ compatible with, and even sympathetic to, a so-called ‘purely political’ 
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account of agonal democracy.    
That said, in exploring the classical sociological insights of Max Weber, one begins with 
the complex task of deciding 'which' Weber to engage with.   As with many, so-called, canonical 
figures, Weber's various contributions and their interpretations vary both by time period and 
author.  Somewhat more unique however, is the fact that unlike other canonical figures such as 
Emile Durkheim or Karl Marx, many of the ‘unifying’ elements of Weber’s work were 
assembled posthumously. As a Weberian scholar, and a scholar of Weberians, Lawrence Scaff 
writes at the onset of his book on Weber’s intellectual legacy: 
The narrative of the emergence of Weberian concepts, analysis, or ‘theory’ is unusual and 
contested. As an historical artifact, the Weberian imprimatur is only contingently related to a 
clearly identifiable body of leading ideas or principles presented systematically by Max Weber in 
his own work and in his lifetime. No clearly demarcated Weberian school of thought has existed 
over time, as it has for Marx, Durkheim, or Freud. Weber certainly had a ‘circle’ of colleagues, 
acquaintances, friends, and partners in discussion, but he never intended to found a school of 
thought. (Scaff, 2014: 1) 
 
This is, of course, by no means to minimize the scope or intensity of Weber’s impact on the 
modern social sciences.  Weber’s legacy stretches across the field in powerful and disparate 
ways.  From friends and associates like Karl Jaspers or Karl Loewenstein, to later explicit 
scholars of his work such as Talcott Parsons, C. Wright Mills, Reinhard Bendix, or Jürgen 
Habermas, to other very different theorists and scholars who critically engaged with, if only in 
passing, some of Weber’s core ideas, including Herbert Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, or Michel 
Foucault, Weber’s influence on the contemporary study of society is difficult to overstate. (2-3) 
Yet despite the diverse and eclectic understandings and applications of Weber’s work, 
some generalizations can be observed. Most notably for the purposes of this work, are the 
divergent ways in which the clear tension between Weber’s sociological and political views, 
writings, and implied values have been acknowledged, taken up, or ignored by later scholars.  In 
this regard we can take note of two very different drives within Weber’s work – what Wolfgang 
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Schluchter has described as a dialectic of dedication and detachment. (Schluchter, 1996: 8) It is, 
in many ways, a tension most clearly articulated between Weber’s two famous orations: Science 
as a Vocation and Politics as a Vocation. These two speeches, carefully added to the corpus of 
Weber’s written work posthumously through the efforts of Marianne Weber, represent, according 
to Schluchter, not simply additions to Weber’s scholarly treatises or academic lectures, but rather 
Weber’s core ‘philosophical’ texts. As Schluchter posits, the two speeches: 
…pursue a different goal. They are “philosophical” texts, intended to lead the listeners (and later, 
the readers) to recognize facts and to encourage self-reflection, to win them over for responsible 
efforts on behalf of a realistic cause… …they were and are speeches about political and human 
self-determination under the conditions of modern Western culture. (8-9)   
   
In this way, Schluchter concludes, Weber can be understood not only to have contributed to 
sociology and to politics, but also to political theory/philosophy.  This is a Weber fraught with 
tensions, but not reducible to a simple contradiction between the detached, restrained social 
scientist and the passionate, though unsuccessful, political statesman.  
Drawing on Schluchter’s careful and novel reading of Weber's sociological and 
philosophical contributions to modern understandings of politics and society, this chapter aims to 
introduce a new, explicitly sociological, conceptual vocabulary into the ‘purely political’ 
articulation of political agon, as well as simultaneously considering the ways in which Weber's 
political philosophy might compliment or challenge the foundational assumptions Mouffe adapts 
and adopts from the work of Carl Schmitt. To this end this chapter is organized in terms of four 
interrelated tasks.  First, we begin with a brief intellectual portrait of Weber as well as his initial 
introductions to English audiences.  In this first section, the chapter presents a short contextual 
starting point from which to engage with this eminent figure’s diverse contributions, and some of 
the influential interpretations is work has inspired.  Second, the chapter considers Weber's 
overarching views on 'the social' and the content and character of conflict within society.  Here 
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the task is to consider the conceptual landscape on which Weber's sociology is built, and explore 
the foundations and core assumptions vis a vis conflict within the social body. With an eye to 
potentially deploying some of these core conceptualizations into a consideration of agonal 
democracy, this section also explicitly takes up Weber's ruminations on the nature of politics and 
'the political.' Considering the ways in which Weber differentiates political action and social 
action, the section ends with the question of how Weber defines, explicitly or implicitly, the 
'essence' of the political as a field of human thought and endeavour.  Third, the chapter explores 
the account of Weber as political philosopher, unpacking and considering Weber’s typology of 
ethical orientations to both social and political action as posited by Schluchter.  Here Weber's 
famous ideal types of Wertrationalitat  (value rational)  and  Zweckrationalitat (instrumental 
rational) social action are considered vis a vis his, slightly less famous, distinctions between 
ethical orientations to politics: Gesinnungsethik (ethic of conviction) and Verantwortungsethik 
(ethic of responsibility). Finally, drawing on the various new conceptual vocabularies adapted 
from Weber, the chapter concludes by comparing and contrasting these underlying assumptions 
about and orientations toward society, politics and conflict with the foundational assumptions 
Mouffe adapts and adopts from Carl Schmitt.  The chapter concludes by considering where 
Weber's insights open new conceptual spaces for a consideration of the social conditions of 
possibility necessary for a radical democracy premised on an ethos of political agon, and, where 








Max Weber was born April 21st 1864, in Erfurt, part of what was not yet a unified 
Germany. Eldest of eight brothers and sisters7, Max was raised as the first son and heir in the 
Weber household - a position which, according to the well-known biography penned by his wife 
Marianne following his death, instilled in him a “profound sense of the privilege of 
‘primogeniture,’ which soon gave him the feeling of responsibility for his youngest brothers and 
sisters.” (Weber, 2003: 31) It is, of course, atypical to dwell on the childhood or more generally 
‘mundane biographic details’ of the theorists, great or small, with whose ideas we engage.  Yet, 
in the case of Weber, so much of whose character and body of thought has was (re)constructed 
after his death, certain core details have become integral parts of the various intellectual portraits 
of this canonical figure in the social sciences.  Most notable of these biographical vignettes are 
Weber’s childhood illness, his brief military service in his youth, and his short but distinguished 
time of as a university lecturer.  This latter point often being discussed in terms of the deep sense 
of anxiety and difficulty he was reported to have felt with regard to academic lecturing,  
juxtaposed to the verve and passion with which he was said to have delivered his more politically 
oriented speeches. Without a need for an in-depth exploration, a few comments on these central, 
and oft repeated, biographical elements in the dominant ‘image’ of Weber as a founding of father 
of contemporary sociology are of use.  
Weber’s famous childhood illness, often referenced with regards to his later issues with 
anxiety and general health challenges, was indeed a serious event.  As a young child, Weber 
became ill with unilateral meningitis, “…which left him susceptible to cramps and congestion for 
 
7 As detailed in Marianne Weber’s comprehensive, if not at times strange, biography of her husband, Max Weber 
was proceeded by seven brothers and sisters.  Of Helen Weber’s eight children, only six grew to maturity.  Two of 
Weber’s sisters died – one soon after the birth, and the other in early childhood. (Weber, 2003: 31) 
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years.” (32) The illness, which, for the time, the young Weber was fortunate to survive, had long 
lasting impacts on his health. Following the illness, descriptions of Weber as a child describe him 
as both weak and sheltered, with a shadow cast over the eldest son in the Weber household in 
terms of a constant “danger of dying or of becoming an imbecile.” (32)  Also noted, though 
perhaps less often, is Marianne Weber’s account of the physical consequences of the illness, 
which she described in strangely detailed terms: 
During his illness, little Max’s head grew conspicuously, while his limbs remained girlishly small. 
The doctor predicted either hydrocephalus or room for a great many things under the arching 
cranium. Max suffered all kinds of nervous anxieties as an aftereffect of the disease. (33) 
    
While the anecdote is likely true, given Marianne Weber’s tremendous attention to detail 
throughout the famous biography, one can still see the naissant beginnings of an origin story. 
Whether by design, happenstance, or an honest mix of the two, the abnormally intellectual child, 
frail but brilliant often persists as part of the intellectual portrait of the later Weber. 
In ways that both parallel how much of Weber’s intellectual legacy would come to be 
characterized, as well as, for that matter, how the personalities of his parents are described by 
Marianne, the image of the frail, reserved, intellectual child Weber is juxtaposed to the corpulent 
and gregarious young man Weber in his early university and military experiences.  Here 
Marianne Weber describes a striking transformation, from a timid boy of striking intellect to 
boisterous youth: 
In his third semester he fought the customary duels and received the ribbon. He now indulged 
wholeheartedly in the gaiety of student life, became a jolly fellow, and soon distinguished himself 
by his outstanding capacity for alcohol. This was of no small significance in those days, because 
it was part of a brother’s education for manhood that he should be able to pour in the greatest 
amount of alcohol without loosing his self-control. Moreover, the food, which got worse every 
week as the semester wore on, forced people to drink more beer. This way of life soon completely 
changed Weber’s physical bearing, and the desire with which he had come to university was 
fulfilled. The increase in his physical girth was even more striking than the expansion of his 
intellect: the lanky youth became broad and strong, and he inclined toward corpulence. (69) 
 
Of his military training, his wife writes mostly of his distaste for both the monotony and intensity 
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of the exercises he was forced to endure. Again, in ways that haunt the scholar’s later work, 
Weber is noted to have disliked most of all that element of his early (basic) military training “the 
tremendous waste of time that is used to turn thinking beings into machines that react with 
automatic precision upon command.” (72) That said, once more presented in nearly dialectic 
tension, Marianne Weber also points out that, by the end of his officer training, Weber none the 
less was left with a “a great admiration for the ‘machine’ as well as a martial and patriotic 
mentality.” (78) 
 The third piece of biographical detail often referenced in the mainstream understanding 
of Weber the sociologist is the relatively short and difficult time he spent lecturing in the 
university proper. In total, Weber spent only six and half years in university professorships, with 
few students or followers. (Scaff, 2014: 1) Most of these were in the early part of his career, 
though he would return to lecturing near the end of his life, and those close to him worried 
actively about the strain that academic duties put on the ambitious scholar.  At this point recently 
married, his wife described her husband’s first foray into professional intellectual work with 
clear concern.   
Was it really absolutely necessary for him to overload himself with work? His teaching 
assignments – about nineteen hours of lectures and seminars – were enough of a strain by 
themselves, especially since the young professor, who was replacing his famous teacher, was 
immediately obliged to take part in the civil service examination for jurists. And in addition there 
were so many self-imposed tasks. Hardly one was completed when his restless intellect took hold 
of a new one. (Weber, 2003: 195) 
 
Of course, the strain was not a result of work ethic alone.  Weber’s approach to teaching was 
fundamentally different than that of the majority of his contemporary colleagues.  In line with his 
famous (later) speech on Science as a Vocation, Weber’s philosophical approach to the 
appropriate role of the contemporary university broke with tradition.  
Almost alone among German academics of his time, Weber believed that the German universities 
of the early twentieth century had to abandon the traditional ideal of personal Bildung [self 
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cultivation] and confine themselves to conveying specialized knowledge to future professionals 
and officials. While his colleagues agonized about the need to preserve or to recover the old link 
between Wissenschaft [pursuit of knowledge], Bildung, and Weltanschauung [world view], to 
derive morally and socially profitable insights from learning by means of “synthesis” or the 
“viewing” of “essential” meaning, Weber opted for a deliberately modest view of Wissenschaft. 
He repudiated the neo-humanist ideal of “cultivation” as self-perfection and focused exclusively 
upon the transmission of expert knowledge and the exercise in logical analysis. Indeed, he took a 
position quite similar to that of his French colleague Emile Durkheim, who scoffed at the yen to 
turn the isolated individual into a self-sufficient work of art by means of “general culture” 
(culture generale). (Ringer, 2004: 225-226) 
 
Weber’s struggles to live up to his own extremely high standards of academic professionalism, 
alongside, because of, or perhaps contributing to, long struggles with anxiety and depression led 
him to leave the university setting both in 1899 – Weber spent a brief period in a sanitarium in 
1900 – and again in 1903.  Weber would not return to an official lecturing role until 1919, a year 
before his death.   
 This brings us to the final piece of biographical detail relevant to our exploration of 
Weber, perhaps the most important for my purposes: Weber’s lifelong political involvements. 
Alongside his famous academic analysis of socio-political concepts like leadership, authority, 
law and bureaucracy; Weber was engaged in many of the great political debates of his day. He 
wrote and spoke on early issues relating to the industrialization of agriculture in Germany, the 
events leading up to, during, and following the First World War, the Russian Revolution, and the 
need for significant reform of the German parliamentary system. As Marianne Weber observed,  
“Weber lived in constant political excitement and could not bear concentrating exclusively on 
scholarly work.” (Weber, 2003: 583) It is also important to acknowledge a certain similarity 
between some of the debates surrounding Weber’s political views and those surrounding 
Schmitt’s work discussed in chapter 1.  Not unlike Schmitt, some scholars have suggested that 
Weber’s clear nationalist political leanings throughout his lifetime, and his periodic attacks on 
the viability of Germany’s democratic structure, speak to political views that might compromise 
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the validity or usefulness of his intellectual contributions.8 That said, it is even more important to 
underscore the fundamental difference between these two discussions.  Whereas Schmitt lived 
through, joined, and actively supported the Nazi regime, Weber’s extensive political 
interventions predated, though perhaps both foresaw and misdiagnosed, the potential rise of the 
National Socialist Party.  Still, Weber’s work as an amateur politician, informed citizen, or 
perhaps what we might call today ‘political activist,’ did, especially in his early American 
reception, give many serious cause for concern. Weber was, by all accounts, politically engaged 
and active for most of his adult life.  While his views changed and evolved with the times, he 
remained throughout his life a German nationalist. Having said that, even a summary review of 
his public positions is sufficient to alleviate much of the concern that surrounded his initial post-
WWII reception outside of Germany.  
Weber’s public participation and political commentary began soon after he began his 
academic career in 1892. (Ringer, 2004: 41) He became involved in one of the large debates of 
the time, which revolved around commercialization of agricultural sectors in East Elbian 
Germany, and the changing roles of  workers, landowner and migrant labourers in the region.  
While the specifics of his political interventions here are not necessarily relevant, this early issue 
offered a young Weber the opportunity to begin to articulate the core of his political position. 
Presenting at a meeting of the Protestant Social Congress in 1894, one of the first articulations of 
Weber’s core political thought can be found in part of a dissenting speech he gave which took on 
themes presented in the opening address of the session.  Specifically Weber said: 
In the welcoming address of pastor Naumann yesterday, we heard an infinite yearning for human 
 
8 For the most part, any serious attacks on Weber on the basis of ‘proto-fascist’ elements of his political 
commentaries are historical artifacts. Most of the real concern regarding Weber’s political orientations came to the 
fore in the years following the Second World War – specifically in the context of his introduction to English 
speaking academics in the United States.  That said, elements of these concerns, and how they were dealt with 
remain part of the Weberian legacy to this day.  
68 
 
happiness, which surely moved us all. But precisely from our pessimistic standpoint… I believe 
we must renounce the idea of fostering… happiness by means of… social legislation. We want 
something else… That which seems to us of value in human beings, autonomy, the profound 
drive upward, toward the intellectual and moral goods of mankind, that is what we want to… 
support even… in its most primitive form. (45)   
 
This early articulation, which Weber would both repeat (though in some ways also refute) in his 
later political and academic writings, is notable in its contradistinction to his stance against 
Bildung as a proper aim of the modern University. Weber explicitly rejected a utilitarian 
objective for public policy and political decision making, a position he reiterated a year later in 
his Freiburg Inaugural Address in 1895: 
The question that moves us when we think beyond the grave of our own generation is not whether 
the human beings of the future will feel well, but what sort of human beings they will be… Not 
well-being but the qualities… that make up human greatness and nobility of our nature are what 
we want to breed into human beings. (48)    
 
This later excerpt casts Weber’s stance against utilitarianism as a sound political ethos in slightly 
darker terms, not least of which because it is difficult to read, with the full hindsight of history at 
our disposal, and not glimpse parallels with the genocidal rhetoric that would appear just three 
decades later.   
That having been said, it is important to also recognize that many of such imagined 
parallels would have had something to do with the very strong influence of Nietzsche’s writings 
in Germany at the time – a pervasive conceptual vocabulary widely known in intellectual circles 
of the day, and that would later be misappropriated and used by the Nazis.   More so, as Fritz 
Ringer points out in his intellectual portrait of Weber, the above excerpt should not be reduced to 
a ‘cold’ argument for what Weber would later describe as power-politics.  As Ringer contends: 
Weber’s inaugural address should not be read only as an expression of his commitment to power 
politics or to nationalism. For he also identified the ultimate aims of social policy with “human 
greatness,” the aspiration to “freedom,” and the desire to share in the “intellectual and cultural 
goods of mankind.” His purpose was not only to exclude charitable grounds to pursue human 
well-being, but even more urgently to deny that social policy could be based on such intra-
economic norms as “productivity,” or upon such implicit aims as the preservation of rural values 




What is particularly interesting, in the context of putting some of Weber’s core ideas in 
conversation with contemporary theories of agonal democracy, is the way in which Ringer 
describes what he calls Weber’s ‘instinctive liberalism.’ (57) According to Ringer, Weber not 
only clearly had ‘humanist’ ambitions for effective political leadership, he fundamentally 
embraced some of the core principles of liberalism.   Specifically, and in direct contrast to 
Schmitt’s concerns regarding pluralism, Ringer contends that Weber fundamentally accepted and 
embraced difference within a polity.  As he explains: 
I mean to point out that his [Weber’s] cultural individualism, which echoes Wilhelm von Humbolt 
and is recaptured in John Stuart Mill’s ideal of an open intellectual community. In such a 
community, radical differences among a plurality of conflicting beliefs and ways of life are 
preconditions of intellectual progress. The model suits not only Weber’s insistence upon the 
toleration of heterodoxy, but also his vision of economics as a “human science” that tries to affect 
the qualities of future populations, rather than securing their welfare. Weber admired autonomous 
individuals who act upon carefully considered principles. He insisted that intellectuals must be 
capable of swimming against the tide of established opinion, and he despised those whose pliable 
natures could adjust to almost anything in their environment that would help them succeed. (57 – 
emphasis added) 
 
Weber’s political interventions, of course, evolved over his life and alongside his academic 
explorations.  While he undoubtedly remained a German nationalist, and, like many of the time, 
supported political reforms which ultimately were leveraged by the Nationalist Socialist Party, 
his commentary remained grounded in a strong commitment to human rights (Grundrechte) and 
the need to check the rise of technical bureaucrats and experts, who he described as technicians, 
from de facto running the country. His later public columns near the end of his life offered 
incisive critiques of the German political system as it then stood.  Set against the backdrop of his 
academic work surrounding the rise of bureaucracy in modern societies, Weber argued that there 
“…were no responsible political leaders, [and] no one to restrain administrative rule by the 
bureaucracy.” (65) 
All this having been said, at the time of Weber’s proliferation to American (English) 
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audiences, truly beginning in the 1950s, Weber’s political views and commentaries were 
carefully disassociated or censured from his academic work.  Even now, with Weber’s place in 
the western canon of the social sciences long since secured, the distinction between Weber the 
rigorous and non-partisan social scientist and Weber the excited/excitable life-long amateur 
political player who presented explicitly normative visions of politics and the political, has 
remained, for the most part, conspicuously intact.  This distinction, and the ways it may have 
helped shaped the dominant understandings and applications of Weberian thought, will both be 
revisited and, to some extent, challenged further below.     
 
 
On the Weberian ‘Legacy’ 
 
 
 While the proliferation of Weber’s writing and thought began, in earnest, in the mid 
1950s, many of his insights were initially brought to American academia with the wave of 
German scholars escaping Nazis Germany. As Lawrence Scaff observes: 
The recognition of Weber’s work and the growth of interest in some of his key concepts, such as 
‘charisma’ and ‘bureaucracy’, was significantly affected by the emigration of scholars and 
intellectuals from Germany after 1933: distinguished scholars like Karl Mannheim and Friedrich 
von Hayek at the London School of Economics, Franz Neumann and Paul Lazarsfeld at Columbia 
University in New York, and of course the many faculty concentrated at the New School for 
Social Research in New York. In the United States five universities with prestigious and 
influential graduate programs became crucial in the 1930s for the development and propagation 





More broadly, the 1930s brought a wave of ‘Émigré’ intellectuals, many of whom had been 
acquainted with Weber personally or professionally.  Notable examples include Alexander von 
Schelting – on whom Talcott Parsons depended on for guidance in his early reading of Weber, as 
well as Hans Gerth – who worked with the likes of Mannheim, Adorno, and later C. Wright 
Mills. Indeed, Gerth’s work with Mills is understood to have been deeply influential, and 
contributed both to Mills’ widely accessible From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology in 1946, as 
well as Mills’ use of Weberian concepts in White Collar and The Power Elite, in 1951 and 1956 
respectively. (15)  
 Notwithstanding the gradual introduction of Weber’s concepts to English (American) 
intellectual audiences, the real proliferation of Weber’s work – understood as a cohesive corpus – 
did not truly begin until 1950s. While Weber’s core concepts had been discussed and even 
influential among a subset of important American academics for nearly three decades, “…by 
1960 in the Anglophone world a substantial body of Weber’s writings was widely and 
inexpensively available to scholars, teachers, students, and the general public” (17)  It was at this 
time that two very different Weberian scholars rose to prominence, bringing with them two very 
different interpretations of Weber:  Talcott Parsons and Reinhard Bendix. 
 It is difficult to overstate the incredible influence that Talcott Parsons played on the early 
(mass) reception of Weber to American (anglophone) audiences as translator, teacher, and 
theorist. Parson’s The Social System, published in 1951, was very well received, and made great 
strides toward “the creation of a ‘Weber-Parsons tradition of social theory,’ which gradually 
‘assimilated’ Weber’s diverse writings on religion, capitalism and Western rationalism…” 
(Caldwell, 2016: 197) Of course today, Parsons’ role in the Weberian legacy has been reduced to 
something between a cautionary tale and the figure of the defeated ‘villain.’  Parsons reading of 
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Weber, what one could call Parsons’ Weber, though initially well received and very influential, 
was eventually rejected by many and resulted in a relentless ‘de-Parsoning’ of Weber. (197) 
Parsons’ efforts to understand and present Weber in the context of a unified theoretical 
perspective, in the ‘grand theory’ tradition, remain an influential moment in the development of a 
Weberian ‘legacy.’  As Lawrence Scaff describes: 
The ‘action frame of reference’ is the phrase Talcott Parsons used to describe his earliest efforts to 
appropriate Weber’s work for his own systematic general theory of action. Parsons’ interpretation 
of Weber actually unfolded in two distinct phases: first, the elaboration of a theory of social 
action that retained in modified form a Weberian commitment to the postulate of the subjective 
interpretation of action. This action theory was then followed by a radical turn toward general 
theory in the form of a full-blown structural-functional theory of the social system. (Scaff, 2014: 
77) 
 
The second part of Parsons’ work revolved around addressing what he saw as failing in Weber’s 
work.  Parsons, a believer in grand theory narratives, posited that while there were the 
foundations of a 'generalized theoretical system’ in Weber’s writings, Weber himself had failed to 
expand or explore such naissant possibilities.  For Parsons, it was a matter or moving the 
Weberian project forward, and illustrates a key debate regarding social theory more broadly. 
Specifically: 
Parsons’ critique of Weber and extension of his ideas reveals a fundamental disagreement about 
the nature of ‘theory’ in the human sciences, a sharp divergence in viewpoints that should be 
underscored. The reason to insist on this emphasis is that the disagreement runs like a red thread 
through the disputes of modern social theory, creating a kind of caesura with Weberians on either 
side of the divide: there are those like Weber immersed in the efforts to grasp the nature and 
meaning of cultural and historical configurations; versus those like Parsons focused primarily on 
the abstract analytic schema of general theory; or in a few instances, those like Anthony Giddens 
or in parts of his work even Jürgen Habermas who on occasion have tried to explore both sides of 
the divide and provide a bridge connecting them. (79) 
 
As is evident, of course, Scaff is not neutral in this matter.  Like most contemporary scholars, he 
presents as objective the fact that Weber himself was, and should be read as having been, on the 
side of ‘efforts to grasp nature and meanings of cultural and historical configurations’ as opposed 
to the construction of any generalized ‘grand’ theoretical narrative. While this divide is not 
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reducible to the distinction with which we are primarily interested – between Weber the 
‘objective’ social scientist and Weber the ‘normative’ political theorist – neither is it entirely 
distinct.  
 While not nearly as influential, another major figure involved at the same time in the 
mass popularization of Weber across Anglo-academe was Reinhard Bendix. Bendix’s 1960 Max 
Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, was one of the first significant challenges to Parsons’ Weber – 
presenting a characterization of Weberian thought far more focused on a thematic of historical 
sociology. It was, in many ways, a far less polemic rejection of Parsons than many contemporary 
challenges – to the point where it was not universally acknowledged as sufficiently ‘breaking’ 
with the Parsonian project.  While it certainly opposed Parsons’ functionalist account of Weber, it 
was also criticized for itself either presenting an exaggerated ‘instrumental’ Weber, or, on the 
other hand, overemphasizing a ‘softer’ cultural Weberianism.  Yet, As Raymond Caldwell posits 
regarding the contemporary value of re-reading Bendix: 
Bendix sought to provide a synthetic overview of Weber’s oeuvre as a whole, effectively 
rebalancing the earlier interpretive focus on The Protestant Ethic and the studies of the world 
religions by giving equal weight to the analytical treatise of Economy and Society, which includes 
studies of economics, religion, politics, power, law and the state. In doing so, Bendix challenged 
Talcott Parsons’ powerful alternative theoretical reading and helped extricate Weber’s historical 
sociology from the claims of functionalism and modernization theory. (Caldwell, 2016: 196)   
 
In this way, while a close re-reading of Bendix is not, for our present purposes, necessary, it is 
useful to acknowledge that “Bendix’s Weber” (201) offers one of the first (popularized)English 
language examples of work that aimed to free the ambivalence and complexity of Weber’s social 
and political analysis from Parsons’ totalizing adaptation.  Most interesting in terms of exploring 
and potentially introducing some of Weber’s conceptual language into contemporary theories of 
agonal democracy, is the emphasis Bendix put on Weber’s complex consideration of what we 
could describe as both ‘the social’ and ‘the political’ dimensions of his analysis.  Specifically: 
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…Bendix opened up Weber’s realistic and often disturbing analysis of the political dynamics of 
modernity. By analyzing ‘domination combined with administration’ and legitimacy as the legal 
enactment of domination, Bendix (1962) argued that Weber avoided any ‘idealization’ or utopian 
vision of modern society, of the state or the nation as realms in which social values, norms, moral 
standards no political ideals are in harmony, or are likely to be in the future. There can be no 
conflation of modern society with the nation or the state; for society is a precarious entity, and the 
nation and the state are rarely identical. Nor can ‘modern society’ as a normative ideal define the 
contingent outcomes of political modernity in Western or non-Western societies. In this way, 
Bendix replaced the Parsonian sociological problematic in which the political analysis of power 
and legitimacy cannot fully account for the enduring nature of social order, and, conversely, the 
sociological analysis of interests, ideas and values [that] cannot fully account for the enduring 
nature of politics and government. At the core of modern capitalist society is a marketplace 
dominated by conflicting instrumental interests that cannot be resolved. At the core of the modern 
nation and state is a form of legal domination founded on the ‘insolvable conflict between the 
formal and substantively rationality of law. (207)    
 
The invocation of concepts like ‘insolvable conflict’ and ‘unresolvable conflicting interests’ is, of 
course, particularly relevant to the task at hand.  Indeed, elements of this influential reading, no 
doubt echo in contemporary explorations which will revisit further below – specifically 
Wolfgang Schluchter’s consideration of Weber as political philosopher. 
 This all having been said, as this chapter moves to consider some of Weber’s core 
concepts and ideas, I do so while acknowledging the breadth and scope of diversity that exists 
amongst post-Parsons Weberians. At the same time, it is also important to note that decades of 
effort to ‘free Weber,’ both from Parsons and other instrumental adaptations, has largely been 
successful.  There is no dearth of access to Weber’s writings – political or sociological. With this 
in mind, the next section moves to present a number of Weber’s core concepts and ‘ideal types’ – 
with an emphasis on the ways he understood ‘society’ and social conflict – before proceeding to 
consider Schluchter’s interesting synthesis of Weber’s science and politics.   
  
 
On Society and Social Conflict 
 
At the heart of the various calls for a radical democracy founded on an ethos of political 
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agon, is the core ‘contingently ontological’ claim that it is neither possible nor desirable to 
eliminate genuine conflict from the realm of politics. This is, as discussed in chapter 1, true of 
this sub-genre of political theory broadly, and of Mouffe’s account specifically. As such, in 
considering alternative theoretical perspectives through which to (re)open a space for the 
meaningful consideration of ‘the social’ alongside a ‘purely political’ account of agonal 
democracy, the question of what is conflict, and how it operates within the social body is of 
central importance. 
Of course, the question of ‘what is conflict’ can be nearly existential in scope if left 
unrestricted. Thankfully, my task here is considerably narrower.  The task at hand is to consider, 
through some of Weber’s key conceptualizations, what in many cases he described in terms of 
ideal types, the overarching treatment of social and political conflict across Weber’s disparate 
works. This exploration is best begun with what Weber explicitly wrote on the topic.   Despite 
the fact that Weber considered various forms of social and political turmoil across both his works 
of political sociology and sociology of religion, he most clearly considered the core meaning of 
conflict in society once in particular.  In the first volume of his seminal work Economy and 
Society, Weber defines, and delineates between, the sociological terms: Kampf (conflict), 
struggle (including Konkurrenz or competition), and Auslese (selection). Specifically, Weber 
contends that: 
A social relationship will be referred to as “conflict” (Kampf) insofar as action is oriented 
intentionally to carrying out the actor’s own will against the resistance of the other party or 
parties. (Weber, 1978: 38) 
 
This definition of conflict is further clarified when one considers it in tandem with Weber’s 
broad understanding of power as the imposition of a person’s will on the behaviour of another.  
In this sense, conflict can be understood, even more succinctly, as the intersection of power and 
resistance. (Bendix, 1977: 290) Weber goes on to distinguish between various forms of such 
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conflict.  First, Weber notes that conflicts in which “actual physical violence is not employed” 
(Weber, 1978:38) are defined as peaceful conflicts. Yet the distinctions between violent and 
peaceful conflict are not always clear, as Weber explains: 
There are all manner of continuous transitions ranging from the bloody type of conflict which, 
setting aside all rules, aims at the destruction of the adversary, to the case of the battles of 
medieval chivalry, bound as they were to the strictest conventions, and to the strict regulation 
imposed on sport by the rules of the game. (38) 
 
In-as-much as peaceful conflicts are oriented towards opportunities and advantages desired by 
multiple parties, Weber defines these as Konkurrenz (competition). Like ‘conflict’ proper, Weber 
suggests that competition can vary from completely unregulated – for which he uses the example 
of the competition between suitors – to formally restricted and bound in rule and convention – 
like that found in economic sectors. 
In contrast to both broad Kampf (conflict) and specific Konkurrenz (competition), Weber 
brings a third type into play by defining the latent struggle for advantages and for survival as 
Auslese (selection). By selection Weber refers to the fact that, given sufficient time, struggles 
occurring on a large scale will lead to a ‘selection’ of those individuals with the qualities (social, 
biological or other) important to success. These processes of selection are, according to Weber, 
social when considering individuals within given lifetimes, and biological when considering 
survival of a species via hereditary inherited characteristics along longer time lines.9  (Weber, 
1978: 38)  
It is via the concept of Auslese that Weber grants the principled ‘necessity’ of conflict.  
While not all forms of selection need necessarily imply relations of conflict, Weber does contend 
 
9 Though certainly not to be conflated with Nietzsche's claim that life is, at its core, the drive towards overcoming, 
there remains none the less an interesting resonance between Weber's notion of selection and some of Nietzsche's 





…even on the utopian assumption that all competition were completely eliminated, conditions 
would still lead to a latent process of selection, biological or social, which would favour the types 
best adapted to the conditions, whether their relevant qualities were mainly determined by 
heredity or by environment.  On an empirical level the elimination of conflict cannot go beyond a 
point which leaves room for some social selection, and in principle a process of biological 
selection necessarily remains. (Weber, 1978: 39) 
 
Selection is, in this sense, Ewig (eternal) for Weber.   Taken together then, Kampf, Konkurrenz, 
and Auslese begin to provide the conceptual landscape for how Weber understands the power in 
social and political relations.  As Peter Breiner contends, there is an important sociological aspect 
to the nexus of between Kampf and Auslese: 
…[E]very social relation has the effect of selecting for one set of character types and against 
another. Without such selection there could be no social relations whether in the form of societal 
purposeful undertakings or communal reciprocity based on shared customs and sentiment. But 
beyond the fact that all social relations involve selectivity (Auslese), Weber claims, we have 
selection in every social relation in which conflict (Kampf) takes place, and as Weber defines the 
concept, conflict turns out to be identical with his definition of power (Macht): ‘Conflict [Kampf] 
is a social relation in so far as the action is oriented toward the intention of imposing one’s own 
will against the resistance of the partner’s, and peaceful struggle is designated as competition. 
And power ‘means every chance within a social relation to impose one’s will over resistance 
irrespective of what this chance depends on’. Therefore, every social conflict is at the same time a 
struggle for power.” (Breiner, 2004: 291) 
 
Conflict for Weber, at least in so far as it relates to selection, cannot be completely removed from 
human association.  Yet Auslese also holds interesting implications for Weber’s conception of 
political struggle, a consideration to which we will return below.    
In addition to the tripartite of concepts describing social and political struggle discussed 
above, Weber also considered the notion of struggle in terms of the prototypical question of 
‘class conflict’ – a set of considerations impossible to imagine outside of a thinly veiled dialogue 
with Marx’s own assertions on the topic. Class struggle, argues Weber, rests on the distorting 
assumption that a ‘class’ necessarily constituted a community.  While Weber concedes that 
communal action can be, and has been, taken on the basis of common economic interests, he is 
quick to warn against generalizing this possibility.  Weber argues that: 
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…men in the same class situation regularly react in mass actions to such tangible situations as 
economic ones in the direction of those interests that are most adequate to their average number is 
an important and after all simple fact for the understanding of historical events.  Above all, this 
fact must not lead to that kind of pseudo-scientific operation with the concept of ‘class’ and ‘class 
interests’ so frequently found these days, and which has found its most classic expression in the 
statement of a talented author, that the individual may be in error concerning his interests but that 
the ‘class’ is ‘infallible’ about its interests. (Weber, 1958: 184) 
 
In an attempt to contribute to and complicate Marx’s discussion of the struggle between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat, Weber conceptualized class alongside the complementary notions 
of status groups and parties. 
Class, contends Weber, is more rightly identified as class situation, and is wholly 
determined by economic situation.  Classes do not, insists Weber, represent communities in and 
of themselves; classes rather represent potential bases for communal action. (Weber, 1978:181) 
More specifically Weber suggests: 
We may speak of a ‘class’ when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal 
component of their life chances, in so far as (2) this component is represented exclusively by 
economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented 
under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets. (Weber, 1978:181) 
 
If then a class is the embodiment of economic situation, Weber argues that a status group is the 
embodiment of social situation.  Whereas the class distinction rests on property and income, the 
status distinction rests on various social markers of honour. 
In contrast to classes, status groups do normally also constitute communities. (Weber, 
1978:185) Unlike crude economic situation, with status comes a myriad of legally and socially 
protected rights.  Where such groups are able to evolve without interruption, Weber posits that 
status groups will become ‘closed castes.’ (Weber, 1978:188) Weber’s main point is to illustrate 
how social status can and does constitute an important variable in the social struggles between 
groups, yet he does continually concede that the various rights, privileges and status symbols of 
such groupings remain closely tied with property, opportunity, and income. 
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In distinction to both classes and status groups, Weber also postulates the party.  As 
Weber describes: 
Whereas the genuine place of the ‘classes’ is within the economic order, the place of ‘status 
groups’ is within the social order, that is, within the sphere of the distribution of ‘honour.’  From 
within these spheres, classes and status groups influence one another and they influence the legal 
order and are in turned influenced by it.  But ‘parties’ live in the house of ‘power.’  Their action is 
oriented toward the acquisition of social ‘power,’ that is to say, toward influencing a communal 
action no matter what its content may be. (Weber, 1978:194) 
 
Parties, as opposed to classes or status groups, argues Weber, are unique in so far as they are the 
vehicles for the exercise of power.  Whereas a class may act communally based on common 
interests, and a status group may more often do the same, only parties have the internal 
organization through which to manifest communal action towards shared – and usually explicitly 
discussed – common interest. 
While these distinctions certainly complicate Marx’s account of the final stages of 
historical class antagonisms present in the capitalist order, and give some context to Weber’s 
abstract conceptualizations of conflict, they do not speak to the social or political productivity of 
such conflicts.   Whereas Marx was quite explicit about the productive character of (at least 
material) conflicts under certain conditions, Weber is not as clear in his account. 
Armed with Weber’s concepts of Kampf, Konkurrenz, and Auslese, as well as a sketch of 
his differentiation from Marx via a vis ‘class struggle,’ this section concludes with a first 
consideration of Weber’s most explicit consideration of politics and the political: Politics as a 
Vocation.  As the title suggests, Politics as a Vocation speaks less to the content of politics 
proper, and more to the question of “…which personal qualities does it presuppose in anyone 
who devotes himself to it?” (Weber, 1978b: 212) That said, and as I will explore further via the 
work of Wolfgang Schluchter in the subsequent section, Weber presents a range of important 
concepts in his relatively short address.  
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According to Weber, the three chief qualities that one should possess for the practice of 
politics are: passion, a sense of responsibility, and judgment.  Weber elaborates on each of these 
qualities in turn. Passion, writes Weber, is not so important as is realistic passion.  As Weber 
explains: 
I mean realistic passion - a passionate commitment to a realistic cause, to the god or demon in 
whose domain it lies.  I do not mean ‘passion’ in the sense of that state of mind which my late 
friend Georg Simmel used to call ‘sterile excitement’ – a state which is characteristic of a certain 
kind of intellectual, especially of Russian intellectuals (though not perhaps all of them!), and 
which now plays such a large part amongst our own intellectuals in this carnival which is 
dignified with the proud name of a ‘revolution.’ (Weber, 1978b: 212)  
 
Passion alone, contends Weber, a politician does not make.  Even a realistic passion to a cause 
must, argues Weber, be tempered with the all-important sense of responsibility to the said cause, 
and the sound and careful judgment to be able to contemplate potential courses of action with an 
inner calm and composure.  Weber describes the use of good judgment in politics as the ability to 
detach from the emotional ties to causes, people and things.  Lack of detachment, argues Weber, 
condemns an actor to political impotence. (Weber, 1978b: 213) 
With this rough sketch of the qualities a politician should possess, Weber goes on to 
question under what ethic should politics proceed.  While we shall, through an exploration of 
Schluchter’s Weber, consider these ethics in the context of a proto-political-philosophy, here we 
will begin with their basic enunciation.  As politics is, according to Weber, the practice of power, 
power being the imposition of a person’s will on the behaviour of another and conflict being the 
social relations in which such imposition is resisted, politics for Weber can be understood as 
constituted through power and conflict.  It is in this context that it is useful to briefly return to the 
important concept of Auslese.  As noted above, selection for Weber plays a key role in both 
social and political relations.  In this way, one can start to identify the contours of a distinction, 
perhaps even a ‘contingently ontological’ one, between political and social conflict. Specifically, 
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in the context of Weber’s definition of power and the selection of and struggle for the means to 
exercise it: 
…politics becomes the struggle for the means to impose one’s will in a political community over 
the resistance of others. It therefore demands that individual political actors or groups engage in a 
constant and relentless struggle, whether they are seeking only to realize prestige for themselves 
or ultimate convictions. But, beyond this, the state and the political community are defined by the 
struggle over the means of power, not because politics is merely about power and not 
fundamental values but precisely the opposite. Weber insists that there is no value that has not 
been at one time or another the object of the state. It would follow, then, that there is no value that 
has not been the object of struggle for political power within and between states. So politics, as a 
struggle for power to capture the means belonging to the state, does not repel the pursuit of 
fundamental political commitments – as one might expect in a definition that focuses on means 
not ends – but rather becomes something of a vortex, pulling such commitments towards its 
centre. (Breiner, 2004: 295) 
 
It is in the context of this understanding of politics as irresolvable struggle, that Weber asks: 
under what political ethic should political conflicts be played out? Weber considers this question 
in terms of the opposing ethics of conviction (also translated as intention) and responsibility. 
While Weber concedes that neither ethic technically implies the opposite of the other, he does 
contend that there remains a firm antithesis between them.  As Weber clarifies: 
Not that an ethic of intention is the same as irresponsibility or an ethic of responsibility the same 
as indifference to intentions. Naturally, there is no question of either of these two things.  But 
there is a profound antithesis between actions governed by the ethics of intention, or to put it in 
religious language ‘The Christian acts rightly and leaves the outcome to God’, and actions 
governed by the ethics of responsibility, where one is answerable for the (foreseeable) 
consequences of one’s actions. (Weber, 1978b: 217) 
 
While clearly pregnant with both a practical secularism and another latent critique of a 
revolutionary idealist reading of Marx, Weber remains somewhat ambivalent around the ideal 
ethos for a vibrant political community.  As Weber warns: 
The man who is concerned for the welfare of his soul and the salvation of the souls of others does 
not seek these aims along the path of politics.  Politics has quite different goals, which can only 
be achieved by force.  The genius, or demon, of politics lives in a state of inner tension with the 
God of love, even with the Christian God as the Church depicts Him, and this tension may at any 
time erupt into irresolvable conflict. (Weber, 1978b: 223) 
 
In a portrait of politics that one might dare to call agonistic, Weber thus describes political 
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conflict in terms of a perpetual friction between morality and the practical pursuit of power, in 
which only the application of force can properly decide, if not resolve, its perennial tensions.  
 
On the Political (Again) – Weber as Political Philosopher 
 
 
Despite the pivotal importance politics and ‘the political’ played in Weber’s work and 
life, the mainstream construction of Weber as a founding father of modern sociology has, by and 
large, confined his explicitly political musings to the periphery of his legacy.  This is, as 
discussed earlier in the chapter, partially in line with the canonicalization and myth building of 
Weber - under which narrative the tension between Weber’s ‘passionate politics’ and ‘disciplined 
social science’ and between politics as a vocation and science as a vocation has been elevated to 
the status of near ideal type.  That said, although it is an element of the mainstream study of 
Weber which has, by and large, survived the ‘de-Parsonsing’ or ‘freeing’ of Weber, other 
contemporary scholars have more recently returned to Weber’s explicitly political musings as 
potentially of central importance to Weber’s intellectual contributions.  
Wolfgang Schluchter is one such scholar. Challenging much of the dominant framing of 
Weber’s work, Schluchter (re)considers both Weber’s seminal texts and several less well-known 
correspondences and writings to explore what he describes as an unrecognized political-
philosophical dimension in Weber. (Schluchter, 1996: 8) Of course, Schluchter admits, this is not 
the same as suggesting Weber was a political philosopher. Certainly, as a matter of historical 
record, Weber never presented himself as a philosopher, as Schluchter recounts: 
Even during the time in which he intensively took up the methodological question so of the social 
sciences and studied modern logicians, he repeatedly emphasized that he studied logic not for its 
own sake, but only to test the utility of the insights of modern logicians, especially Rickert, for 
solutions [to] the problems of his own discipline. He conceived of himself more as a patient who 
was conscious of his symptoms than as a physician who knew how to cure them… …He 
described the illness; he also named the remedies that had already failed or that, being mere 




Instead, what Schluchter offers is an account of Weber, his Weber, in which the often under-
considered political-philosophical dimensions are brought to the fore “…in addition to rational 
insight and rational conviction.” (45) Weber’s writings “…also give expression to a 
philosophical existence.” (45)  Making use of this account, we return to the distinction between 
gesinnungsethik (ethic of conviction or intention) and verantwortungsethik (ethic of 
responsibility) and explore Schluchter’s outline of a typology of ethics encompassing them both.  
 In some of his early analysis of gesinnungsethik and verantwortungsethik, Schluchter 
framed a preliminary typology in a way that highlighted the idea of progressive development 
over time. This, according to Schluchter, had the effect of over-emphasizing a temporal or 
historical development from ‘simple’ pre-ethical positions to more ‘complex’ ethics of 
conviction and responsibility.  (Schluchter, 1981: 62) Schluchter illustrated this first 
typology, in terms of three key distinguishing features of each ethical stance: basis of 
evaluation, object of evaluation, and the type of resulting conscience. So, for example, pre-
ethical evaluations (‘superstition’ or magic-based systems), according to this typology, or 
distinguishable by the fact that they take, as both the basis of their evaluation and the object 
of their evaluation, a conception of outside forces working in retribution against particular 
‘wrong’ actions.  This is a non-ethical system precisely because it does not produce a type of 
conscience, instead instilling a pragmatic regime of avoidance – for example, it is not a 
matter of conscience as to whether one lets one’s children play by the river unattended; one 
does not let children play unattended by the river lest an angry river spirit take them and 
drown them. In contrast, an ethic of conviction (gesinnungsethik) takes as its basis of 
evaluation the ethical principles being adhered to, and its object of evaluation the intentions 
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underlying those principles. As such, it produces a conscience which Schluchter describes as 
autonomous-rigid – an internalized conscience that defines right and wrong according to a 
rigid structure of whether principles are or are not adhered to. Children might or might not be 
allowed to play unattended by the river based on the principle being applied.  Were the 
principle that children should be allowed autonomy to grow and learn without direct 
supervision, then allowing them to play by the river unattended would be ethically justifiable 
in so far as it followed that principle. Schluchter illustrates this first attempt to lay out a 
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This early typology however, with its heavy reliance on Weber’s cross-cultural analysis and 
assumption of progressive developmental trajectories, was, according to Schluchter, not entirely 
accurate.  Indeed, Schluchter notes in his later work that this early view was partially tied to a 
tendency for an ethic of conviction to be used as a polemic foil against which a more ‘advanced’ 
ethic of responsibility can be positively contrasted.  Even Weber, argues Schluchter, occasionally 
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falls prey to this reduction: 
Admittedly, even Weber did not always resist the tendency to oversimplify the distinction for 
polemical purposes. Especially in those passages in “Politics as Vocation” where he took a 
political stance on the situation of Germany after the November Revolution of 1918, he tended – 
as Guenther Roth has pointed out – to “equate enmity to capitalism with the incapability to bear 
the ethical irrationality of the world” and to “force Christian pacifists and socialist 
revolutionaries… under the same rubric,” that of adherence to an ethic of conviction. The 
political devaluation that goes with this classification is obvious. (Schluchter, 1996: 49) 
 
This however, argues Schluchter, is not an accurate account of the distinctions between 
gesinnungsethik and verantwortungsethik.  He argues that Weber’s distinction between these two 
ethical positions needs to be understood in the context of his broader understanding of values and 
the practical limits of ethical positions. Especially in the context of politics, Schluchter argues 
that none of Weber’s ethical positions can be understood as offering “…unequivocal directives 
for solving practical problems.” (49). According to Schluchter: 
As soon as we take a closer look at Weber’s texts however, we immediately realize that matters 
can not be that simple, for he himself emphasized that the ethic of conviction must not be equated 
with irresponsibility nor the ethic of responsibility with mere realpolitik. A proper demarcation of 
the two ethics obviously rests on a specification of the kind of responsibility connected with them, 
that is, on the answer to the question to whom and for what one is responsible. (49) 
 
It is in this context that Schluchter raises, albeit somewhat briefly, the spectre of Weber’s own 
philosophical standpoint – a position Weber once described in terms of adherence to the idea of 
value collision. Diametrically opposed to any sort of crass relativism, Schluchter argues that 
Weber’s notion of value collision rests on the understanding that “…ethical values are not the 
only ones that carry claims of validity.” (49)  For Weber, not completely unlike Schmitt, different 
spheres of human endeavor and thought generate and acknowledge different systems of values, 
potentially valid in their own context. As Schluchter emphasizes: 
This is especially true for political problems, where ethical and cultural values often compete. In 
certain circumstances, cultural values can even be realized only by those who take ethical ‘guilt’ 
upon themselves. (49)    
 
Armed with this understanding, Schluchter contends that a proper understanding of the 
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distinctions between gesinnungsethik and verantwortungsethik can be developed by expanding 
and complicating the typology of ethics found across Weber’s political and religious sociological 
writings.  Correcting his earlier illustration, Schluchter posits a more nuanced typology (100) 
illustrated10 below: 
 




10 While the content of this typology is reproduced directly from Schluchter’s work, its visual representation has 
been modified for clarity. 
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As evident in this figure, there are four primary distinctions that structure this second attempt at a 
typology of Weberian ethics – technical vs. normative, conventional vs. moral, substantive vs. 
formal, and constitutive vs. regulative. Let us briefly consider each in turn.  
 The first distinction in the typology, which Schluchter draws from Weber’s extensive 
sociological study of religion, is between ethics, which are normative in character, and other 
‘doctrines of prudence’ which posit outside forces (spirits, magic, or pro-active divinities) as 
responsible for punishing specific transgressions – that is, which are technical in nature. As noted 
above, in this sense “…a magical ‘ethic’ is not an ethic in strict sense of the word. It lacks a clear 
distinction between a technical and a normative rule.” (70) Somewhat analogous to Weber’s 
distinctions between value rational and instrumental rational social action, Schluchter contends 
that ‘doctrines of prudence’ represent a pre-ethical orientation in so far was they rely on 
subjective (generally superstitious) means-end relationships. While seeking to minimize an 
overarching developmental perspective in this updated typology, Schluchter none the less 
concludes that: 
Regardless of how tortuous the actual historical paths were, one generalization can be made: Only 
with the transition from taboos to religious laws, from coercion and bribery to worship and service to 
the divine, from a fraternization guaranteed by taboos to one guaranteed by one’s “conscience,” was 
the equation of useful versus harmful with good versus evil rejected and faith in the power of demons 
and gods and in their mediators made relatively independent of their contributions to the (material) 
success of the faithful. (70) 
 
In this sense, the first ‘true’ distinction between types of ethics proper appears in the form of a 
contrast between conventional and moral ethics. In this second key distinction, the key contrast 
is between external and internal guarantees. Whereas conventional ethics operate by 
amalgamating moral and legal imperatives – what Schluchter describes as the ‘elevation of laws 
into sacred laws’ (71), moral ethics depend on “cultural prescriptions subdivided into the spheres 
of outer and inner freedom, legality, and morality.” (71) In so doing, the distinctions rendered 
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under moral ethical stances move away from obedience and open a space for the emergence of 
the concept of conviction – and therefore all ethics of principle.  
Expanding the category of ethics of principle, Schluchter proposes two sub-categories: ethics 
of dogmatic principle and reflexive principle. This brings us to the third key distinction 
underpinning Schluchter’s proposed typology - the contrast between substantive and formal 
ethics.  Based in part on what Schluchter describes as Weber’s “scattered remarks on Kant’s 
ethics” (73), this distinction relates to the level of abstraction of the ethical principles at play. 
While substantive ethics can be theoretically deduced and thus empirically grounded (76), formal 
ethical principles are those which can “…examine the rational character, and thus the general 
lawfulness, of maxims and rules that are held by individuals to be morally valid.” (76) Thus, 
while both ‘rational,’ the formal ethical principle attempts to moves beyond its culturally 
embedded character and implies a ‘sphere’ of abstracted moral positions “…in which the 
‘culturalism’ of this concrete morality is reflexively broken.” (78)   Here the distinction is 
understood in terms of ‘revealed or rationally deduced substantive norms’ and ‘universalizing 
principles.’ (77) Whereas ethics of dogmatic principle – including both a substantive ethic of 
responsibility and conviction – are based on “ …a sphere of concrete morality that still remains 
embedded in its specific social and cultural milieu…”(77), ethics of reflexive principle are 
conceptually built on a universalized principles, or internally consistent value axioms, which 
seek to step out of their historical and cultural contexts to be able to provide a basis for the 
consideration of actions or rules held by others. That said, this is not to suggest any degree of 
cultural relativism – a position Weber very explicitly rejected and reviled – but rather, as 
Schluchter argues, a level of awareness of historical and cultural contingency which renders 
mutable what might otherwise be immutable ethical convictions, and seeks more abstracted 
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principles upon which a range of more embedded positions can be judged or justified.  
The ideas of judgment (in the sense of criticism) and justification lead to the final core 
distinction in Schluchter’s posited typology: the contrast between constitutive and regulative 
ethics of reflexive principle. On the side of constitutive, there are cognitive formal ethics of 
responsibility and conviction, while on the side of regulative there are criticistic formal ethics of 
both responsibility and conviction.  This final distinction relates to the character and application 
of the universalized principles characteristic of formal ethical positions. Specifically, the 
distinction relates to the status of the universalized principle as either a principle of justification 
or a principle of critical examination.   As opposed to an ethical position which holds rationality 
or reason preeminent above all other considerations, Schluchter suggests that one of the unique 
features of Weber’s preferred criticistic formal ethics is the notion that rationally deduced 
universalistic principles, while important in being able to engage with and criticize other ethical 
positions, cannot be rigidly interpreted as a way to determine the full validity of opposing views. 
This is a particularly important distinction for a comprehensive understanding of Weber’s 
conceptions of gesinnungsethik and verantwortungsethik argues Schluchter, as “one of the 
indispensable elements of Weber’s position is the assertion that a convictional value can be 
criticized but not justified by reason.” (93)  
Taken together, Schluchter’s typology of ethics offers considerable additional depth to 
Weber’s contrast between the respective ethics of responsibility and conviction.   Both, following 
Schluchter’s typology, can be understood in terms of formal and criticistic ethics of principle – 
distinguishable from an array of other substantive and constitutive permutations.  In both cases, 
this serves to emphasize what we earlier noted as Weber’s commitment to value collision – a 
conception of values, in some ways compatible with a contemporary agonistic perspective, that 
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rejects the very possibility of the rational justification of one over another.   While the initial 
contrast between idealism and pragmatism remains, Schluchter’s careful contextualization of 
gesinnungsethik and verantwortungsethik within a broader typology of ethics allows us to 
observe other, equally if not more interesting, characteristics.  It also provides a far more 
nuanced understanding of Weber’s preferred ‘political ethic of responsibility’ as Schluchter 
succinctly summarizes: 
Whoever seeks to satisfy – without self-deception – the law according to which they engage in action 
must have knowledge of their own “ultimate interiorly ‘consistent’ value axioms” and of their 
consequences. This demands, using the term from Nietzsche, “intellectual honesty.” It also demands, 
however, the readiness for real dialogue, and indispensable preliminary stage to real confrontation. 
Weber repeatedly emphasizes that ideals can only prove themselves in struggle with other ideals or 
perish if lacking the strength to prevail. However, before they can pass the test in real life, ideals must 
survive the relativizing effects of value discussions. Only in this way can they be capable of arousing 
conviction (uberzeugungsfahig). Whereas in Kant, everyone can, in principle if not in fact, always 
take the general point of view, Weber’s approach necessarily demands a formal critique of conviction 
in the framework of a value discussion. The institution of such discussions is – in addition to a theory 
of personality – at the centre of his own standpoint in ethics. (92) 
  
Once again, this account of Weber suggests an orientation to ongoing conflict at the level of 
value judgements and ethics, which strongly resonate with the underlying principles of  
contemporary perspectives oriented around a (re)turn to an ethos of political agon.  While 
certainly not positioning Weber as an agonal thinker per se, Schluchter’s careful integration of 
Weber’s political and ethical insights within the broader context of Weber’s more well known 
social insights, offers, at the minimum, an interesting sympathetic conceptual vocabulary upon 
which contemporary theorists, interested in an agonistic account of politics or democracy, could 
draw upon.  
 
Between Weber and Schmitt – Friends, Enemies, Values and Vocations 
 
 
If we conclude our exploration of Weber with the clear concession that he does not, per 
se, present us with either a vision of the political or the social that one can rightly call agonistic; 
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we must, as we consider the value of the conceptual vocabulary he does offer, also remind 
ourselves that Schmitt was no more an agonistic theorist in his own right.  Indeed, it is only 
through an explicitly selective reading of Schmitt that Chantal Mouffe has been able to build her 
radical vision of agonal democracy. Therefore, in a similar vein, through what I have described 
as creative adaptation, we can consider the ways in which certain Weberian insights might help 
supplement and support a more thorough account of agonal democratic politics. Specifically, we 
can compare certain theoretical pillars in Weber and Schmitt, and explore the ways that 
supplementing elements of Schmitt’s core understandings with some ‘new’ conceptual 
vocabulary harvested from Weber offers new opportunities to develop a more robust 
understanding of the social conditions of possibility for any democratic ethos based on political 
agon. 
The first comparison worth making between Schmitt and Weber is regarding their 
fundamental conceptualization of the political. As discussed in Chapter One (1), Schmitt’s 
understanding of the political is, fundamentally, one based on the centrality of conflict.  
Explicitly, Schmitt contends that:  
The political is the most intense and extreme antagonism, and every concrete antagonism becomes 
that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy 
grouping. (Schmitt, 2007, 29) 
 
One of his most famous intellectual contributions, and the one at the core of the contemporary 
use and rehabilitation of his work by agonal theorists, Schmitt’s assertion that the true 
ontological nature of the political can only be understood via the antithetical distinction of friend 
and enemy inextricably entwines all things ‘political’ with conflict, and ultimately the threat of 
war.11   In contrast, but perhaps not as much as one might intuit, Weber’s understanding of the 
 
11 As discussed in Chapter One (1), Schmitt’s conceptualization of the political depends on the existence of discrete 
‘nation-like’ entities and the constant ultimate threat of violent conflict between such collectivities.  
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‘essence’ of the political relates to the use of, and struggle for, power.  As discussed above, 
Weber’s understandings of Kampf (conflict), Konkurrenz (competition), and Auslese (selection) 
underpin his conceptualization of politics and the political, as well as the characteristics he posits 
a strong politician should possess. For Weber, politics “…becomes the struggle for the means to 
impose one’s will in a political community over the resistance of others…” (Breiner, 2004: 295) 
and as such “…demands that individual political actors or groups engage in a constant and 
relentless struggle.” (295) This remains true, according to Weber, regardless of whether one 
genuinely acts according to one’s convictions, or one is aims only to instrumentally enhance 
one’s own standing, power, wealth or prestige. In this way, and without narrowing his 
understanding to a binary opposition between friend and enemy, Weber offers a 
conceptualization of the political inherently defined through irresolvable conflict.   
This brings us to the second important comparison between Weber and Schmitt, the degree to 
which politics and the political are understood as purely pragmatic or even amoral spheres of 
human thought and action. For Schmitt, it is necessary to understand the political as being born 
of the ultimate relation to conflict – that between the friend and enemy.  This core antithetical 
relation, the ability to define and distinguish between political friends and political enemies, as 
well as the practical power to compel the collective ‘we’ to mobilize and do violence against the 
collective ‘them,’ represents the ultimate core logic of the political.   For Schmitt, the insertion of 
any other logic, understood through different core antithetical binary distinctions, only serves to 
obscure, obstruct or pervert the political. Take, for example, Schmitt’s musings on the integration 
of moral considerations, the distinction between good and evil, into politics.  As discussed in 
Chapter One (1), Schmitt contends that: 
by transcending the limits of the political framework, it simultaneously degrades the enemy into 
moral and other categorizations and is forced to make him a monster that must not only be defeated 




Indeed, Schmitt goes further, contending that there can be no possible justification for the 
ultimate end of politics – the violent confrontation of inter-collectivity war – outside of purely 
political grounds.   Framing it in a seductively sympathetic manner, Schmitt argues that there can 
exist, by definition, no rational purpose, norm, social ideal, nor legal authority which can “justify 
men killing each other” (49) except the real and practical danger represented by a true enemy – 
therefore a purely political rationale. In contrast, Weber’s conceptualization of the political 
simultaneously acknowledges it as a distinctive sphere where participants constantly struggle to 
impose their will over others, and as a space in which various ethics can be imagined, compared, 
and followed.  In this way, as we have explored throughout this chapter, Weber offers a portrait 
of the political in terms of a perpetual friction between morality and the practical pursuit of 
power.   On the one hand, he warns that: 
The man who is concerned for the welfare of his soul and the salvation of the souls of others does 
not seek these aims along the path of politics.  Politics has quite different goals, which can only 
be achieved by force.  (Weber, 1978b: 223) 
 
Yet on the other hand, and very much contra Schmitt’s perspective, Weber offers us a not only a 
vision of political ethics, but a stance on the best ethical position from which to engage in such 
inherently fraught political contest.  
Through Schluchter’s exploration and elaboration of Weber’s explicit and implied 
perspectives on ethical positions applicable to political action, the third and perhaps most 
important distinction between Weber and Schmitt takes shape.  If the first contrast between 
Schmitt and Weber is in the way both define politics vis-à-vis conflict, and the second the space 
they make for normative action outside of purely instrumental or pragmatic realpolitik, then the 
third contrast must be marked between Weber’s consideration of gesinnungsethik (ethic of 
conviction or intention) and verantwortungsethik (ethic of responsibility) as two criticistic ethics 
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of reflexive principle, and the complete absence of any possible political ethics in Schmitt. 
Whereas through Schmitt, Mouffe inherits a view of politics in which political actors take purely 
pragmatic decisions justifiable only within the internal logic of politics as conflict between friend 
and enemy, Weber, and more specifically Schlucter’s reading of Weber, offers an understanding 
of the political as irreducible struggle to instill one’s will on others, but which can, and should, 
still be moderated by particular ethical stances applicable to the political sphere – the 
characteristics underpinning which can be selected in those seeking to pursue politics as a 
vocation. Providing more depth than typically associated with gesinnungsethik and 
verantwortungsethik, Schluchter’s Weber provides a well-developed category of political ethics 
which demands simultaneously a commitment to rationally deduced moral principles abstracted 
beyond one’s practical position or interests, and a reflexive acknowledgement that such value 
positions can only ever serve as a point of relational critique, and not justification for one set of 
























Chapter 3  
 
Unfamiliar Territory:  Looking Beyond the Canon to the Social Conditions of 





Remaining committed to our two starting propositions that: 1) agonal democratic 
theorists broadly, and Chantal Mouffe specifically, share with a critical sociology the normative 
emancipatory aim of producing scholarship which can contribute to the overturning of existing 
systems of inequality and domination, and 2) that despite the typically problematic treatment of 
the social by theorists in this area, the exploration of agonal democracy in political theory 
contains significant normative and analytic capacities worth exploring; this chapter continues 
with the objective of challenging the logic of determination present in this subset of political 
theory under which the social is essentially determined by the political. Through the creative 
adaptation of selected classical sociological insights, the present analysis remains focused on 
expanding the nascent conceptualizations of the social underpinning this proposed agonal 
(re)turn, and asking a key sociological question: what are the underlying social conditions of 
possibility for a radically emancipatory democratic order premised on the ideal of political agon?  
Having shown, in the previous chapter, how one might leverage some of the classical 
sociological and political insights of Max Weber to nuance a more narrow account of ‘the 
political’ in order to (re)open a conceptual space within a ‘purely political’ account of agonal 
democracy, we are left now with the question of from where to offer this proposed more robust 
conception of ‘the social’ compatible with, and even sympathetic to, such an account.   
Though Weber offers both a view of ‘the social’ replete the potentially productive 
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character of social conflict, as well as an alternative account of ‘the political’ inherently defined 
by and through conflict, and, in this way, ‘opens up’ the conceptual landscape surrounding 
agonal democratic theory to a deeper understanding of the social; we have not, as-of-yet, 
succeeded in (re)introducing such an understanding. The degree to which Weber’s insights alone 
do not fully satisfy, is, to some extent, a feature of the deep divide between his sociological and 
political-philosophical works - a division which is in part a reflection of Weber’s own 
professional-ethical standpoints, as well as one which has been exaggerated and extended 
through his post-war uptake and legacy across western anglophone academia. Weber’s many 
seminal insights into the nature of the social remain systematically distanced from his important, 
though less renown, works on the nature of politics and political ethics. However, as noted at the 
end of the previous chapter, Weber, and more specifically Wolfgang Schlucter’s reading of 
Weber, does offer a great deal in terms of expanding the conceptual landscape associated with 
radical agonal democratic theory. From Schlucter’s account of Weber we can derive an 
understanding of the political which remains premised on irreducible struggle to instill one’s will 
on others, but which can, and should, still be moderated by ethical stances applicable to the 
political sphere from outside and beyond it.  It is a vision of the political which simultaneously 
resonates with Carl Schmitt’s friend/enemy characterization, upon which Mouffe builds her 
radical account of agonal democracy, while challenging the notion that values and ethics 
originating outside the political sphere need be viewed as anathema. It simultaneously supports a 
core understanding of the political as irreducibly characterized by and through conflict, while 
explicitly acknowledging the distinctive but not necessarily completely unrelated character of 
conflict in the social.  
It is here that our third chapter begins, having introduced, through Weber, some level of 
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conceptual possibility for an account of the social both compatible with Schmitt’s understanding 
of the political and sympathetic to Mouffe’s objectives in adapting it; we turn our attention to 
finding the conceptual vocabulary through which to (re)introduce a viable notion of the social 
into the body of agonal democratic theory.   In order to do this, we find ourselves leaving the 
core of classical western sociological canon and moving further to its periphery. Specifically, I 
propose to consider the classical insights of Ferdinand Tönnies and Georg Simmel. Sociologists 
and social thinkers of late 19th and early 20th centuries, Tönnies and Simmel are both interesting 
figures in classical sociology who occupy somewhat ambiguous positions in the contemporary 
western sociological imagination. Simultaneously part of, and on the periphery of the so-called 
‘founding fathers’ of sociology, both Tönnies and Simmel enjoy positions in what one might call 
the second or third tiers of the ‘pantheon’ of classical sociological theory as it has been 
constructed and maintained in the mainstream of anglo-western sociology. While both thinkers 
have received some degree of renewed attention amongst contemporary English speaking 
scholars, their work has not yet ascended in the mainstream of western sociology to the degree 
that the work of, for example, their mutual acquaintance Max Weber has enjoyed. Overlapping 
near-contemporaries of both Max Weber and Carl Schmitt, Tönnies’ and Simmel’s works both 
offer alternative, though complimentary, insights to those so far explored.  
Like Weber, both Tönnies and Simmel contributed to the birth of what would become the 
German sociological tradition – and their work reflected both the exciting intellectual and 
political age in which they were born into, and the deep anxieties preceding the rise of the 
Nationalist Socialist Party and Nazism.   
This having been said, I do not propose to consider Tönnies and Simmel in equal 
measure. Somewhat counterintuitively vis-à-vis their respective levels of modern uptake in 
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contemporary western social thought, a strong emphasis will be put on the exploration and 
(re)consideration of the work of Ferdinand Tönnies. While this is by no means to debate the 
significance of Simmel’s seminal insights, nor take away from their renaissance12, for which 
there is no real parallel for Tönnies, in contemporary sociology; the primacy herein accorded to 
Tönnies is neither arbitrary nor without historical precedent.   Indeed, from a historical 
perspective, Tönnies’ influence during his career – both discursive and institutional – 
significantly surpassed that of Simmel’s, and arguably, that of Max Weber. Although both his 
discursive and institutional influence was significantly, and intentionally, reduced following his 
excommunication from German academia at the end of his career for his outspoken refusal to 
bend his work to serve the Nazis agenda; to this day it is Tönnies, and not Simmel (nor even 
Weber), who is credited as the father of German Sociology. If Carl Schmitt is understood as a 
figure whose academic work was, for a time, unduly advantaged by prestige and academic 
standing gifted to him for his loyalty to the National Socialist Party, Ferdinand Tönnies can be 
understood as one of those from which those ‘gifts’ were forcibly taken and redistributed. 
Additionally, beyond their historical intersections, there is a substantive though generally 
overlooked philosophical connection between Tönnies and Schmitt – specifically in terms of 
their contrasting relationships to, interpretations of, and intellectual commitments to the political 
theory of Thomas Hobbes. Both were, and continue to be, acknowledged as substantive 
Hobbesian scholars13. In this way, Tönnies not only offers additional insight into the social 
 
12Unlike Tönnies, Simmel’s work has experienced somewhat of a contemporary renaissance amongst anglophone 
western sociologists. Still not considered on par with what became the canonical figures of his time (Durkheim and 
Weber, chiefly), his varied insights into modern society – on topics ranging from fashion to religion, from the 
mechanics of monetary economies to the ambiguous nature of distance and proximity in social relations – have 
garnered wide consideration.  (Frisby 1985, 1992a, 1992b, 2002, Witz 2001, Deflem 2003, Dodd 2008, Kemple 
2009, Cooper 2010, Vandenberghe 2010, Horgan 2012)   
13 Although Schmitt’s connections with and work on Thomas Hobbes is commonly noted, the degree to which 
Tönnies was a renown scholar of Hobbes, or to which Hobbes work influenced Tönnies’ sociological works, 
remains relatively underexplored amongst western sociologists. That said, while not a dominant theme in the 
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dimensions of conflict not considered by Schmitt, his work provides an alternative trajectory 
from a comparable starting point.  
With this in mind, this chapter is organized in terms of five (5) interrelated tasks.   First, 
we begin by exploring the unique and particular historical context in which Ferdinand Tönnies 
both rose to pre-eminence and was later reduced to relative obscurity. Second, the chapter 
considers Tönnies’ philosophical underpinnings, specifically his relationship to they famous and 
foundational work of Thomas Hobbes - to whose writings he dedicated a significant portion of 
his career. How Tönnies understood Hobbes, and the degree to which his own work remained 
influenced by Hobbes will be compared and contrasted to that of Carl Schmitt’s, who also 
famously contributed to Hobbesian scholarship in Germany. Third, this chapter will move to 
consider some of the key sociological insights from Tönnies most seminal work – Gemeinschaft 
und Gesellschaft. This examination will begin with an exploration of the traditional 
interpretation of Tönnies among western anglophone sociologists, but it will not end with such a 
view. Instead, I propose an alternative lens through which to (re)consider some of the key 
conceptual artifacts Tönnies introduces. Specifically, reading Tönnies’ seminal Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft in terms of a shared underlying normative commitment in common with Thomas 
Hobbes’ Leviathan –certain of Tönnies key conceptual artifacts and insights can be considered 
from a new angle.    
As its fourth task, the chapter will consider the opportunities and inherent limits present 
in the insights and conceptualizations borrowed from Tönnies. Seeking to move beyond some of 
these limitations, this chapter will introduce a few key complimentary insights from the work of 
 
sociological understanding of Tönnies among English speaking western sociologists, some recent work has sought 
to bring to light both Tönnies’ contributions to Hobbesian scholarship and the degree to which both drew on – or 
rejected – core elements of Hobbes political theory. (Mastnak, 2015; Wickham, 2014; Filippov, 2013; Bond  
2011(a), 2011(b), Bertman, 1999; Thomsen, 1997) 
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Georg Simmel – bringing them into conversation with those of Tönnies. Here, Simmel’s 
emphasis on the complexity of human sociation, as well as the liminal and ambiguous character 
of most social relationships will be briefly explored. More specifically, his famous, though short, 
ruminations on the stranger as key figure in modern society, as well as his more abstract 
observations regarding the productive role of conflict within the social. Finally, this chapter will 
conclude by imaging the conceptual possibilities opened by deploying some of Simmel’s key 
conceptualizations to theoretically ‘nudge’ both Tönnies and Schmitt – and consider the 
implications for understanding both the political and the social dimensions of a radical 
democratic theory premised on the ideal of political agon if one moves from core antithetical 
binary distinctions towards trinodal spectrums of oppositional difference.  
 
Discursive vs Institutional Foundations 
 
With these five-fold objectives in mind, before moving to this chapter’s first formal task - 
exploring Ferdinand Tönnies as peripheral ‘founder’ of sociology in terms of the unique and 
particular historical context in which he lived and wrote - it is valuable to pause and consider 
precisely what is meant when we speak of notions like ‘founders’ in a field or discipline. Of 
course, we begin by acknowledging the historically-, culturally-, geographically- and/or 
linguistically-contingent nature of such monikers.  As noted above, while Simmel has gained 
significant status in the so-called canon of contemporary western anglophone sociology, it is 
Tönnies who remains more celebrated in his native Germany.  Yet beyond the various 
contingencies that clearly caveat any such notion, there also remains other core difference in the 
way disciplines broadly, and sociology specifically, identify and even partially deify their so-
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called founders. This difference revolves around both the distinction between discursive and 
institutional founding status, as well as the relative importance a given discipline places on each. 
As Peter Baehr explains: 
“Discursive” founders, it transpires, are often imagined to lay the tracks of traditions. Their 
importance is held to derive more from the stock of ideas they have provided for sociology than 
from any organizational contributions to it they have made. This distinguishes them from 
“institutional” founders – our second category – which refers to people whose significance lies in 
the fact that they established some artefact or institution demonstrably related to the sociological 
enterprise: for instance, a sociology journal, an academic society or association, a university 
department. (Baehr, 2016: 6)  
 
These two different dimensions or ways in which an author can be seen as having ‘founder’ 
status, are not, Baehr argues, treated equally.  While it can be easier to validate, through 
historical artifact, institutional contributions understood to be founding activities – such as 
starting a journal, establishing a programme, or building a school/faculty – it is the harder to pin 
down act of discursive founding that Baehr posits is held in higher regard within sociology. 
Specifically, Baehr invites us to: 
…recognize that in sociology, it is discourse, general theory, above all, which appears to make a 
founder iconic. Albion Small was a founder of a university department, a journal, and a school – 
but few would accord him the founding status of Marx and Weber, even though the direct 
institutional contribution of Marx to sociology was zero, and, as we have already noted, of Weber 
was minimal. (8) 
 
In this way, we can understand that, despite the huge institutional impacts Tönnies may have 
made during his career, his relatively more modest discursive echoes have pushed him farther 
afield in the hierarchy of classical sociology vis-à-vis Simmel.  
That said, it should also be noted that Baehr offers his readers a bit of caution with regards to the 
idea of founding discourse.  Although he illustrates that sociology – as a contemporary discipline 
and institution – tends to privilege those seen as having laid the tracks for whole spheres of 
study, he also cautions us not to take too literally the notion of the ‘founding of a discourse.’   
Specifically, he warns: 
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In sum, “founders of discursivity” is a misnomer. Discursivity cannot be founded since it is 
inherently an interaction, not a deed of the founding figure. One can produce a body of work that 
becomes the focus for a discourse but one cannot found a discourse (work + interpretation) itself 
since discourses entail what happens to a work where it is identified as significant. (20) 
 
To this I would add that, as such, discursive ‘founding’ is therefore inextricably tied to the social 
and political climate of the time in which a body of work is written – in as much as the 
identification of a body of work as ‘significant’ is neither objective nor ahistorical. While 
significant ideas can inspire discourses despite an absence of institutional impact, the availability, 
contextualization, and ultimately probability of being identified as significant is also a deeply 
contingent process.14  
 Returning to the peripheral statuses of Simmel and Tönnies amongst contemporary 
sociological classics, one can clearly draw connections to Baehr’s claim of the relative weighting 
of discursive vs institutional founding.  Whereas Simmel achieved very minimal institutional 
impacts over the course of his career, and indeed did not even primarily identify himself with 
sociology as a discipline, the later discursive uptake of his writings have positioned him much 
closer to the centre of the contemporary sociological canon.  In contrast, Tönnies, whose writings 
were once considered the very centre of all sociological work in Germany, and in spite of his 
varied and significant institutional legacy in Germany, has not – to date - inspired the same 
degree of discursive interest amongst western anglophone sociologists. Though we can agree 
with Baehr that this is, factually speaking, a result of the relative significance placed on each’s 
 
14 Here I would respectfully point out that Baehr misses some of the implications of his own insights.  In several 
places in his book, he spends energy ‘fending off’ perceived feminist and post-colonial critiques of the cannon 
which emphasize those not privileged enough to be considered at the time they wrote.  Instead, I would argue that 
Baehr’s own reflections on discursive founding offers a better path to understanding.  Had, at the time, certain 
female or non-European authored works enjoyed the same level of legitimacy of say the work of Karl Marx, many 
ideas from such works might well have been qualified as ‘significant’ and therefore been the focus of extensive 
discourses.  It is not, in my view, either revisionist nor an attack on the status of existing classics, to acknowledge 




contributions – we would be wise to also consider the extent to which the Nazis’ initial 
excitement towards a crass reading of Tönnies’ work, as well as his subsequent purposeful and 
meticulous expulsion from German academia for rejecting their advances at the end of his career, 
may have also played a lasting role in the uptake of his ideas in the decades since.  
 
Historical Context – The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand Tönnies  
 
Ferdinand Tönnies was born (roughly) on July 26th 185515 on his parents’ farm in the 
parish of Oldenswort, in the district of Eiderstedt, which lay under the duchy of Schleswig-
Holstein. (Mitzman, 1973: 41) Tönnies father’s family was of Frisian origin, while his mother’s 
family, whose surname was Mau, were from East Holstein. While his father was a very 
successful cattle farmer, his mother came from a family of Protestant ministers and scholars. 
(Cahnman and Heberle, 1971: xv) Tönnies spoke little of his childhood, and what little 
descriptions there are of his youth primarily note two important landmarks: when his father 
retired and moved the family to the small (but somewhat famous) town of Husum, and of his 
friendship with poet Theodor Woldsens Storm. (Mitzman, 1973: 42) Already renowned when he 
befriended a young and impressionable Tönnies, Theodor Storm would go on to be considered 
one of the most important literary figures in Germany’s realist art movement.  The famous poet 
was so impressed with Tönnies, that he asked the boy to help review proofs of a poetry 
anthology he was preparing for publication – an honour not lost on the young Tönnies. (43) The 
brief, but likely formative, association between a young Tönnies and Storm is of note here in so 
 
15 There is some uncertainty and inconsistency as to the identification of the year of Tönnies birth.  While some texts 
note it definitively as 1855 (Mitzman, 1973: 41), others note it as being between 1855 and 1859 (Cahnman and 
Heberle, 1971: xiv).  As it is not material to the work at hand, it is here noted simply in the interest of historical 
accuracy. Interestingly, there is no such confusion regarding the day or moth of Tönnies birth. 
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far as the realism the poet would become renowned for emphasized mundane or banal 
experiences and imagery over romanticized visions of ‘great’ moments or events.  The early 
influence of this artistic commitment is of potential note given both Tönnies’ focus on everyday 
life and sociation in his writings, as well as his later rejection of the Nazis’ perverse 
romanticization of the German volk and their attempts to read such into his work.   Tönnies 
family’s wealth enabled him to continue his studies as a young man at a range of Universities, as 
was the custom of the day, in Jena, Bonn, Leipzig, Berlin and Tuebingen.   Interestingly, and no 
doubt true of Weber, Simmel and Schmitt as well, Tönnies noted of his early education an 
emphasis on what we have, in previous chapters, spoken of in terms of antithetical binary 
oppositions.  As Mitzman notes: 
From the few things he [Tönnies] says about his education, it is apparent he was taught early to 
think in terms of conceptual opposites (e.g., such notes as “Understanding distinguishes, draws 
limits. Reason sees the unity in things”), and that he was early familiar and impressed by Plato’s 
doctrine of ideas. (41) 
 
During this period Tönnies also completed his mandatory military service.  Like Weber, Tönnies 
found little delight in military discipline or routine, and was discharged in the summer of 1875 
on account of being deemed too physically weak for field duty. (Mitzman, 1973: 44) Throughout 
his education Tönnies pursued a range of academic interests including philosophy, statistics, 
archaeology, classical languages, and history, culminating with a doctorate from the University 
of Tuebingen in classical philosophy in 1877 at the age of (approximately) twenty-two. 
(Cahnman and Heberle,1971: xv)  
Tönnies proceeded to pursue a career in academia, and began teaching at the University 
in Leipzig.  This period was one of depression and sickness for Tönnies, and, some argue in 
correlate, a period in which Tönnies also was tempted by romantic works which “…condemned 
modern society and counseled a return to feudalism.” (Sample, 1987: 65) While still somewhat 
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debated, evidence points to this infatuation with extremely nostalgic and anti-liberal perspectives 
as having been distinctively temporary.  Tönnies went on to assert throughout his life, with a few 
exceptions, a fierce commitment to a socialist and progressive informed hopefulness. (65) After 
his time in Leipzig, Tönnies achieved a post as assistant professor of ethics at the Christian-
Albrechts University of Kiel in 1881. However, the intellectual and practical atmosphere in the 
Prussian University did not suite the young Tönnies.   Describing the Prussian system as 
authoritarian, repulsive, and hopeless, Tönnies “…abandoned the lectern to write and travel 
while living off of his inheritance.” (66) It was during this period, 1880 to 1887, mostly 
following his departure from the University of Kiel, that Tönnies wrote his most seminal work 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft – originally published in 1887. (Jacoby, 1955: 148) While 
Tönnies would go on to publish extensively in the field of sociology over his career and life16, it 
was Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft which propelled Tönnies to the peaks of status and 
reputation in German academia. The book was extremely well received in Germany, with 
numerous reprinting and new editions, and was eventually translated to English as ‘Community 
and Society’ in 1957.   Somewhat ironically, it was also this seminal work that later drew the 
interest and attention of the Nazis.  Interested in both a conservative/nostalgic reading of 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft as well as in the status and credibility the pre-eminent sociologist 
might have been able to offer the party – Tönnies’ was approached by members of Hitler’s inner 
circle as a potential ally.  Tönnies vehemently rejected these advances, characterizing the Nazis’ 
 
16 Tönnies published extensively in sociology throughout his career, mostly in German, with a few being later 
translated to English, French and Spanish. Key publications in German include - Schiller als Zeitbürger und 
Politiker, Buchverlag der "Hilfe" (Berlin, Germany), 1905; Das Wesen der Soziologie, Zahn & Jaensch (Dresden, 
Germany), 1907; Weltkrieg und Völkerrecht, S. Fischer (Berlin, Germany), 1917; Die Entwicklung der Socialen 
Frage Bis zum Weltkriege, W. de Gruyter & Co. (Berlin, Germany), 1919; Der Zarismus und Seine Bundesgenossen 
1914: Neue Beiträge zur Keirgsschuldfrage, Deutsche verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte (Berlin, 
Germany), 1922; Soziologische Studien und Kritiken, G. Fischer (Jena, Germany), 1925; and Das Eigentum, W. 
Braumüller (Wien, Germany), 1926.   
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reading of his seminal work as gross misinterpretation. A principled stand that would ultimately 
cost him all he had attained.  
Following the publication of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Tönnies’ career in German 
academia was substantively secured. It was during this period that Tönnies was in closest contact 
with both Max Weber and Georg Simmel, and when his reputation and status as a – if not the – 
preeminent German sociologist of his day was solidified. Alongside his rising discursive 
importance, Tönnies’ also made substantial institutional contributions to a fledging German 
Sociology - helping found the German Sociological Society – over which he presided as 
President for some 22 years. (148). Interestingly, and not generally assigned significant 
importance amongst contemporary western sociologists, Tönnies’ was also, throughout his 
career, an accomplished and renown scholar and historian of English political thinker and 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Even as his reputation as a sociologist was growing in Germany, he 
had a parallel but distinctive reputation amongst English scholars at the time based on his 
writings on and translations of Hobbes.   Tönnies began his studies of Hobbes as a student of 
Friedrich Paulsen as early as 1875.  He did extensive archival and historical research into Hobbes 
throughout his career, and later, was heavily involved in the founding of the Hobbes Society, and 
its local chapter Kiel Hobbes-Gesellschaft. (Mastnak, 2015: 975) Tönnies’ published one of the 
first ‘modern’ and critical editions, with the reintroduction of previously excluded passages, of 
works two key works by Hobbes: The Elements of Law (with new materials found in his archival 
work) and Behemoth.17 The degree to which these two dimensions of Tönnies’ academic career – 
 
17 In the introduction to the second edition of Tönnies’ edited version of Hobbes’ Behemoth in 1969, M.M. 
Goldsmith notes that despite a few errors in translation that had been noted since the first publication in 1889, even 
80 years later Tönnies’ edition remains “the closest one we have to a critical text” and that, above all, “against the 




sociologist and Hobbesian scholar – are interconnected is interpreted very differently depending 
on the perspective from which he is being considered. For the most part, at least as a quasi-
canonical figure in western anglophone sociology, the implications Tönnies’ role not just as a 
scholar of Hobbes, but as “the leading figure in Hobbes studies in his come country and 
internationally” (Mastnak, 2015: 968) is either ignored, or relegated to realm of curiosities, 
footnotes and asides18. This is, I contend alongside some Hobbesian scholars19, a mistake.  
Understanding the relationship between Tönnies’ sociology and his understanding of Hobbes 
political theory offers unique opportunities, both in terms of how one reads some of his seminal 
sociological contributions, and how such contributions could be creatively adapted in the context 
of explicitly political projects. That said, before exploring the connections between his 
Hobbesian scholarship and his sociology, a few words on the end of Tönnies’ career are required.   
 Despite, or perhaps partially because of, his preeminent standing in German and 
international academic circles, the twilight of Tönnies career and life, like many others of his 
day, fell under the long shadow of the National Socialist Party as the Nazis finally overtook 
Germany. While, as a young man, Tönnies was not always immune to the pervasive antisemitism 
of his time, he quickly grew to recognize the great dangers pregnant in texts and positions 
linking racist perspectives, crass readings of Darwinian theory, and distortions of statistical data, 
and a twisted interpretation of the relationship between psychological and physiological elements 
 
18 This is important because the degree to which Hobbes influenced Tönnies is not so much a secret, as something 
which was noted and set aside in his post-war uptake amongst English speakers in the west. The depth of the 
connection is quite explicitly discussed in the introduction to the 2nd edition of Tönnies’ published version of 
Hobbes’ Behemoth circa 1969 – but was not successful in bringing such a connection to the fore of mainstream 
western reading of Tönnies’ sociology.  
   
19 Certain sociologists, political theorists and other scholars of both Tönnies and Hobbes have made an argument 
that Hobbes has a greater role to play in the understanding of certain seminal sociological thinkers like Tönnies, and 
through him Parsons, (Mastnak, 2015; Filippov 2013), as well as more broadly that Hobbes, in his own right, has 
something to offer contemporary sociology (Wikham, 2014; Bond 2011(a), 2011(b)).   
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of human life – imposing a vulgar deterministic view of body and mind that would ultimately 
lead into the worst parts of the eugenics movement. (Cahnman, 1973: 284) This early concern 
had long crystalized into opposition by the time the economic, national and perhaps even 
existential chaos that gripped Germany and other parts of Europe following the end of the first 
world war.  Despite having, much like Weber, long kept formal political party membership and 
involvement carefully divided from his academic life; in the summer of 1932 as the National 
Socioalist Party continued to grow, Tönnies joined the opposing Socialdemocratic Party. (285) 
On July 29th, 1932 - two days before a federal election held following the premature dissolution 
of the Reichstag  – Tönnies published an open letter in Schleswig-Holsteinische Volkszeitung, a 
local social-democratic newspaper. Abandoning entirely any previous attempt to separate direct 
political involvement from scholarly critique, the letter, entitled ‘An Open letter to my 
compatriots at the Northern frontier’ directly and clearly implored Germans of Schelswig-
Holstein to reject Hitler and the National Socialist Party. Speaking directly of the dangers of both 
Hitler and his Party, Tönnies wrote: 
He is a man distinguished by unclear enthusiastic thinking, based on ignorance of reality, a man 
who in his feeble mind imagines he can solve problems some of which the best minds of the 
nation have worked on for centuries, on many of them certainly during the last hundred years; it is 
a party whose final goal could be nothing but an irreparable disruption of all social conditions. 
(286)  
 
The National Socialist Party was soundly defeated in Schelswig-Holstein in the subsequent 
election, however, although Hitler and the National Socialist Party technically lost the election, 
the strong showing of the National Socialist Party across most of Germany provided the foothold 
which they ultimately leveraged to gain power.  Yet even after the Nazis gained and began to 
consolidate power, Tönnies continued to openly oppose them.  This had real and material 
consequences for Tönnies, as E.G. Jacoby describes:  
It was a period of harvest for the acknowledged “elder sociologist” of Germany, of a ripe  fruition 
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of the ideas he had tended and fought for over many years. But he also saw a sudden end put to a 
vigorous development in social research and sociological teaching at German universities by the 
advent of Hitler’s gang, and when he died he was as alone as head been solitary in the early days 
of his scholarship. (Jacoby, 1955:148)    
 
The contrast with Schmitt and other sympathisers, collaborators and opportunists is hard to 
overstate. Very much contra Schmitt – who, as discussed in Chapter one, chose to align himself 
with the Nazis party either genuinely or for convenience - Tönnies explicitly rejected and 
opposed the rise of the National Socialist Party in Germany, even well after they began to 
consolidate and solidify their power.  A prominent figure and public intellectual by the time the 
Nazis began to consolidate power, Tönnies both rebuffed advances for his support and openly 
opposed the new regime.  
Ultimately, Tönnies’ refusal to align with the new political climate ultimately cost him his 
position, his pension, and, at least for a time, his position in the academic pantheon. What is 
particularly interesting to note about this, is the fact that, on the surface, Tönnies’ most 
influential work Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft as well as his scholarship on Hobbes, was seen 
by many in the Nazis party as naturally aligned with their views. As Samples explains: 
National Socialism advanced the “folk community” (Volksgemeinschaft) as a political goal. For 
the Nazis, all Germans belonged to a tight-knit community of blood that precluded all divisions 
and conflict in society. Tönnies work was misused to support this idea, and inevitably, the Nazis 
sought the blessing of the “the philosopher of community.” Seven months after Hitler came to 
power, a fervent party member, Ernst Wolfgast, visited Tönnies praising him as the intellectual 
forefather of the new fascist state. Tönnies harshly rejected the interpretation and later judged the 
whole affair a bitter joke.  (Samples, 1987: 68)  
 
Tönnies lost his professorship, including all pension and support, in 1933 amid wide spread 
‘purges’ within the university in Kiel and Germany more broadly – a systematic program that 
would later be described as an effort toward “the elimination of all racially alien and politically 
unacceptable elements” (Mastnak, 2015: 977) within the university. Tönnies died three years 




Tönnies – Sociologist & Hobbesian or Hobbesian Sociologist?  
  
As noted above, concurrent to Tönnies’ ascension as the founding father of German 
sociology, he was, in Germany and beyond, recognized as one of the preeminent historians and 
scholars of fifteenth century political philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Through his early mentorship 
under Friedrich Paulsen, Tönnies turned away from the more en vogue Emanuel Kant and began 
a life long study of, and appreciation for, the political thought of Hobbes. Before Tönnies, the 
Christian-Albrechts University in Kiel where he spent the majority of his career had a nearly 
two-hundred-year reputation as an institution known for its refutation of Hobbes – who at times 
was read as both politically controversial and potentially heretical. By the end of Tönnies career, 
it had been transformed into the centre of Hobbesian scholarship in Germany and beyond. (968) 
Among his more noteworthy accomplishments, Tönnies travelled to Britain where he spent years 
doing research on Hobbes via the Devonshire family archives in the British Museum and Oxford 
College – through which he both discovered two previously unpublished manuscripts of Hobbes: 
The Elements of Law Natural and Political, as well as the Short Tract (what was believed to be 
an early version of Behemoth). (Filippov, 2013; Mastnak, 2015) More broadly, Tönnies brought 
to bear on Hobbes the full weight of his training in ‘the science of textual criticism.’  Classically 
trained vis-à-vis the German tradition text-critical research of ancient and medieval works, 
Tönnies was one of the first to apply these techniques to more modern texts. (Mastnak, 2015: 
971)    
Tönnies contributions to Hobbesian scholarship are difficult to overstate.  Both in terms 
of his interpretations of Hobbes’ writings and his impact on the organized study of Hobbes in 
Germany – what we have discussed above in terms of Baehr’s notions of institutional and 
discursive founding – the centrality of Tönnies work amongst those who studied Hobbes at the 
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time, and for years to follow, is without question. Tönnies introduced a wealth of new historical, 
biographical and textual insights into both academic and public discourses on Hobbes – he even 
spoke to a broader German audience of the day on the then-new medium of radio. (974) He 
organized conferences and symposiums – including a congress in September of 1929 coinciding 
with the 250th anniversary of Hobbes’ death. He built international networks amongst Hobbesian 
scholars including an international association – Societas Hobbesiana (Hobbes Society), for 
which he served as President.  Tönnies also helped found the local chapter of Societas 
Hobbesiana, the Hobbes Society in Kiel or the Hobbes-Gesellschaft. (975) 
All this having been said, the question remains: what does Tönnies’ work on Hobbes 
offer us in terms of the task at hand?  A foray into Tönnies relationship to Hobbes is, much like 
the selection of Tönnies himself, neither accidental nor arbitrary.  Tönnies’ Hobbesian influences 
are of interest to us in the context adapting and deploying some of his insights on the nature of 
the social vis a vis Mouffe’s ‘purely political’ account of agonal democracy for two primary 
reasons:  1) considering Tönnies’ understanding of Hobbes helps contextualize the starting point 
from which he wrote Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, and 2) comparing and contrasting how 
Tönnies understood Hobbes, and in particular Leviathan, to how Schmitt would later interpret 
Hobbes offers us a common point from which to map the divergent trajectories of these two very 
different theorists.  
Even for those largely unfamiliar with the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, most 
intuition would align his famously dark depiction of humanity’s natural state as being more 
closely connected with Carl Schmitt’s politics as violence than Ferdinand Tönnies’ subtle 
distinctions between social solidarity under conditions of community and society.  And yet, as is 
oft the case, such intuitions might lead one astray.  Despite the outward appearance of alignment, 
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many argue that Schmitt must critique, and even refute, Hobbes in order to forward his own 
political theology as laid out in The Concept of the Political. By contrast, though Tönnies’ 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft could appear at odds with Hobbes’ contractually pragmatic 
proposition of State as necessary compromise, a closer reading reveals a far less antagonistic 
conceptual relationship. Let us briefly consider some of similarities and differences in how both 
theorists approached Hobbes’ most famous postulations as well as their implications for more 
contemporary theories of the political and the social. To be sure, both Tönnies and Schmitt have 
in common a critical orientation towards the liberal democratic order most scholars identify as 
the natural outcome of Hobbes’ account of Leviathan. Yet while Schmitt decries liberal 
democracy in the pursuit of nearly-explicit fascist or totalitarian political organization, Tönnies 
discomfort with the limits of a liberal modus vivendi20 propelled him towards democratic 
socialist and communist ideals21. Although, while the former was infamous for his polemical zeal 
in forwarding his vision of the political, the latter’s normative commitments tended to be more 
muted in his academic writings.  That said, despite initial appearances, it is Hobbes’ influence on 
Tönnies, much more so than on Schmitt, which offers us an important alternative way to read the 
formers seminal work.     
Tönnies was, as discussed above, an expert on the philosophical writings of Hobbes. 
 
20 I use the latin modus vivendi or mode of living in the same sense in which John Rawls deploys it to describe the 
merely practical compromises in a pluralist society juxtaposed to a deeper committed overlapping consensus of 
shared values. Without in any way meaning to align Tönnies with Rawls, the term none the less captures the 
former’s discomfort with the limits of liberal democratic society under conditions of early capitalism as he 
experience them at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
 
21 Tönnies political orientations here, and specifically his relationship with Marx, are complex and evolved over the 
course of his career. The degree to which Tönnies was variously inspired by and critical of Marx and the various 
tenants of capitalism, socialism and communism changed over the course of his career.  While Tönnies is clearly 
very much indebted to Marx in his seminal description of gesellschaft (society), his more aspirational exploration of 
gemeinschaft (community) moves distances itself from a classically Marxist interpretation or approach. Elements of 
this relationship are considered further below in the chapter. 
113 
 
Indeed, in comparison to Schmitt, there is little doubt that Tönnies was the greater Hobbesian 
scholar. In quantity and quality of his contributions, in equal measure discursively and 
institutionally, Tönnies familiarity with, analysis of, and recognition as an expert of Hobbes was 
greater than that of Schmitt. That said, in the context of our exploration, and potential creative 
adaptation, of Tönnies seminal sociological writings, one might wonder: what is the significance 
of this Hobbesian scholarship?  My answer here, is that in understanding Tönnies work on and 
relationship to Hobbes’ political project, one is presented with both a vital point of comparison 
vis a vis Schmitt, and, more importantly, with a means to reconsider the impetus behind Tönnies 
seminal Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Specifically, in understanding how Tönnies’ read and 
understood Hobbes’ Leviathan, one can re-examine the core sociological considerations in 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft in a fresh light. Somewhat contrary to the dominant reading of 
sociological considerations in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, which characterize his work in 
terms of a comparison between mechanical and organic solidarity in rural and urban settings at 
times limited by an apparent nostalgia for the smaller scale communities of the past; I would 
propose that this seminal work can also be considered in terms of a parallel project to Leviathan.  
From this perspective, one can approach Tönnies explorations of different forms and functions of 
social solidarity as simultaneously complimentary and evolutionary to the those found in 
Hobbes’ more explicitly political writings.  Tönnies did in fact explicitly note that his writings 
comparing community and society started with Hobbes. As Mastnak points out: 
Tönnies is perhaps better known as a founder of sociology than as a pioneer of Hobbes studies. 
But in his intellectual formation and career, the two academic pursuits were intimately linked. 
Tönnies’ study of Hobbes informed his articulation of the emerging science of sociology. That, in 
fact, was how Tönnies saw it. ‘My starting point was Hobbes’, he said, speaking about 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, his first—and most influential—sociological work. (Mastnak, 
2015: 969) 
 
From this perspective, one can read Tönnies and Hobbes as having a shared common objective in 
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their respective opuses – to ascertain how human beings, inherently conflict prone and 
egocentric, could best organize themselves into a viable and sustainable ordered society. 
(Filippov, 2013: 115)  
This alternative reading, premised on the idea that Tönnies was, in Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft, continuing a project in some ways similar to that undertaken in Hobbes’ Leviathan, 
depends on a particular understanding of Hobbes’ famous depiction of the state of nature, as well 
as the political organization he posits necessary to tame it.  For Tönnies, these were what 
classical sociology would term ideal types – neither historically accurate portraits, nor fully 
realizable pragmatic schematics. The gap in Hobbes, according to Tönnies, had to do less with 
how he imagined the state of nature – often a point of tension among critics of Hobbes – but 
more in how he posited the various ways functional ‘society’ could be arranged. The modus 
vivendi set forth in Leviathan focused almost exclusively on the need to build political amity – as 
opposed to considering bonds of familiarity or friendship.  In ways that are, at least in part, 
notably similar to the project at hand, Tönnies believed Leviathan to have been limited by its 
failure to consider elements outside the purely ‘political’ dimensions of a well ordered society. 
As Alexander Fillipov notes: 
According to Tönnies, Hobbes, while constructing his society (without using the actual term) and 
his state, refrained from all the natural and original bonds which tie people together in families 
and friendships, from all the instincts of sociality (social Instinkten). They were of no importance 
for his theory, being too weak to hold great societies together against individuals who are 
isolated, egocentric and virtually hostile to each other. (116) 
 
From this perspective, Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft can read in terms of not only a 
contribution to the conversation begun in Leviathan – but also an attempt to introduce a more 
nuanced understanding of the social into a work famously focused on the political. While Hobbes 
offered a single ideal type of political association as an answer to a state of nature famously 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short, Tönnies conceptualized two ideal types of social 
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organization and considered the relative merits, strengths, and challenges of the bonds of social 
solidarity produced and maintained under each. In Gesellschaft (society) Tönnies’ constructs an 
ideal type of sociation which, in line with Hobbes social contract, is free from “the natural and 
original bonds which tie people together in families and friendships.” (116) However, he also 
posits an alternative ideal type - Gemeinschaft (community) – into which was poured all these 
hitherto unconsidered original bonds. In this way, Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft 
follows Hobbes in constructing pure concepts, or ideal types, of human sociation – but places the 
natural and original bonds between humans within the notion of community. (116-117) 
According to this alternative reading, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft can be seen as an attempt 
to introduce explicitly social elements – specifically concept of social solidarity22 – into an much 
older project, greatly admired but potentially limited by its exclusively ‘political’ orientation.   
 
 
Solitary, Poor, Nasty, Brutish and Schmitt 
 
 
While the scope and depth of influence the writings of Thomas Hobbes may have had 
 
22It is difficult to invoke the idea of ‘social solidarity’ without recalling the work of another preeminent sociologist 
of the day: Emile Durkheim. Durkheim’s (now canonical) De la Division du Travail Social (The Division of Labour 
in Society) was first published in 1893, some six years after Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community 
and Society) which was first published in 1887. That said, it was not until the printing of the second edition of 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft that Tönnies work was recognized as seminal in Germany and beyond, nearly two 
decades after De la Division du Travail Social.  As will be discussed further below in this chapter, Durkheim’s 
concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity bear unmistakable similarities to how Tönnies deploys the notions of 
organic and mechanical forms of affirmative social relations. Although it could appear, in an initial pass, that the 
two theorists are speaking of essentially the same thing – only with the descriptive and normative implications of 
their terminologies inverted – there remain much deeper distinctions between the two perspectives.  None the less, 
the two theorists were aware of each other’s work – both discursive and institutional – a young Durkheim published 
a critical review of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft which led to an exchange of views between the two in a series of 
reviews and responses between 1883 and 1889. This exchange, and the similarities and differences in how 
Durkheim and Tönnies viewed mechanical and organic social solidarity/affirmative relations more broadly are both 





Ferdinand Tönnies might seem counterintuitive from the perspective of his sociology, the same 
cannot be said of Carl Schmitt. While in many ways less accomplished as a Hobbesian scholar – 
the explicit echoes of of Hobbes are far more obvious in Schmitt’s writings. The two were, it 
must be admitted, aligned in a common preoccupation “…with the fear of chaos and the concern 
with physical safety and public order.” (Thomsen, 1997: 10) Indeed, as Jacob Thomsen argues: 
Perhaps more than any other political thinker since Hobbes, Schmitt can be identified with this 
concern for public order at the expense of individual freedom. Like Hobbes, Schmitt stressed the 
centrality of violence in the human experience and he associated sovereignty with ‘power being 
exercised on behalf of groups locked in conflict.’ (10) 
 
Yet appearances can be deceiving, and the degree to which Schmitt can be understood as a 
Hobbesian in his own writings remains under debate.  Some, including Jürgen Habermas 
(Habermas, 1989), contend that Schmitt was, at best, only loosely committed to Hobbes as both 
subject and inspiration – and that his own writings run rough shod over the classical political 
philosophy to which he pays outward tribute. While the historical debate itself may be 
immaterial to the project at hand, a closer review of Schmitt’s understanding, critiques, and 
application of the core insights found in Hobbes’ Leviathan vis-à-vis Tönnies does, as previously 
noted, offer a way to begin to map the two theorists’ divergent trajectories.  
 Without question, Schmitt, like Tönnies, both admired and was critical of Hobbes. 
Though not a life-long scholar of Hobbes, Schmitt’s interest certainly wasn’t fleeting. He 
delivered lectures on Hobbes in the early 1930s, and even then, his interest in Hobbes was 
already well known – in part through his correspondences with Leo Strauss. (9) Hobbes is 
deployed - briefly but effectively - in several places in Schmitt’s Der Begriff des Politschen 
(Concept of the Political) originally published in 1932.  His most notable contribution to 
Hobbesian scholarship proper took the form of his publication of Der Leviathan in 1938, in 
which he collected and combined his lectures on Hobbes into one treatise. Institutionally, 
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Schmitt was also acknowledged, though this acknowledgement is, taken in historical context, 
difficult to fully access given its entanglement with the fierce politics and in-fighting that defined 
German academia under the Nazis regime.  He was, for example, invited to speak alongside Paul 
Ritterbusch at a congress in 1938 celebrating the three hundred and fiftieth anniversary of 
Hobbes’ birth – organized by Tönnies’ friend and co-founding member of the Hobbes-
Gesellschaft: Cay von Brockdorff. There, he and Ritterbusch were acknowledged as the leading 
figures in a new wave of Hobbesian scholarship, one which was most notable for its alignment 
with Nazis doctrine and its break from the politically undesirable previous wave – which Tönnies 
was credited as founding., this may not have been a straightforward acknowledgement of either 
of the men’s Hobbesian scholarship.  Indeed, Ritterbusch, while the more prominent Nazis at the 
time, was not Schmitt’s equal as scholar or intellectual. Nor were the two allies, belonging to 
different factions within the Nazis political landscape. As the Rector of Kiel University, 
Ritterbusch had actually been the one to purge Tönnies from his tenured position. Schmitt 
ultimately declined to speak at the conference but remained listed alongside Ritterbusch as 
‘equals’ in founding the emergent new wave of Hobbesforschung. (Mastnak, 2015: 976-977) Yet 
as Mastnak suggests: 
In the way he [von Brockdorff] conducted the congress and reported on it I am inclined to see an 
act of resistance. By honouring Hobbes, he was playing a game of politics. At the centre of that 
game was neither direct critique of the third phase of Hobbes studies nor definition of the 
relationship between the third and second phase of Hobbesforschung in Germany. Rather, von 
Brockdorff set out, I believe, to manipulate the relations between the two men he named as 
representatives of the third phase of German Hobbes studies. Made of Ritterbusch and Schmitt, 
two men who, von Brockdorff well knew, were neither allies nor friends, the third phase could 
only implode. (979) 
 
Regardless of the instability of his institutional impacts, Schmitt’s discursive echoes remain.  
Many to this day admire and draw upon Schmitt’s particular understandings and critiques of 
Hobbes, as well as the understandings of state and politics he deployed Hobbes to support.  This 
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is of course evidenced, among many other possible examples, by Chantal Mouffe’s own 
adaptation of Schmitt around which our current endeavour orbits.  But what then are Schmitt’s 
core insights into Hobbes, and how does his understanding differ from that of Tönnies? 
 One of the key differences between the two theorists’ approach to Hobbes, was how they 
viewed the texts themselves.  Specifically, with regards to Leviathan, Schmitt was far more 
interested in mythology and symbolism than Tönnies’ classically trained textual analysis 
approach allowed. As Mastnak argues: 
Schmitt focused on Leviathan as a mythical figure and ‘political symbol.’ Myth played hardly any 
role in Tönnies’ interpretation of Hobbes’ political theory. Discussing the relation between 
Hobbes’ Leviathan and Behemoth, for example, Tönnies briefly referred to ‘the state as one 
monster, revolution as they other.’ He commented on Hobbes’ ‘comparison of the state with a 
biblical myth monster,’ but only to remark that it was ‘a kind of poetical intuition one could 
hardly expect from a sober thinker.’ (986) 
 
Myth, and the use of the biblical references to both Leviathan and Behemoth, were, 
unsurprisingly, far more important to Schmitt – who at times identified himself as a political 
theologian.  In fact, the subtitle to his 1938 Der Leviathan translates to ‘the significance and 
failure of a political symbol.’ (Habermas, 1989: 130) Hobbes, Schmitt argues, erred in as much 
as he failed to fully understand the various meanings ascribed to the biblical symbols he 
deployed. Leviathan – which in the Old Testament refers to a great sea beast who rises from the 
depths and overcomes Behemoth the parallel land power – was a poor symbolic choice to 
associate with the State according to Schmitt, in part because of how those stories were 
classically read and understood. With a charmingly politically expedient anti-Semitic flare, 
Schmitt contends: 
For in the centuries that followed, the substance of the modern state, as represented by 
this image, was misunderstood as something abnormal and contrary to nature: ‘The 
image was not adequate to the system of thought with which it was linked… The 
traditional Jewish exegesis rebounded against the Leviathan of Hobbes.’ (130) 
 
In the context of this criticism of Hobbes’ choices in symbolic representation, Jürgen Habermas 
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argues that Schmitt also projects back upon Hobbes his own ontological understandings of the 
political as first laid out in Political Theology in 1922. That the state – Leviathan – not only must 
come to power through conflict – the defeat of Behemoth – but also “…so it is only in 
suppressing revolutionary opposition that the state can assert itself as a sovereign power.” (130) 
 The other major difference between how Schmitt and Tönnies understood Hobbes has to 
do with how each understood the famous propositions concerning the state of nature.  As 
discussed above, for Tönnies, the state of nature was a conceptual tool against which to build an 
ideal type of association through which to examine the building blocks of political or social 
solidarity. In contrast, Schmitt believed Hobbes erred in juxtaposing the state of nature with a 
political state – instead as we have discussed at length conjoining the two into an ontological 
account of the political as defined by and through constant enmity. As Mastnak observes: 
For Hobbes and Tönnies, the status naturalis was not political; for Schmitt it was. But Schmitt 
did not simply restore ‘the Hobbesian concept of the state of nature […] to honor.’ He had 
redefined the concept. For Schmitt, the state of nature meant a ‘state of war among groups’ – not 
among individuals. Such was the malaise that Liberalism had brought upon the modern world. 
Schmitt’s solution for that malaise was the ‘total state.’ (Mastnak, 2015: 988) 
 
In this way, Schmitt simultaneously rejected and expanded Hobbe’s notion of the status naturalis 
or state of nature.  No longer concerned with the terms of a social contract that could subordinate 
and overcome the imagined pre-societal state of violence, Schmitt’s concept of the political 
becomes premised on an ongoing and irresolvable state of nature.  For him, unlike both Hobbes 
and Tönnies life with leviathan remains poor, nasty, brutish and potentially short.  Schmitt 
decried the spaces Hobbes left open for private opinions and (arguably) liberal democracy, 
instead insisting that the only way to protect societies from the constant risk of violent 
dissolution was his own conception of a totalizing (totalitarian) state which broaches no diversity 




Community and Association  
 
Having explored the important role Hobbesian scholarship played in Tönnies’ intellectual 
life, as well as the parallel with Schmitt, we turn our attention to Tönnies’ work proper.  
Specifically, to his most famous work Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft.  Although now translated 
as Community and Society, early editions of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft were also translated 
into English as Community and Association.23 This is of note in so far as it helps remind us of the 
dual meaning of the English term ‘society’ – at once reference to the totality of a given social 
collective, inclusive of its economy, politics, norms and values, as well as to a particular 
grouping or association of individuals formed around a shared purpose: i.e. the Society for the 
Preservation of Great American Songbooks, or the Canadian Sociology Association. For 
Tönnies, as we will explore, the German term gesellschaft contains fragments of both meanings. 
As discussed above, I am proposing that one can read Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft not only as 
a work of pure and applied sociology, but also as a text intended to supplement and support the 
political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes – specifically with regards to the nature of a ‘stable’ 
social contract. By no means a radical reinterpretation, I do contend that (re)considering Tönnies 
through this different lens helps shift some of the traditional focus and emphasis from its 
historical descriptive dimensions to its more critical implications. That said, before considering 
this alternate accentuation of Tönnies’ famous text, it is worth beginning with an overview of its 
traditional interpretation.  
 As noted above, Tönnies first published Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft in 1887 at the age 
of (approximately) 32, but the work wouldn’t become renowned until its second edition was 
 
23 An example of this is Charles P. Loomis’ early English translation of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft entitled 
Community and Association, first edition published by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, London in 1955. That said, 




printed in 1912.  Yet, while its initial reception might not have been as impressive as it would 
later become, it was by no means ignored. The work was widely read and considered by Tönnies’ 
peers – both in Germany and internationally – and while it was not immediately canonized, it 
was recognized as important quite early on. In what is likely the review by the most famous, in 
retrospect, of Tönnies’ contemporaries internationally, the first edition of Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft was reviewed by a young and upcoming French sociologist in the Revue 
Philosophique in 1889. Although critical of elements of the work, the reviewer was also suitably 
impressed.  Of what would become one of German sociology’s foundational texts, Emile 
Durkheim wrote:  
Although this work, in the first place, is a social-scientific study, views of a very diverse nature 
are intimately mingled in it. At the same time, one will find therein a complete sociology and a 
similarly complete philosophy and psychology. The author is inspired, alternately or 
simultaneously, by Schopenhauer, Karl Marx, Kant, Sumner Maine and the theorists of 
evolution.24 Naturally, such an eclectic synthesis renders the reading of this book very laborious, 
and that’s a pity: because one can discover interesting ideas in it which we will try to disentangle.  
(Cahnman, 1973: 240) 
 
In what we can agree is one of the most ‘traditional’ or at least oldest summaries of Gemeinschaft 
und Gesellschaft, Durkheim described Tönnies’ primary scholarly objective in terms of: a study 
of two forms of group-formation, to characterize both their forms, and determine their mutual 
relationships. (241) While early, this characterization of Tönnies’ project remains more or less 
consistent, up to and including its early reception after its translation to English.  In a not wholly 
dissimilar manner, Talcott Parsons described Tönnies’ exploration of gemeinschaft and 
gesellschaft in terms of an analysis of “…positive types of social relationship, that is, modes in 
 
24 It is interesting to note that here, in Durkheim’s 1889 review of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, the same year 
Tönnies published a critical edition of Behemoth with previously missing sections re-inserted to significant acclaim, 
Thomas Hobbes is not mentioned as one of the core theoretical foundations upon which Tönnies builds. This may 
have had to do with the degree to which Durkheim would have been aware of Tönnies work as a Hobbesian scholar 
– at reputation that was mostly based in England initially – but also might be connected to Durkheim’s broader 
ambitions to clearly delineate sociology as a distinctive academic field. 
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which individuals are bound together.” (140) Deploying Tönnies as means of further exploring 
and to some extent expanding Weber’s theory of social action, Parson’s goes on to summarize 
Tönnies’ conceptualizations of community and association/society, contending that:  
For Tönnies, gemeinschaft and gesellschaft are ideal types of concrete relationship. His scheme is 
in this sense a classification. Its importance here lies in its stating and classifying facts in such a 
way as to bring out with especial clarity what are for the present analytic purposes highly 
significant points. Above all it shows the limitations of the understanding of complexes of action 
in terms of the immediate ends and situation of each particular act taken alone. (149)  
 
Of course, it is important to note that Parson’s engagement with Tönnies’ work was not one of 
pure intellectual curiosity, or dedicated study of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft.  Instead, 
Parsons’ ‘Note on Gemeinshaft and Gesellschaft’ which appeared in Werner Cahnman’s 1973 
collection of essays and newly translated original documents - Ferdinand Tonnies: A New 
Evaluation – was a reprinted section of Parsons’ work building his own theory of social action in 
his 1968 book The Structure of Social Action.25 
Accepting, for the moment, the traditional reading of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft as 
the sociological exploration of ideal types of social organization, let us explore Tönnies’ 
overarching description of these two core concepts.  Gemeinschaft, according to Tönnies, is 
characterized by a genuine sympathy and understanding which binds together human beings as 
members of a totality (Tönnies, 2002: 47). It is a dominant characteristic of smaller rural 
lifestyles, and to some degree is predicated on, or at least facilitated by, these smaller 
collectivities organized around kinship ties.   As he notes: 
The real foundation of unity, and consequently the possibility of Gemeinschaft, in first place is 
closeness of blood relationships and mixture of blood; secondly, physical proximity; and, finally, 
for human beings, intellectual proximity.  In this gradation, therefore, are to be found the sources 
 
25 This is an important point in so far as Parsons would later be subject to significant criticism for his ‘overly 
pragmatic’ presentation and interpretation of Weber’s work.  Indeed, contemporary Weberians, as discussed in 
previous chapters, spent considerable effort in what they described as the ‘de-Parsonizing’ of Weber’s English 
translated work. This is not to suggest that Parsons’ reading of Tönnies is inaccurate, but rather to acknowledge that 
Parsons’ was likely more interested in how a particular reading of Tönnies could support his project, than on what 
Tönnies himself might have intended.  
123 
 
of all kinds of understanding. (Tönnies, 2002: 48) 
 
To this notion of understanding and genuine sympathy, Tönnies adds a particular orientation to 
and understanding of property.  According to Tönnies, “[l]ife of the Gemeinschaft is mutual 
possession and enjoyment and possession of enjoyment of common goods.” (Tönnies, 2002: 50) 
Here the rules of barter and exchange are foundational, and life is organized around necessary, as 
opposed to dispensable, goods.  Gemeinschaft is thus characterized as the natural and ideal form 
of sociation, one founded on a unity of members through true bonds of social solidarity. 
In contradistinction to the natural, genuine, and implicitly socialist association of 
Gemeinschaft, Tönnies posits the association of Gesellschaft.  While these two forms of 
association may superficially appear similar, Tönnies suggests that they are different to the point 
of being nearly antithetical.  Specifically, he contends that Gesellschaft:  
“[…] superficially resembles the Gemeinschaft in so far as the individuals live and dwell together 
peacefully.  However, in the Gemeinschaft they remain essentially united in spite of all separating 
factors, whereas in the Gesellschaft they are essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors.” 
(Tönnies, 2002: 65)  
 
Whereas the totality of the Gemeinschaft is built on understanding, genuine sympathy and the 
mutual enjoyment of property, Gesellschaft is focused on what Tönnies describes as the fiction of 
objective value.  Tönnies argues that one of the greatest challenges that faces the Gesellschaft is 
how to create the objective quality of ‘value’ in the infinite diversity of property.  Worth, as the 
measure of property in Gemeinschaft, is, according to Tönnies, a “quality which is perceived by 
the real individual.” (Tönnies, 2002: 67) Worth is therefore subjective, and thus cannot be 
generalized into an objective standard.  Instead, Tönnies argues, the collectivity of the 
Gesellschaft creates a fictional being, a generalized individual, whose task it becomes to 
represent a generalizable and objective worth.  As worth cannot be objective, Tönnies describes 
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this generalized quality as value.26   
In order for the concept of a generalized objective value to function, the hypothetical 
being’s analysis of worth must be accepted by all in the collectivity.  This, for Tönnies, is the 
acceptance of a single artificial27 will by the totality of the Gesellschaft.  As he describes it: 
In order that the judgment may even with this qualification become objective and universally 
valid, it must appear as a judgment passed by “each and every one.”   Hence, each and every one 
must have this single will; in other words, the will of exchange becomes universal, i.e., each and 
every one becomes a participant in the single act and he confirms it; thus it becomes an absolute 
public act. (Tönnies, 2002: 67) 
 
It is in this way that the individuals who make up the membership of the Gesellschaft subjugate 
themselves to the latter’s artificial will, initially to affirm a conception of objective value 
necessary for an exchange economy, then later to recognize it as the originator of a postulated set 
of natural laws and conventions.  According to Tönnies, the more individuals accept this will of 
the Gesellschaft, the more the famous contention of Adam Smith, that every man becomes in 
some measure a merchant, becomes a reality (Tönnies, 2002: 76). As Tönnies notes: 
In Gesellschaft every person strives for that which is to his advantage and he affirms the actions 
of others only in so far as and as long as they can further his interest.  Before and outside of 
convention and also before and outside of each special contract, the relation of all to all may 
therefore be conceived as potential hostility or latent war. (Tönnies, 2002: 77) 
 
Thus, with the generalized ‘will of exchange’, individuals in relations of Gesellschaft become 
 
26 For Tönnies, the broader distinction between ‘worth’ under Gemeinschaft and ‘value’ under Gesellschaft is 
further underpinned by a strong affinity with Marx’s surplus theory of value. The artificial ‘value’ assigned by the 
generalized will of Gesellschaft is, for Tönnies, defined through a directly Marxist understanding of labour. 
Although Tönnies’ includes a number of caveats with regards to how commodities are exchanged and the degree to 
which ‘agents of commerce’ can affect markets, he still concludes that under conditions of Gesellschaft “…the value 
of each category of commodities and consequently of every possible quantity thereof is determined by the average 
labour power required in the Gesellschaft for their production.” (Tönnies, 2002: 97) The degree to which Tönnies is 
indebted to Marx, the maturity of his early reading of Das Kapital, and his later critiques of Marx are briefly 
considered further below.  
 
27 According to Tönnies, the transition from ‘worth’ under conditions of Gemeinschaft to ‘value’ under conditions of 
Gesellschaft depends on a sort of artificial collective perspective (or will) that determines an abstracted standard 
upon which a common value can be based.  This use of the concept of a collective ‘artificial will’ needs to be 
understood in the context of much more detailed distinction Tönnies makes with regards to two forms of human will 
- natural and rational. How Tönnies describes these two different forms of human will, and their alignment with 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft respectively will be considered in greater detail below.   
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more and more instrumental and self-interested, and therefore fundamentally disconnected from 
and adversarial towards, those around them.  
 
Worth, Value and the Influence of Marx 
 
In order to fully understand Tönnies’ overarching description of life under conditions of 
Gesellschaft, it becomes necessary to briefly consider the degree to which his, explicitly 
sociological, account was influenced by political-economy, and its greatest simultaneous critic 
and contributor – Karl Marx. In the original forward to Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft in 1887, 
Tönnies not only cited and praised Marx as the “… the most remarkable and profound social 
philosopher… with regards to that vantage which is most important to me (economic)” (Bond, 
2013: 137) he did so at a time when openly engaging with Marxist writing and ideas could have 
been dangerous.  At the time a young and relatively unknown Tönnies was drafting what would 
become his most famous treatise, Marx was living in exile and Germany was passing laws aimed 
at suppressing ‘dangerous’ socialist ideas and groups. As Niall Bond points out, in this way  
Tönnies open use and explicit citation of Marx needs to be understood in its proper historical 
context.  The invocation of Marx in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft meant Tönnies was: 
…courageous enough to quote him [Marx] notwithstanding the application of the anti-socialist 
law (Gesetz gegen die gemeingefuhrlichen Bestrebungen der Sozialdemokratie) adopted by the 
Reichstag on 19 October 1878, which prohibited social democratic agitation and banned the SPD. 
(140) 
 
Indeed, Tönnies was “…among the earliest academics to make Marx unapologetically citeable as 
a source in established academia…” (137) Although his views, over the course of his career and 
life, evolved away from Marx in several important ways, Tönnies remained both intellectually 
indebted and personally inspired by Marx.28  
 
28 While Tönnies was living in London with family and doing archival research on Hobbes at the British Library, he 
was said to have observed Marx working nearby. The two did not, however, become acquainted as Tönnies’ uncle – 
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 Very much in line with many contemporary scholars of Marx, Tönnies was far more 
interested in Marx’s careful analysis of capitalism than his preliminary musings on communism. 
Indeed, Tönnies’ use of Marx in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft is quite uneven – with no 
references to the ‘father of communism’ in his description of life under the communal conditions 
of Gemeinschaft, but, at times, a near line by line consideration of key concepts from Das 
Kapital in his reflections on life under Gesellschaft. As Bond aptly summarizes: 
Marx is not to be found among the authors cited in Tönnies’ theory of community, which was 
impacted more by Engels’ understanding of primitive communism… …By contrast, in Tönnies’ 
theory of society or Gesellschaft – that is, §19 through §40 of the first book of Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft, Marx dominates. Tönnies describes society as a state of latent negativity with each 
member acting for himself. The only motive for doing anything for anyone else in society is to 
obtain the equivalent at the very least (§19). §20 reproduces much of [the] first section of the first 
chapter of Marx’s Capital, affirming that the value of goods as an objective quality is based upon 
a necessary quantity of work, the time required for their manufacture. (141) 
  
That having been said, it would be an error to characterize Tönnies in terms of a follower of 
Marx. Despite the clear intellectual debt a young Tönnies owed Marx, he did not embrace all of 
Marx’s propositions or predictions.29 Tönnies deployed a number of Marx’s key observations but 
also adapted them to his purposes. More than this, Tönnies also rejected and even inverted some 
of Marx’s foundational assumptions.  Most importantly for our own understanding of 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, is Tönnies dissatisfaction with, and challenge to, Marx’s 
conceptualization of historical materialism – and the genus of determinism it prescribed.  
 At the core of Tönnies challenge to the way Marx deploys historical materialism, is a 
distinction between what he describes as a material theory of history and philosophical 
 
with whom he was staying - forbade him from falling in “…with the dangerous company of Karl Marx.” (138) Later 
in his career, Tönnies did form a professional friendship with Friedrich Engels – whom he both visited and 
corresponded with. 
 
29 Tönnies would eventually publish a short critical intellectual biography of Marx in 1920 entitled Karl Marx, 
Leben und Lehre (His Life and Teachings).  In it, Tönnies both re-articulated differences present in his adaption of 
Marx in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, but also expanded on what he himself acknowledged had been his earlier 
and incomplete understanding and interpretation of Das Kapital.  
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materialism. (Cahman, 1973: 221) Tönnies argues that what this approach amounts to is “…a 
realistic, or anthropological, view of man as a being that exists and perpetuates himself and is 
engaged in the business of making a living.” (221) He concedes that, as per Marx, these natural-
biological requirements and the core socio-economic processes needed to meet them are, relative 
to others, mostly independent variables.  Similarly, Tönnies agrees that there exists another strata 
of more dependent variables – legal, political or ideological – what Marx constituted as the 
superstructure.  However, as Cahman succinctly explains: 
…Tönnies pleads (Marx, Leben und Lehre, p.  141) that the oft-quoted Marxian statement that 
man’s existence determines his consciousness ought to be modified in the sense that man’s 
existential situation merely conditions his consciousness in a more effective and immediate 
manner than is the case the other way around. Consequently, Tönnies’ formula is both more 
comprehensive and more cautious than the formula ascribed to Marx. (222)  
 
For Tönnies, a material-centric understanding of history is simply the continuation of, and 
ongoing contribution to, a scientific approach to understanding the past. It is an essential part of 
any scientific approach to knowledge, but not a new panacea for understanding the world’s ills. 
As Tönnies himself explains: 
The main point is history is viewed anthropologically and that anthropology is approached 
without supranatural and theological prejudices. From this point of departure, the tremendous 
importance for social relations of the tools and instruments of work (but also armaments!) is 
obvious; likewise, the importance of scientific and technological thought and knowledge, whose 
purpose it is to perfect tools and instruments, for the development of social relations. The 
development of social relations, then, is relatively independent of legal conditions and political 
forms while legal conditions and political forms, in turn, are to a high degree dependent on social 
relations and pushed, infringed upon, at times even shattered by them. In this sense, the socio-
economic theory of history is in harmony with the totality of prehistorical and historical 
investigations in the nineteenth century, with the studies of the evolution from stone age to bronze 
age to iron age, form societies of hunters to those centred around agriculture and the crafts; with 
the increased weight that is put nowadays upon the causes and effects of the economic condition 
of a population, the state of the public finances and of foreign trade, and their importance for the 
understanding of political, military, and spiritual transformations.30 (226) 
 
For Tönnies, the calculating and generalized will that emerges under conditions of modern 
 
30 Reprinted from Ferdinand Tönnies, “Entwicklung der Soziologie in Deutschland im 19, Jahrhundert,” in: SStuKr 
II, pages 76-80.  
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‘society’ comes before, both logically and historically, the development of particular types of 
trade and finally capitalism. (220) It is for this reason that, for Tönnies, the essential distinction 
in characteristics between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is not simply about use value and 
exchange value – though that distinction is noted – but instead about the underpinning difference 
between spontaneous/integral (or natural) will under conditions of Gemeinschaft, and calculating 
(or rational) will which comes to dominate under conditions of Gesellschaft.  
 
Natural Will as opposed to Rational Will 
 
 As noted above in excerpts from Durkheim’s (less than entirely kind) first review of 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Tönnies’ work seems to alternate between sociology, psychology 
and philosophy, and (at least according to Durkheim) renders the book, at times, somewhat 
difficult to follow.  Without necessarily conceding entirely to a young Durkheim’s pointed first 
impressions, it is worth noting that in the second section of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft 
Tönnies’ wanders quite a distance from what most would consider traditionally ‘sociological’ 
considerations, and lays out what feels more like a mix of psychological, philosophical, and at 
times even ontological musings on the essential forms of human thinking, acting, and being.31 
Specifically, Tönnies dedicates nearly a quarter of his seminal study of community and society to 
distinguishing between two different forms of human thinking – natural will (alternatively 
referred to as spontaneous or integral will) and rational will (also described as calculating will).  
 Tönnies begins this examination with important caveats around the distinctions and sub-
distinctions he details.  At core, he argues, the will encompasses both ‘the will which includes 
 
31 It should be noted here that while Tönnies doesn’t frame his discussion in as careful sociological terms as Max 
Weber, there are clear and obvious parallels between the former’s archetypal natural and rational wills and the 
letters seminal typology of affective, traditional and rational (value and instrumental) motivations to social action.  
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thinking’ and ‘the thinking which encompasses the will.’ (Tönnies, 2002: 103) These two 
elements, and all sub-distinctions within them, must, according to Tönnies, be understood in 
terms of a united whole – with discrete elements distinguishable analytically but not practically.32   
Such a unity, Tönnies argues, must be “in the first case [natural will] be understood as a real or 
natural one; [and] in the second case [rational will] as a conceptual or artificial one.” (103) He 
goes on to make clear that, despite his use of analytic distinctions that focus on thinking as 
discrete from acting, the two must be understood as, again, part of a unified whole.  From 
Tönnies, thinking and the mind are to the brain what movement is to the muscles. That said, the 
distinction between natural or spontaneous will (Wesenwille) and rational or calculating will 
(Kürwille) - and the correct interpretation thereof – is, for Tönnies, “…essential to the subject of 
[his] treatise.” (103) 
 Tönnies summarizes the analogous relationship between Wesenwille and Kürwille in 
terms of the same organic vs mechanical distinction he deploys more broadly vis a vis 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.  As he explains: 
An AGGREGATE or form of the rational will is related to an aggregate of the natural will in the 
same manner as an artificial tool or machine built for definite ends or purposes compares with the 
organic systems and the various organs of the animal body… …Tools and organs have this in 
common in that they both contain and represent accumulated labour or energy which gives 
definite ness as well as augmentation to the total energy of their respective owners… …The two, 
however, different in their origin and in their qualities. An organ comes into existence by itself, 
through repetition of the same activity by the whole organism or by an already existing organ; 
this additional and specific energy is developed to a greater or lesser degree of perfection. A tool 
is made by the human hand which takes an extraneous substance and gives it unity and form 
according to the idea of the end or purpose which it is expected to serve in accordance with the 
will of its creator.” (135) 
 
Wesenwille (natural will) is for Tönnies the organic and naturally occurring form of human 
 
32 There is an interesting parallel here with the opening sections of Georg Simmel’s essay on association – wherein 
he makes a similar, though broader, set of caveats about the importance of not mistaking analytical distinctions for 
practical or ‘real’ divisions. 
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thinking that emerges from the evolution of traditional human sociation and being.  In contrast, 
Kürwille (or rational/calculating will) is an artificial type of human thinking that is brought into 
being through an (over)emphasis on means/ends calculations and the (often false) assumption 
that outcomes can be shaped by intentions. Wesenwille is characterized in terms of four elements: 
liking, remembering, habit, and feeling; whereas Kürwille is composed of the three interrelated 
thought-activities of: deliberation, discrimination, and conception/judgement. It is worth 
considering each element in turn.  
 Liking, for Tönnies, refers to the mental acknowledgement of the inborn pleasure 
associated with certain objects/actions.  As with all the elements, Tönnies contends that liking is 
defined simultaneously through affirmation and negation. That is to say that it is concurrently the 
move towards pleasure and the move away from pleasures antithesis. According to Tönnies, 
pleasure – as identified under the liking element of natural will originates with notions of 
survival, ease of labour, and reproduction/procreation. Distinguished from this first form – liking 
– is the second element: habit.  Habit, for Tönnies, is the “…will or lust resulting from 
experience.” (110)  Experiences or outcomes that might be contemplated with initial indifference 
or unpleasantness can and do become pleasant through experiential association with other 
pleasant outcomes. Closely associated with this second element, is the third element of 
remembering/memory. If habit is the mental process of developing liking based on experience, 
then memory is the capacity to store and reproduce experientially informed liking over time. 
Taken together, these three first elements of Wesenwille offer a pictured focused on instinct 
(related to inherent liking), habit, and actions explicitly motivated by past experience (related to 
memory).  The fourth element, feeling, ties these three elements together while concurrently 
attaching recognizable (and somewhat nostalgic) human attributes to each of the three other 
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characteristics.  Tönnies argues that the elements feelings captures the variable of ‘human 
excitation’ to the equation.  He argues that core feelings can be associated to each of the other 
elements of natural will: “…passion is based on liking, courage on habit, and genius on 
memory.” (117) Taken together, these elements provide a view of Tönnies’ Wesenwille as being 
the inherent or genuine thinking-activities of humanity – as well as the origin of what would 
come to be seen as ethical virtues.33   
 By contrast, Tönnies describes Kürwille (rational or calculating will) in terms of 
deliberation, discrimination, and conception/judgement.  Deliberation is understood in terms of a 
decision point when “…two inherently hostile ideas meet each other.” (121) This opposition is, 
according to Tönnies, the binary opposition between pleasure and displeasure. As Tönnies 
summarizes: 
Deliberation as will is directed toward that which is painful, that which is not wanted per se, but 
only thereby to get that pleasure which results from it and which is actually and primarily desired. 
(121) 
 
The antithesis here is of principle importance for Tönnies, who emphasizes that it is through the 
relationship between thinking and acting that means/ends calculation emerges. Interestingly, and 
in a way not mirrored in other famous considerations of means and ends, Tönnies suggests that at 
a core level ends can be equated with pleasure and means with pain.  Means are undertaken only 
in so far as they work towards ends – were means pleasurable in the sense Tönnies uses the term, 
 
33 It is interesting to observe that the second edition of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft includes a note referencing 
Hobbes and more directly pointing out that the feelings identified – passion, courage and genius – (which are 
remarkably close to Hobbes’ cardinal virtues) only become virtues in so far as they serve others. However, that 
having been said, Tönnies immediately goes on to quote Hobbes with reference to the fact that social virtues are 
definitionally first individual virtues – that is to say they serve individuals before and more than a collective. 
Specifically Tönnies quotes Hobbes (De Homine, Ch. XIII, 9) in saying “The three cardinal virtues, courage, 
cleverness, and temperance, are not virtues of the citizens, they are general virtues of man, because they are useful 
not alone to the commonwealth, but also to such individuals as posses them. Just as the commonwealth can maintain 
itself only through the courage, cleverness, and temperance of its citizens, it may also be destroyed by the courage, 
cleverness, and temperance of its enemies.” This short, but fascinating, link between Wesenwille and the cardinal 
virtues of a social collective offers an interesting link between Tönnies ideal types of social ion and Hobbes ideal 
type of political collective.  
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they would themselves be ends.  
 The second element of Kürwille is discrimination. According to Tönnies, discrimination 
is the part of the rational will which choose between and gives definitive hierarchy to competing 
ends – ends having already through deliberation been identified as on the pleasure side of the 
pleasure/displeasure dichotomy. This is, for Tönnies, will as “decision,” as he explains: 
It [discrimination] has at its disposition only a homogenous and indifferent quantity of 
possibilities and decides, in every given instance, to realize as much of it as is necessary to bring 
about an imagined result. (122) 
 
Alongside deliberation and discrimination, Tönnies adds the third element of conception (or 
judgement).  Unlike the other two, conception is not tied as directly to action or outcome.  It is a 
‘binding judgement’ which “…develops out of the complexity and variability of experience, 
simple and constant categories to which various phenomenon can be related…” (122) 
 Thus, Tönnies offers us a tripartite understanding of Kürwille (or rational will) 
constituted through the thinking acts of deliberation, discrimination and conception – the 
interrelationship between which he sums up as follows: 
In deliberation, action and idea are one. Discrimination is related thereto as a general principle to 
which many special purposes are subordinated. Finally, conception itself does not determine the 
realization of by action, and conceives of it only as a consequence of its realization in thought 
itself. To understand deliberation, it is essential to study the end, aim or purpose; to understand 
discrimination, where end or purpose is presupposed, it is essential to investigate the reasons; to 
understand conception, we have to find the principles according to which it is constructed. (123) 
 
 
Genuine and Artificial – Social Solidarity under Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
 
 
Notwithstanding a young Durkheim’s pointed critique of Tönnies’ foray into the 
philosophical, there is, I would contend, more method than madness in Tönnies’ careful 
consideration of different forms of human will.  Indeed, while a significant aside in the context 
of reading Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, the near ontological account of human nature not only 
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grounds key distinctions between the two forms of sociation Tönnies explores, but also their 
underpinning conceptions of social solidarity.  Key to this distinction are the dominant forms of 
human sociation and the bonds that bind members together under conditions of Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft.  Here, as discussed above, Tönnies suggests that while these bonds are natural, 
organic and genuine under conditions of Gemeinschaft, they are mechanical and artificial under 
conditions of Gesellschaft. Specifically, Tönnies’ compares notions of kinship, neighborhood, 
and friendship in relation to Gemeinschaft, as compared to their negation under Gesellschaft and 
the mechanical substitutes of contractual and market relations which serve to bind its members. 
In this regard, Tönnies’ point is not subtle – social solidarity is genuine, real and strong under 
conditions of Gemeinschaft, and it is artificial, mechanical and weak (possibly even illusionary) 
under conditions of Gesellschaft.  As he explains, people under each form of sociation are 
fundamentally oriented towards each other differently: 
[In] the Gemeinschaft they remain essentially united in spite of all separating factors, whereas in 
the Gesellschaft they are essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors. In the Gesellschaft, as 
contrasted with the Gemeinschaft, we find no actions that can be derived from an a priori and 
necessary unity; no actions, therefore, which manifest the will and the spirit of the unity even if 
performed by the individual; no actions which, in so far as they are performed by the individual, 
take place on behalf of those united with him. In Gesellschaft such actions do not exist. On the 
contrary, here everybody is by himself and isolated, and there exists a condition of tension against 
all others. (65) 
 
It is only through artificial bonds – like legally backed promises of contracts – that individuals 
under Gesellschaft find themselves connected to others.  In this sense, Gesellschaft is artificial in 
a number of senses.  First, it is the negation of the genuine, real and natural bonds found under 
Gemeinschaft.  Second, it is the establishment of each individual as isolated and in direct 
competition with each other – again something Tönnies see’s as artificial, the product of 
capitalist market forces and relations. Third, the Gesellschaft functions through the enactment 
and acceptance of an artificial ‘unity’ or personification of collective valuation that, as discussed 
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above, replaces the genuine conception of worth. The essential character of the relational bonds 
(social solidarity) that coalesce the Gesellschaft are relations of domination built on the 
atomization of its individual members under artificial principles of capitalist individualism and 
market drive autonomy. As Tönnies summarizes: 
The merchants and capitalists (the owners of money which can be increased by double exchange) 
are the natural masters and rulers of the Gesellschaft. The Gesellschaft exists for their sake. It is 
their tool. All noncapitalists within the Gesellschaft are either themselves like inanimate tools – 
that is, the perfect concept of slavery – or they are legally nonentities, i.e., they are considered 
incapable of free will and consequently incapable of action under the existing system of 
contracts…  
… According to the conception of natural law characteristic of Gesellschaft all human beings as 
rational persons and free agents are, a priori, equal. Everybody represents and possesses a certain 
power and freedom and his sphere of rational will. Everybody can kill his fellow men, if he 
deems it wise. Everybody can appropriate and use derelicts and defend them against attack. 
Everyone can, if he has material and tools, produce new things and acquire ownership in them by 
his own labour. And, thus, everybody can transform his activity into a commodity to sell. He can 
also make the object of a promise, i.e., a contract. (83-84) 
 
In contrast to the artificial/mechanical, and anemic, social solidarity characteristic of 
Gesellschaft of the time (although eerily contemporaneous with our own), Tönnies juxtaposes a 
characterization of social cohesion under (concurrently past and imagined) conditions of 
Gemeinschaft.    
 Social solidarity under conditions of true community, or in Tönnies parlance, the organic 
character of genuine unity of Gemeinschaft can be understood in terms of three distinct sub-
types:  gemeinschaft of blood (kinship), gemeinschaft of place (neighborhood), and gemeinschaft 
of the mind (friendship).  These genuine, and for Tönnies natural, social bonds represent – 
together – the foundations of social solidarity under Gemeinschaft. The three – kinship, 
neighborhood, and friendship – are also interrelated. According to Tönnies, kinship as embodied 
through the family is strongest and most natural of the organic bonds. It is centered in the hearth 
and common home, it is the sharing of possessions, and intimacy in life of proximity, but it is not 
limited to such physicality – “…where it is strong and alive in the closest and most intimate 
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relationship, it can live on itself, thrive in memory alone, and overcome any distance…” (43) 
Alongside kinship, Tönnies also describes neighborhood – the comparable unity born of living 
together in the relative physical proximity of the rural village or town. Communal fields, shared 
spaces, the need to rely and depend on one another extend the unity of blood into the unity of 
place.  Interestingly, the third dimension of natural/organic solidarity under Gemeinschaft is 
distinguishable from the first two in so far as it relates to a proximity of thinking as opposed to a 
physical lived proximity. Friendship, for Tönnies is understood in terms of closeness of 
intellectual attitudes – including a shared faith or belief structure. Though more abstract than the 
other two – Tönnies’ argues that the same basic characteristics stand.  These bonds “…must be 
made and maintained through easy and frequent meetings, usually to take place in a town.” (43) 
They are, of the three natural social bonds under Gemeinschaft, “…the least organic and 
intrinsically necessary…” (44) Yet for Tönnies, they remain part of the tripartite composition of 
the unity of genuine community – family, neighbor, friend or comrade.  
 
Through the eyes of Leviathan: Nostalgia, Dialectics, and Durkheim 
 
Tönnies’ account of the ‘genuine’ and ‘organic’ social bonds and connections under 
conditions of Gemeinschaft, as opposed to the ‘artificial’ and ‘mechanical’ bonds under 
conditions of Gesellschaft can be – and often is – read in terms of a historicized account.  In this 
reading, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft becomes a romantic and nostalgic appeal to an imagined 
past where alienating market forces had not yet degraded the inherent nobility and unity of the 
German volk.  Indeed, as discussed above, soon after the ascension of the Nationalist Socialist 
Party, Ernst Wolfgast (one of Hitler’s zealots) approached Tönnies and praised his work as 
foundational to the Nazis’ plan to return Germany to its imagined past glory. (Samples, 1987: 68) 
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There are however several reasons not to interpret Tönnies work in this way, not least of which 
being Tönnies’ complete rejection of the Nazis interpretation of his work, and the heavy price he 
paid for it. 
As proposed above, I contend that a more interesting way to approach Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft is in terms of a parallel with Hobbes’ Leviathan.  Specifically, an attempt by 
Tönnies to expand – via a more fulsome sociological analysis – the exploration of underlying 
conditions of possibility for a stable political order. This both resonates with Tönnies as an avid 
and accomplished Hobbesian scholar, and in with the political turmoil of his time. From this 
perspective, Tönnies work becomes less about a historicized comparison about the evolution of 
associations in Germany at the turn of the 20th century, and more about the articulation of 
different forms of social bonds that can underpin stable and peaceful human collectivities. In this 
reading, Gesellschaft can be understood as a parallel type of social-contract based society 
assumed by Hobbes as being necessary to escape the state of nature, while Gemeinschaft 
describes an alternative – and better – form of human association Tönnies’ believes is absent 
from Hobbes’ consideration. In short, from this reading, Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft 
can be re-considered in terms of an attempt to complicate the social dimensions of Hobbes’ 
Leviathan – positing that there is an alternative, more organic and natural, form of social 
solidarity that can found a stable political order than the only one conceived by Hobbes.  Re-
considering Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft in this way relies on three key points: 1) a rejection 
of a nostalgic reading and focus on gemeinschaft and gesellschaft as ideal types, 2) an 
understanding of Tönnies as a dialectic thinker, and 3) an understanding of Tönnies’ distinction 
between organic and mechanical ‘affirmative social relations.’  
 In considering these three necessary positions, we turn to yet another famous 
137 
 
contemporary of Tönnies – Émile Durkheim; a contrast with whom serves to elaborate each 
point. Durkheim, like Tönnies, was working hard to establish sociology as a discipline in France 
while in parallel to Tönnies’ and Weber’s efforts in Germany. Though not unknown to one 
another, the two did not correspond in depth – with most of their interactions revolving around 
an early review of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft by Durkheim, and Tönnies’ response a few 
years late. Of course, Durkheim would go on, both in terms of discursive and institutional 
founding, to become one of the founding ‘fathers’ of sociology writ large, whereas Tönnies 
legacy has largely been limited to Germany. However, the two thinkers have been discussed 
together at times – largely due to the similarities in their uses of the terms ‘organic’ and 
‘mechanical’ to describe social relations/solidarity in their respective seminal works. 
Specifically, some have suggested that Durkheim and Tönnies essentially described the same 
typology of social solidarity/relations – organic/genuine as opposed to mechanical/artificial – 
only that they each took an inverse view.  This however, as Werner Cahnman points out in his 
introductory remarks to a reprinting of the Durkheim’s review of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft 
and Tönnies’ lengthy response, misses the fundamental differences of “…both the point of 
departure of the two celebrated sociologists and the image of society at which they arrive…” 
(Cahnman, 1973: 239) 
 Without a lengthy aside into Durkheim’s famous analysis of social solidarity, let us 
consider briefly how Tönnies’ views diverge – even granting the apparent conceptual inversion. 
For Durkheim, mechanical solidarity is an anthropologically/historically (at least in his early 
writings) form of social cohesion premised on strong social roles and restraints. In contrast, as 
examined above, the affirmative social relations under conditions of Gemeinschaft are internally 
driven – being very directly linked to Tönnies’ conception of natural will. The differences 
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between Durkheim’s notion of more modern organic solidarity and Tönnies’ description of 
artificial social bonds under conditions of Gesellschaft are even more striking. While for 
Durkheim, organic solidarity is “…an evolutionary sequence to ‘mechanical solidarity,’ marking 
the triumph of liberty over coercion…” (240), for Tönnies the essential character of real social 
bonds under Gesellschaft is there absence – with social cohesion being premises on the artificial 
stand-ins of market and contractual relations. Nor do these conceptions align in opposite 
couplings – with both Durkheim’s and Tönnies’ stronger and weaker conceptualizations of social 
solidarity remaining premised on fundamentally different foundations.  
 More broadly, while a younger Durkheim was pursuing a sociological investigation 
aligned with anthropological methods of the day, Tönnies approached Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft in terms of a ‘pure’ sociology that could subsequently be ‘applied.’ As Cahnman 
notes:  
In Tönnies’ scheme, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, as pure concepts ever-present ingredients in 
any society although in “applied” sociology there is a tendency for Gesellschaft-like features to 
increase with the passage of time. (240) 
 
 
Analyzing Durkheim’s early review of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, Cahnman further argues 
that while Durkheim clearly realized that Tönnies approached his work as a dialectician – that is 
to say that both opposing conceptions would be held within their opposites – he did not identify 
the strand of what can now be characterized as phenomenology – Tönnies’ point of departure 
being the “contradictory intentionalities of the mind.” (248) Not only do elements of 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft exist in contradicting tension in any unity, they are not conceived 
of in terms of simple hypothetical conditions that can be inductively confirmed or discredited.  
Instead, Cahnman argues, “…for Tönnies, it is a concept that elucidates reality, but cannot be 
verified or modified by it.” (248) 
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 Taken together, one can read Tönnies in terms of a dialectic account in pure sociology of 
two competing ideal types of human sociation premises on two divergent and contradictory – but 
still concurrent – forms of human will.  Far from a nostalgic contribution to German 
romanticism, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, from this perspective, offers an exploration of 
potential social conditions of possibility for stable socio-political orders – which both 
acknowledges the weakening of genuine solidarity under conditions of early capitalism and 
reintroduces the possibility of stronger ties in different settings.  From this perspective, Tönnies 
adds to Hobbes’s project by exploring the implications of the social contractual foundations of 
Leviathan while offering an alternative possibility for those necessary social bonds.   
Social Conflict and the limits of Tönnies  
While Tönnies’ insights on the relationship between social solidarity and forms of 
sociation are clearly relevant to our contemporary question with regards to the social conditions 
of possibility for an agonal democratic order, so too are his thoughts on contest and conflict 
within the social body.  For Tönnies, social conflict is by and large a negative, destructive, force; 
he explicitly rejects the idea that there could be any room for true conflict within a healthy social 
body. Indeed, he conceives of social conflict as the antithesis of association, and therefore of 
successful human society; conflict within the social is understood as an “unnatural and diseased 
state” (Tönnies, 2002: 48). All conflict, however, is not created equal. Tönnies distinguishes 
between social conflict based on 'hostile passions,' which spring from the loosening or rupture of 
natural ties, and social conflict “[…] which is based upon strangeness, misunderstanding, and 
distrust.” (Tönnies, 2002: 48) The former, argues Tönnies, tends to be intense but brief, while the 
latter is typically chronic. For Tönnies, a healthy social body must be organized in a way to 
mitigate, and ideally completely avoid, acute conflict - notably of the chronic kind.   
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Here again it is worth recalling Tönnies’ relationship to Hobbes.  Like Hobbes, Tönnies 
ultimately views conflict within the social body as destructive – a defining element present in the 
state of nature which must be managed and overcome for society/state to be successful, stable, 
and sustainable. Whereas Hobbes’ political philosophy proposed the famous social contract 
under which a pragmatic compromise is reached based on political amity and mutual benefit; 
Tönnies explores two opposing ideal types of social organization that might form the social 
underpinning of such a pragmatic political order.  While Gesellschaft allows humans to live 
together in relative peace, through Gemeinschaft Tönnies explores a competing ideal type of 
social organization where the ‘natural bonds’ between people – kinship and familiarity – are 
allowed to flourish. As discussed above, in this way, one can read Tönnies as attempting to 
introduce a spectrum of social foundations – as represented through the binary opposition 
between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft – underpinning the kind of pragmatic socio-political 
compromise Hobbes is theorizing in Leviathan. Yet in all three pure conceptualizations – 
Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft, or society as assumed under Hobbes’ Leviathan – conflict remains a 
primarily destructive impulse, anathema to social order, stability and society.  For Tönnies, as 
much as for Hobbes, social order takes as its primary role the need to mitigate the violent conflict 
that defines pre-societal humanity.  
However, leaving aside the underlying understanding of conflict as necessarily 
destructive for the moment, we can still adapt from Tönnies a core conception of the social in 
which the range of possible social relations and types of solidarity are predicated, to some 
degree, on its core organization.  Without fully necessarily embracing Tönnies’ description of 
urban life under early capitalism, we can concede that contemporary western society is organized 
in a manner more akin to conditions of Gesellschaft than Gemeinschaft, and that, as such, 
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predisposes itself to certain patterns of social solidarity, conflict, and, most importantly, core 
social relations. In the final section of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Tönnies considers what he 
suggests is a key distinction “dealing with one’s relation to one’s fellow beings.” (Tönnies, 2002: 
237) Tönnies contends that modern human sociation is premised in an important way on relations 
of familiarity and estrangement, a point implied throughout his comparison of community and 
association.  While under the tight knit conditions of Gemeinschaft it might the distinction 
between we and they might be relatively stable; under conditions of Gesellschaft, the lines 
between ally, competitor, and opponent are not always as clear. Though Tönnies makes no move 
to explicitly provide an ontological account of ‘the social’ through a formal binary opposition 
between familiarity and estrangement, the implied spectrum between familiar and 
estranged/unfamiliar represents an interesting perspective through which to consider the core 
distinction rendered within the social. Such a view of the core antithetical distinction 
underpinning the social, alongside Mouffe’s/Schmitt’s understanding of the political, is 












Although, as illustrated above, Tönnies offers us a rather compatible vision of the social to 
consider alongside the concept of the political that Mouffe depends on as the starting point for 
her agonal democratic project, this potential parallel conceptualization, if based solely on 
Tönnies’ work, carry with it certain assumptions significantly at odds with some of the 
foundational concepts Mouffe and other agonal theorists depend upon – and therefore is 
ultimately insufficient to the task at hand.  However, given the importance that the distinctions 
between friend, enemy, and adversary plays in Mouffe’s account of an agonal democratic order, 
the social distinction between familiar and unfamiliar, and the potential spectrum of social 
relations which might flow from such, seem worthy of further consideration. 
Though Tönnies’ insights on sociation and solidarity can - especially from the perspective 
of a Leviathan-esque exploration of ideal types of social stability - be adapted to begin to form 
the foundation of a more robust look at the social conditions of possibility for agonal democracy, 
there remains some substantive work of creative adaptation to be done. Specifically, both the 
implied spectrum of relations surrounding a core dichotomy within the social between the 
familiar and strange, as well as the application of such a notion to a conceptual framework that 
allows certain forms of conflict, be they political or social, to be productive in character – 
requires what I will refer to as a gentle conceptual nudge. Indeed, not only does any defining 
distinction between familiarity/estrangement as a core antithetical distinction rendered within the 
social remain deeply nascent in Tönnies’ work, his overall characterization of conflict – be it 
explosive or chronic – as inherently antisocial, substantively limits the reach of such a 
conceptualization. Without adaptation, Tönnies obvious insights would still leave us with a 
vision of the social which takes as its objective ‘stability’ – more problematically, a view of 
stability to privileges the mitigation or complete elimination of conflict. Such a vision would 
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seem to have limited potential to be put into meaningful conversation with Mouffe’s deployment 
of Schmitt’s concept of the political – as defined by and through genuine but productive conflict.  
Unwilling to discard the valuable insights one can garner from Tönnies, this chapter takes 
it as its fourth task to provide the proposed conceptual nudge through a controlled collision with 
a select few alternative social insights from another of Weber’s, Tönnies’, and Schmitt’s near-
contemporaries:  Georg Simmel.   Though our engagement with Simmel will be relatively 
modest, this is, as noted at the onset of the chapter, by no means to minimize the historical or 
contemporary importance of his contributions. Indeed, Simmel’s short but comprehensive 
consideration of the social, conflict, as well as his evocative theorization of the stranger, in the 
context of modern urban sociation, have become invaluable to many modern sociologists and 
social thinkers. Like Tönnies, though to a lesser degree, Simmel's work has occupied a relatively 
ambiguous space with regards to the classics. (Deflem, 2003: 68) Somewhat the opposite of 
Tönnies, Simmel’s semi-founder status is premised much more on notions of discursive founding 
as opposed to instructional founding.  The result, as Baehr remarks regarding the relative 
valuation of discursive vs institutional founding in sociology predict (Baehr, 2016: 8), is that 
Simmel’s status amongst Anglo-western sociologists is, for the most part, higher than that of 
Tönnies. Yet, despite being much better represented in recent sociological scholarship, Simmel, 
like Tönnies, remains a perennial not-quite-canonical figure.  Notwithstanding, he offers a wealth 
of insights uniquely suited to the questions at hand.  
George Simmel  
Somewhat of a portent of how the legacy of this diverse thinker would come to be 
streamlined as one of the key inspirations behind the contemporary sub-field of urban sociology, 
George Simmel was born on March 1st 1858 in his parents home located at the corner of 
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Leipzigerstrasse and Friedrichstrasse – an intersection that “was later to epitomize metropolitan 
Berlin at the turn of the century.” (Frisby, 2002: 21) Yet despite Simmel’s contemporary status as 
– first and foremost – a sociologist, his short but prodigious intellectual career saw him dabble in 
a wide range of fields, and he also (and sometimes equally) recognized as an aesthetician34, 
essayist, psychologist, and philosopher. (22) Yet despite having published some 25 books and 
over 300 other articles, reviews, and notes – Simmel never achieved significant institutional 
acknowledgement. The degree to which (at least in his early years) these challenges related to 
Simmel’s particular and atypically diverse approach to research and intellectual interests, or 
more to deep currents of antisemitism that would fester from nascent to catastrophic throughout 
his lifetime, remains difficult to discern. What can be confirmed is that Simmel’s relationship to 
and acknowledgment from established academic institutions never matched his intellectual 
contributions. His first attempt at a dissertation - entitled ‘Psychological and Ethnographic 
Studies Music’- was unceremoniously rejected by his committee in 1880, wherein one 
committee member noted they would be doing the budding academic a ‘great service’ if they did 
not encourage him any further in this research direction. Simmel subsequently gained his 
doctorate for far more traditionally philosophical oriented essay on Kant in 1881, and was 
granted habilitation35 in January of 1885. (23) 
Simmel’s early publications and teaching records demonstrate an initial focus on 
philosophy and specifically the – then quite timely – interest in Darwinism. Between 1886 and 
 
34 One of Simmel’s most notable contributions here – while somewhat obscure from a sociological perspective - was 
research he published near the end of his life entitled ‘Rembrandt: An essay in the Philosophy of Art.’ 
 
35 Habilitation, in this context, refers to one of the processes by which doctoral degrees and teaching qualifications 
were conferred in Germany at the time. As part of the habilitation process, Simmel submitted additional research on 
Kant and was required to give a public lecture – after which he was granted a privatdozent (adjunct professorship) at 




1889, Simmel taught seminars at the University of Berlin on ‘The Philosophical Consequences 
of Darwinism’ and in 1895 he published a an essay entitled ‘On the Relations between the 
Doctrine of Selection and Epistemology.’ (24) Simmel’s other interests included work on Herbert 
Spencer, an ongoing adjacent fascination with psychology, as well as extensive research and 
writing on the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.  In terms of direct contributions to 
sociology proper (still an emerging discipline at the time which had not yet solidified consistent 
credibility amongst more established academics) Simmel published numerous explicitly 
sociological articles between 1890 and 1910 – including (at least) nine translated contributions to 
the (then new) American Journal of Sociology. That said, in addition to the large volume of 
articles and essays Simmel published throughout this period, his key sociological contributions 
are generally acknowledged to include his books Über Sociale Differenzierung (On Social 
Differentiation) in 1890, Soziologie36 (Sociology : inquiries into the construction of social forms) 
in 1908, and Grundfragen der Soziologie (Fundamental Questions of Sociology) in 1917.  
Despite his relentless and prolific intellectual production and strong reputation for 
rigorous approach to his research, Simmel’s career did not progress quickly or particularly well. 
In 1908, following the publication of Soziologie, Simmel was considered for the position of 
second chair in philosophy at Heidleberg University. His prospects for this prestigious 
appointment seemed initially strong, with faculty37 involved in the potential appointment 
concluding that: 
 
36 Though Simmel’s contributions to Sociology would – long after his death – gain considerable standing, the 
reception of his work at the time was mixed. One of the most ‘important’ reviewers of his book noted that while the 
book contained many ‘psychological comments of great sensitivity’ its opening chapter on methodology in the 
social sciences did not seem the strongest one in the book. (Frisby, 2002: 29) The reviewer was Ferdinand Tönnies.  
 
37 Among those who strongly supported Simmel for the appointment at Heidleberg University was none other than 
Max Weber – who “…lamented that Simmel ‘remains deprived of the official recognition that would come from 




In his fiftieth year, and in the middle generation of contemporary academic teachers of 
philosophy Simmel is decidedly the most unique figure. One cannot locate him in any of the 
general currents; he has always gone his own way… There is no doubt the Simmel, with his 
extensive and many-sided knowledge and with his penetrating intellectual energy, if anyone were 
capable of doing so, could raise sociology from the state of empirical data collection and general 
reflections to the rank of a genuine philosophical discipline. If he can be secured for Heidelberg, 
then the social sciences as a whole and in all their branches … … would find such a 
comprehensive representation as exists nowhere else. (31) 
 
Sadly, but 1908, antisemitism – long simmering below the surface of German society – had 
become far more explicit and institutionally supported. In contrast to the support Simmel 
received from within the academy, in a report to the minister of education, university officials 
described Simmel as “an Israelite through and through, in his external appearance, in his bearing 
and in his mode of thought.” (31)  It was not until 1914, at the age of fifty-six, that Simmel 
finally achieved a full university appointment as chair of philosophy at the University of 
Strasbourg. He would die some 4 years later at the age of sixty.  
  
 
Conflict, Familiarity and Estrangement – Simmel on ‘the social’ 
 
In many ways, Simmel’s work represents some of the most comprehensive and focused 
considerations of conflict in society of its day.   Taking a fundamentally different position on 
conflict than those postulated by either Tönnies, Schmitt, or Hobbes – who all, albeit in radically 
different ways, understand conflict as anathema to stability38 - Simmel contends that conflict, in 
its various forms, represents a crucial element of all human sociation. Simmel argues that rather 
 
38 While this fact should be clear with regards to Tönnies, it might cause a moment of hesitation with regards to 
Schmitt. Afterall, Schmitt’s concept of the political is itself fraught with conflict. That said, it is important to recall 
that while Schmitt characterizes the political in terms of the distinction between friend and enemy, he asserts that it 
is only through the total state – an unapologetic vision of totalitarianism – that the state can hope to survive the 
ravages of conflict which he sees as otherwise inevitable. For Schmitt conflict is eternal, but a destructive force to be 
forever controlled, protected against, and ultimately feared by those who would have ‘order.’  
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than understanding conflict as an obstacle to, or negation of, social unity, it instead must be 
understood as both proceeding and being operative within every moment of such a unity 
(Simmel, 1955: 15).  The tendency to understand conflict in terms of its socially destructive 
character, according to Simmel, stems from the way in which it is analytically abstracted from 
the totality of social forces at play.   Conflict, Simmel grants, does not by itself produce what we 
could consider a viable social structure – however, neither does any other abstracted element of 
human sociation.  As Simmel notes: 
In this respect, conflict thus is hardly different from any other form of relation which sociology 
abstracts out of the complexity of actual life.  Neither love nor the division of labor, neither party 
affiliation nor superordination of subordination is likely by itself alone to produce or permanently 
sustain an actual group. (Simmel, 1955: 21) 
 
Indeed, Simmel asks whether this tendency to abstract what we perceive to be elements of 
heterogeneous bonds which form complex social relations might not in fact be more 
characteristic of the limits of our analytic capabilities than of the relations themselves.   Perhaps, 
posits Simmel, these complex relations are homogeneous in character, “but our minds cannot 
grasp their homogeneity.” (Simmel, 1955: 21) These complex social relations, according to 
Simmel, are mirrored by psychological phenomena within individuals.   Complex emotional 
responses, experienced as homogeneous, are none the less, post factum, understood in terms of a 
multiplicity of oppositional forces.  However, this, Simmel suggests, may have less to do with 
the fact that actual elements of a series are being unpacked, than with the fact that “…the 
calculating intellect often lacks a paradigm for this unity and must construe it as the result of 
several elements.” (Simmel, 1955: 22)   
This leads Simmel to contend that it is this lack of a paradigm able to grasp complex 
unities, which leads sociologists (among others) to consider social interactions in term of various 
interplays of (so-called) converging and diverging currents. (Simmel, 1955: 23)   That is, 
148 
 
according to Simmel: 
…the structure [of a group] may be sui generis, its motivation and form being wholly self-
consistent, and only in order to be able to describe and understand it, do we put it together, post 
factum, out of two tendencies, one monistic, the other antagonistic.  Or else, these two do in fact 
exist, but only, as it were, before the relation itself originated.  In the relation itself, they have 
fused into an organic unity in which neither makes itself felt with its own, isolated power. 
(Simmel, 1955: 23) 
 
Simmel’s point is not that these opposing social currents do not ever exist side by side in real 
social settings, on the contrary, he concedes that they do.   Instead, Simmel argues is that what is 
important to recognize is that in numerous cases when such elements are analytically separated 
to fit neatly into either monistic or antagonistic categories, what is being done may be less akin 
to separating discrete phenomena mixed together, and more akin to dissecting a living totality 
into arbitrarily cut out segments.   According to Simmel, in either case, the analytic division of 
elements from a whole risks misunderstanding or essentializing their relations to the totality.  
  Another cause for the misrepresentation of antagonism and discord as a purely 
destructive force is, according to Simmel, the two-fold understanding of social ‘unity.’  As 
Simmel contends: 
 
There is a misunderstanding according to which one of these two kinds of interaction [monistic 
and antagonistic] tears down what the other builds up, and what is eventually left standing is the 
result of the subtraction of the two (while in reality it must rather be designated as the result of 
their addition). (Simmel, 1955: 16) 
 
This is because the dominant understanding of social unity constitutes it as “the consensus and 
concord of interacting individuals, as against their discords, separations, and disharmonies.” 
(Simmel, 1955: 17) As Simmel points out, this however, is but one of two possible 
understandings of unity.   The second conception of unity is one in which unity designates the 
total group-synthesis of its components or the ultimate wholeness of a group. (Simmel, 1955: 17) 
The totality of the ‘wholeness’ of a group, argues Simmel, is necessarily constituted by both 
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unitary and dualistic relations.   So, then, Simmel points out, unity refers both to the total 
wholeness of a group, and to “functional components considered specifically unitary.” (Simmel, 
1955: 17) This latter use of the term, according to Simmel, serves to obscure the former, and 
broader, sense of unity.  According to Simmel, several forms of conflict actually presuppose and 
depend upon a preexisting unity and social order, and do not posit its destruction.   Simmel notes 
that several forms of conflict are actually characterized by a mutual acceptance of the rules and 
limits of said conflict by the conflicting parties themselves.  Legal conflict and what Simmel 
calls Kampfspiel (antagonistic games) are prime examples. (Simmel, 1955: 38)   
Simmel goes on to consider several other forms of social conflict, and the various ways in 
which their antagonistic elements presuppose and build upon elements of unity.   Most ‘radical’ 
of these, Simmel argues, is the sociological phenomenon of jealousy.   As Simmel explains: 
Jealousy can combine the most passionate hatred with the continuation of the most passionate 
love, and the lingering of the most intimate unity with the destruction of both parties – for, the 
jealous individual destroys the relation just as much as that relation invites him to destroy his 
partner. (Simmel, 1955: 55) 
 
For Simmel, jealousy, Kampfspiel, and legal conflict all help to illustrate that what are commonly 
understood as conflicts are not pure antagonisms; they represent various social relations in which 
elements of antagonism and unity are interdependent, and only, at best, analytically separable.  
While in many ways less developed than his work on conflict, Simmel's now seminal 
ruminations on the social form of the stranger also offers an important catalyst for our proposed 
deployment of some of Tönnies key sociological insights.  To be sure, Simmel’s brief but 
discursively foundational notion of social strangership is a marked contrast to the conventional 
meaning that Tönnies ascribes to the term. Whereas for Tönnies the quality of strangeness or 
estrangement is presented in contradistinction to its oppositional parallel - familiarity, Simmel 
contends that the social position of ‘the stranger’ is better defined by and through a thicker 
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exploration of its liminality and hybridity.   For Simmel, the stranger represents a position 
between the familiar and the alien.  As he notes: 
In the case of the stranger, the union of closeness and remoteness involved in every human 
relation is patterned in a way that may be succinctly formulated as follows: the distance within 
this relation indicates that one who is close by is remote, but his strangeness indicates that one 
who is remote is near. (Simmel, 1971: 143) 
  
In this way, far from being the simple opposite of familiarity, the stranger, according to Simmel, 
represents the hybrid social form through which sameness and difference coexist.  The social 
form of the stranger, for Simmel, represents the ‘inorganic appending’ of an organic member of 
the group. (Simmel, 1971: 145) The stranger is the historical form required for sociation beyond 
familiarity.   
Of course, for Simmel, the concept of the stranger was limited to a fascinating, but 
discrete, liminal social position within a particular historical context.  Yet despite the relatively 
brief consideration Simmel offers on the stranger, it has inspired a wealth of analysis and theory. 
In this way, in order to understand the full scope of Simmel’s conceptualization fo the stranger – 
and its discursive echoes – it becomes necessary to move beyond what Simmel himself wrote. 
Building on Simmel’s original postulation, contemporary sociologists and social theorists have 
dramatically expanded the scope and depth of the original concept ‘the stranger’ as a social type, 
exploring in detail the notion of the ‘strangership’ as one of the defining forms of sociation in 
modern societies. Strangership shifts focus from social form to social relation. “Where the study 
of strangers focuses on specific traits of individuals and groups, the concept of strangership 
focuses instead on the characteristics of relationships between strangers.” (Horgan, 2012: 607) 
Not only are the social relations of strangership understood as pervasive in a contemporary 
context, they are posited as at least “partially constitutive of social order – especially in cities.” 
(Horgan, 2012: 613)   Let us briefly consider this contemporary expansion of Simmel’s stranger 
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as the social relation of strangership. 
Drawing together insights from several seminal contemporary considerations of the 
stranger (e.g. Collins 2004, Alexander 2004, Fine 2010), Critical sociologist and Simmelian 
scholar Mervyn Horgan proposes three core conditions of possibility necessary for the 
emergence and/or presence of the social relation of strangership: copresence, mutual agreement 
about social distance, and mobility. (Horgan, 2012: 614-615) The first and most basic 
requirement for strangership is copresence.  Understood as both spatial and temporal, copresence 
is set out as encountering and approaching in the context of a proximity in time and space, “…it 
involves at least two persons in the same place at the same time.” (Horgan, 2012: 614) The 
second condition of possibility for strangership is a mutual agreement about the relevant social 
distance. This second requirement speaks to the inherent mutuality of all social relations – in the 
classical sense.  For a relation of strangership to emerge or remain present “...those in relations of 
strangership have an implied mutual understanding of the nature and degree of social distance by 
which the relationship ought to be characterized.” (Horgan 2012: 616) Though not necessarily 
symmetrical, the second basic requirement for strangership is basic shared understanding of 
terms of the relation.  The third basic condition of possibility for strangership is mobility.  One of 
the core characteristics of Simmel’s original account of the stranger, physical mobility – the 
movement of peoples across borders and through communities – has remained a central theme in 
discussions of the stranger.  Expanding this idea, Horgan argues that the social relation of 
strangership needs to be considered not only as constituted through traditional notions of 
mobility, but also via the possibilities of social and symbolic mobility. Social mobility speaks to 
the (relatively) modern fluidity and interaction between various social positions (e.g. economic, 
ethnic, or professional), bringing individuals and groups previously strongly segregated into 
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previously improbable proximity. Symbolic mobility relates to notions of recognition and status, 
suggesting that access to symbolic resources or radical transformations in contexts can contribute 
to relations of strangership even in the context of an otherwise stable understanding of the local. 
(Horgan, 2012: 617) 
 
What Simmel offers Tönnies  
 
Drawing on Simmel, as well as some of his contemporary interpreters, we find ourselves 
with a nuanced conceptualization of conflict in society – not always as an antithetical force to 
unity, but as a complex play of social relations and positions defined and modified through 
notions of material and symbolic proximity, distance and understanding. How then might this 
perspective adjust the key insights drawn from Tönnies?  Whereas we are aiming to adapt from 
Tönnies a core conception of the social according to which social relations and types of 
solidarity are predicated, to a significant degree, on its core organization; Simmel offers a careful 
consideration of the role for socially productive conflict and a conceptualization of the stranger 
as a social position, or in its more contemporary interpretation a social relation, defined not vis a 
vis a binary opposition, but indeed constituted precisely through a hybrid and liminal position 
betwixt and between the foundational we and they.  Taken together, we can import into Tönnies 
view of the social two main additions:  1) the notion that conflict, acute or chronic, need not 
always be anathema to social stability or unity, and 2) that the social might be better framed not 
in terms of a binary opposition but in terms of a field of tensions anchored in a conceptualization 
of not only a core antithetical distinction but also an ever present liminal co-constituted middle 













Key here is the notion that strangership is introduced as a liminal point concurrently between, 
outside of, and incorporating elements of both the antithetical positions in the core binary 
opposition. In this way, injecting a conceptual vocabulary based on Simmel’s figure of the 
stranger not only serves to nudge our core depiction of a complimentary account of the social to 
partner with the concept of the political underpinning Mouffe’s work, it also provides another 
way to consider the essential transfiguration – from enemy to adversary – upon which Mouffe’s 
normative project depends.  Here, as illustrated below, the concept of liminality offers a way to 
reconsider the adversary not in terms of a transformation of the enemy, but as a liminal figure - 
concurrently between, outside of, and incorporating elements of both the antithetical positions in 


















This all having been said, it is important to note here that I am not contending that these 
elements exist in Tönnies’ work as it is written, neither explicitly nor even in a nascent form. 
Both the conceptualization as conflict as potentially productive, and the shift from a binary to 
tripartite set of core distinctions introduce perspectives Tönnies’ did not embrace, or at least, did 
not clearly articulate in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft.  Very much in parallel to the larger 
project to introduce new landmarks into the conceptual geography of agonal democratic theory, 
to Mouffe’s selective appropriation of Schmitt’s concept of the political, or even Tönnies’ 
reconsideration of Hobbes’ core question of social stability through a lens that prioritized familial 
bonds, this shift doubtless represents a change to the letter and spirit of the work as presented.    
And yet, neither of the two elements derived from Simmel – conflict as productive and a 
tripartite rather than binary set of core distinctions - necessitates a substantive reordering of the 
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picture of the social Tönnies’ offers us. Far from destabilizing the foundations of Tönnies’ 
impressive exploration of the roles social organization play on producing and maintaining 
different forms of social solidarity, I would contend that this proposed conceptual nudge adapts 
and adjusts the edges of that work rendering them more compatible with contemporary 





































Chapter 4  
 
On the Utility of Abstracting an Ethos of Social Agon: Thinking Agonal 




As discussed at the onset of this project, the small, but prominent, subset of contemporary 
political theory concerned with the conceptual re-prioritization of the political ideal of agon in 
democratic theory – what we have described as agonal democratic theory - offers a fascinating 
challenge to what has become the dominant focus of mainstream work on democracy with 
principles of deliberation, compromise, or consensus. These theorists, though diverse in the 
particulars of their radical visions for a (re)new(ed) democratic order, share as a core principle 
that it is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate genuine conflict from the realm of politics. 
That said, and as briefly noted in chapter 1, these theorists also share a belief that in order to look 
beyond the contemporary democratic imaginary, radical democratic theory must re-center its 
efforts around the concept of the political itself – a move that has been described (often 
critically) as a shift toward “a philosophy of politics whose fundamental task is, in the first 
instance, to isolate and capture the very essence of political being.” (McNay, 2014: 2)  
Though inherently sympathetic to the critical and normative underpinnings of this radical 
agonal (re)turn, as I have argued throughout this project, the emphasis on capturing an 
ontological account, however contingent and qualified, of the political appears to have produced 
as a by-product a withdrawal from a nuanced understanding of the social which ranges from 
substantial to complete. While some critics of this subset of political theory have rejected this 
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attempt to consider the ‘essence’ of the political altogether, I argue that one need not abandon 
this radical contingent-ontological turn altogether. Instead, I contend that one can bolster such 
theoretical approaches through engagement with classical sociological accounts of the social in 
order to inject into these socio-anemic accounts a complimentary understanding of the social. 
Indeed, at the very core of this project is the contention that by challenging the dominant logic of 
determination in most agonistic theory - under which the social is essentially reduced to an 
aftereffect of the political – one can recover and expand some of  the nascent conceptualizations 
of the social subsumed within, and underpinning these radical democratic visions. By injecting 
into agonal democratic theory selected sociological insights from classical theory as alternative 
theoretical pillars, we are able to begin to ask a distinctive, hitherto ignored, and deeply 
important sociological question. Namely: what are the underlying social conditions of possibility 
for a radically emancipatory democratic order premised on the ideal of political agon? 
To this end, in chapter 1, we considered the ways in which the analytic and philosophical 
foundations of Chantal Mouffe’s radical democratic theory – taken as emblematic of the field – 
predisposed Mouffe’s agonal account towards a devaluing, ignoring, and reducing of the social 
to the merest sediment of previous political contest. In chapters 2 and 3, we explored a selection 
of classical sociological thinkers – Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, & Georg Simmel - in order 
to identify, consider and adapt some of their key insights with regards to the political and social 
as potential alternative foundations for the social dimensions of a radical democratic vision. 
However, in attempting to consider an account of radical/agonal democracy that takes more 
seriously the position and importance of ‘the social’ – I have, to this point, focused on the 
creative adaptation of classical sociological insights meant to offer a fresh conceptual terrain 
upon which to build an (albeit contingent) ontological account ‘the social’ to compliment and 
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parallel Mouffe’s ‘purely political’ account of ‘the political.’  The result is that, to this point and 
very much like Mouffe and other agonal theorists, this project has offered relatively little 
consideration of the so-called ‘ontic’ dimension of the political – what Mouffe calls politics, nor, 
if it is to be more robustly consider, the social – what we can describe as sociation.39  
As explored in Chapter 1, Mouffe draws on Heidegger’s distinction between dasein-
ontological or essence of being and dasein-ontical or existence of being (Heidegger 1962: 32) in 
order to explain what she sees as a fundamental distinction between the political and politics. 
Though not identical to the Heideggerian formulation, Mouffe’s adaptation of the 
ontological/ontic dichotomy permits her a way of focusing on what she believes is the key to 
fully understanding and theorizing a new and radical vision for modern democracy. While 
politics refers to the ‘ontic’, the political refers to the ‘ontological.’ That said, despite the use of 
Heideggerian terminology, Mouffe’s account of the character of the political suggests neither the 
eternality nor the immutability of a classical ontological claim. Indeed, reading her 
ontic/ontological distinction through the lens of her previous work with Ernesto Laclau in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, I concluded that Mouffe’s deployment of these categories 
could only be understood in terms of a relatively high degree of historical contingency. (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 2000) This contingent ontic/ontological distinction allows Mouffe to set aside the 
important but messy character of lived politics and focus nearly exclusively on the ‘essence’ of 
the political and the various conceptions and misconceptions she argues have led political 
theorists astray. Though others use different terminologies, Mouffe is not alone in this focus on 
essence over practice. Indeed, this ‘philosophical turn’ is common among most if not all agonal 
theorists. (Connolly, 1991 & 1995; Honig 1993 & 2009; Tully, 1995 & 2006; and Hatab, 2002) 
 
39 Add short description of where we borrow the term sociation from – SIMMEL – and how we are mirroring the 
distinction between the political & politics with the social & sociation. Sociation = social action for Habermas … 
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I have argued from the onset of this project that any viable conceptualization of ‘the 
political’ must be considered alongside a complimentary account of the social. While I am not 
unsympathetic to the move to consider ‘the political’ – or a complimentary consideration of ‘the 
social’ - in terms of a contingent-ontological account; this does not mean that the exploration of 
ontological accounts of either the political or the social (no matter how contingent) are not 
potentially problematic or fraught. The risk of either essentialism or, at the extreme, a sort of 
transcendental determinism that obscures or negates the lived experiences of real people must be 
avoided if there is any chance of meeting the shared normative commitments of both the radical 
democratic turn we are exploring, and critical theory more broadly. Although Mouffe explicitly 
notes the equal importance of the ontic and ontological, her work on agonal democracy focuses 
near entirely on the latter. This opens Mouffe, and many other agonal theorists, to substantive 
critique. Specifically, the critique goes, such a philosophical emphasis leads inevitably to a 
neglect – benign or otherwise – of the very lived experiences of inequality, exploitation, 
disenfranchisement, domination, and even resistance, with which radical agonistic theorists are, 
from a normative perspective, trying to address. Furthermore, it may inadvertently contribute to 
the common tendency to ignore or diminish everything outside a narrow construction of ‘the 
political’; including, more specifically, to obscure, reduce or ignore the necessary underpinning 
societal conditions of possibility for agonal democracy in terms of both their ontological (the 
social) and ontic (sociation) dimensions.  
Aiming to both mitigate this risk and introduce an alternative conceptual vernacular 
through the creative adaption of certain key social thinkers; in this chapter we turn our attention 
to a fourth and final philosopher, political theorist and sociologist – Jürgen Habermas. 
Challenging the dominant traditional reading of Habermas’ account of deliberative democracy as 
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exclusively focused on consensus, as well as Mouffe’s and other agonal theorists’ often less than 
amiable engagements with it; I propose that, very much in line with the insights garnered from 
Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Georg Simmel, Habermas may offer agonal theorists several 
complementary conceptual tools that have, to date, been underestimated or ignored. This is, of 
course, by no means to ignore the very real distinctions between radical/agonal democratic 
theories and Habermas’ procedural account of deliberative democracy, nor the very real 
antagonisms between Habermas and the likes of Schmidt, upon whose work Mouffe builds so 
much. However, I do contend that Habermas’ work can be read through the lens of a nascent 
agonistic sensibility, which, while by no means rendering it part of the agonal democratic 
tradition per se, does open up the hitherto underexplored possibility of a more productive 
engagement across what have traditional been seen as diametrically opposing perspectives. 
Specifically, I contend that Habermas’ work offers Mouffe and other agonal democratic theorists 
both 1) an example of a theoretical account of democracy and justice that more successfully 
balances the ontic and ontological dimensions, and 2) an account of the social conditions of 
possibility for a theory of deliberative democracy, upon which agonal theorists may be able to 
build with regards to a radical democracy premised on the ethos of political agon.  
With this in mind, this chapter is organized around the goal of facilitating, and perhaps at 
times mediating, this proposed potential renewed exchange. Both between deliberative and 
agonal democratic theory broadly, and between Habermas and Mouffe more specifically. To this 
end, I begin by introducing Jürgen Habermas as the fourth and final sociological thinker, with an 
emphasis on his intellectual origins and his position vis-a-vis the discursive and institutional 
‘founders’ discussed thus far. Here, we also find ourselves returning to our consideration of Max 
Weber – upon whose seminal understanding of social action Habermas builds his own critical 
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account of communicative social action.  Habermas’ Weber, as we will see, is closely linked to 
Schluchter’s reading of the canonical figure – though perhaps with a stronger claim to the unity 
of Weber’s overarching sociological objectives. Next, we pause from Habermas to briefly 
explore some of the key elements of the claim that the agonal (re)turn in political theory, with its 
emphasis on the ontological essence of the political, inherently weakens any viable consideration 
of the lived experiences that play out across the ontic dimensions, what Mouffe calls the messy 
realities, of everyday politics. To do this, I explore the recent work of Lois McNay, who levels 
the charge that such theorists have fallen prey to forms of ‘social weightlessness’ and as a result 
have failed to meet their own normative commitments to address the social inequality and power 
imbalances of the real world. Here, we consider both certain sympathies with McNay’s critique – 
that agonal theorists may well have, to date, paid too little attention to the ontic dimensions of 
politics – while challenging some of her other claims.  Most notably, that any exploration of the 
ontological distracts from or negates from the greater importance of the ontic, as well as the even 
more deeply troubling conflation of the ontic dimensions of the political (politics) and the social.   
In the third section, we return to Habermas, this time exploring how his more ontological 
understanding of communicative social action provides a foundation for a more ontic-oriented, 
what he describes as procedural, account of deliberative democracy. Here, as noted above, I 
propose a fresh re-reading of Habermas’ deliberative democratic musings, considered in terms of 
their potential synergies and sympathies with the core principles of the agonistic vision of radical 
democracy – and specifically Mouffe’s account thereof.  Taking a more agonistic, as opposed to 
antagonistic, approach to a dialogue between radical and discursive visions of democracy, I 
explore the potentials for re-imagining both theories in terms of a productive tension. Finally, 
this chapter will conclude with a consideration of the ways in which agonal accounts of radical 
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democracy that more fully balance both the ontic and the ontological dimensions of their 
theoretical perspectives, may not insulate them from the critique of social weightlessness, but 
may also provide a more fertile conceptual landscape in which to address the social conditions of 
possibility necessary to realize their own normative aspirations.   
 
Jürgen Habermas - Between Contemporary, Classical, and Canon 
 
 I propose to introduce elements of the work of Jürgen Habermas into the discussion 
surrounding the social conditions of possibility that could underpin a viable agonistic vision of 
democracy. I do so in two distinctive, but overlapping, ways.  While in chapters 2 and 3, this 
project sought to explore insights from classical sociological thinkers as alternative foundations 
for agonal theory broadly – and Chantal Mouffe’s work specifically – by way of the creative 
adaptation of conceptual pillars in the works of canonical and canon-adjacent perspectives of 
Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Georg Simmel; here we turn to the work of a more 
contemporary sociologist, philosopher and political theorist.  And yet, while it is true that agonal 
theorists have, quite directly, engaged to some extent with Habermas on their own accord – 
specifically his responses to John Rawls and the development of a procedurally founded theory 
of deliberative democracy – this is not the only way in which I seek to introduce the vast and 
diverse insights of a thinker widely described as one of the most important philosophers of our 
time.  Whereas, in some ways, one can view Habermas as a contemporary of agonal thinkers like 
Chantal Mouffe, William Connolly, or even moral philosopher John Rawls – he is concurrently 
very much a product of the social, political and cultural circumstances that so affected the 
classical insights of Weber, Tönnies, Simmel and, though very differently, Schmitt. In this way, I 
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am proposing to introduce Habermas as a sort of liminal figure. On the one hand, Habermas 
represents a present day thinker who, while shaped by his early childhood experiences with the 
Nazi regime and Second World War, has developed political, philosophical and sociological 
perspectives shaped by modern developments – and has engaged in the same telltale 
philosophical, moral and political debates through which the radical agonistic vision of 
democracy was born. However, at the same time, Habermas can also be read in terms of his 
being the youngest of those same classical German  thinkers shaped by a vibrant intellectual 
heritage violently interrupted – both practically and symbolically – by the unimagined horrors of 
the National Socialist Party rule over Germany.40  In this way, in exploring and seeking to 
creatively adapt elements of Habermas’ seminal thought, we do so simultaneously in terms of 
looking for alternative foundations for agonal democracy vis a vis classical sociological insights 
from German scholars other than Carl Schmitt, and, through a purposeful re-reading and re-
examining a procedural account of deliberative democracy as well its existing interpretation by 
agonal thinkers – proposing that the two perspectives may have more in common than has 
traditionally been allowed.41   
 
 
Rise of Rationalism – Habermas’ foundational interpretation of Weber 
 
 
40 Justification – in terms of who Habermas studied with and where, whether there was (yet) a true break with the 
classical academic environment and thinking in which Tönnies, Weber, Simmel and Schmitt had developed. 
 
41 This is by no means to minimize the very real differences between Habermasian accounts of deliberative 
democracy, and radical democratic claims based on an ethos of agonism.  Specifically, authors like Chantal Mouffe 
and William Connolly (among many others) have long lists of disagreements with Habermas’ procedural accounts 
and vision of ideal communication. Instead, this is to note that, despite these very real issues, one can – as will be 
explored later in this chapter – re-read Habermas in terms of a nascent agonal sensibility, and through this, expand 
and develop the interchange between these two adjacent responses to Rawls.  
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Engaging with the massive corpus of Habermas’ contributions – be they to philosophy, 
political science, sociology, or communications studies – can be daunting. Habermas’ works and 
evolving insights cross multiple disciplines and span more than seven decades. That said, for the 
purposes of this project, a selective exploration of Habermas begins, for us, with a return to Max 
Weber. Foundational to his seminal work, The Theory of Communicative Action (volumes 1 & 2), 
Habermas’ critical engagement with Weber – both in general and specifically with regards to 
Weber’s famous typology of social action – is a necessary starting point for understanding 
Habermas’ concept of communicative action, the central underpinning role it plays in his later 
work on deliberative democracy, and the potential ways it could be deployed to further expand 
the conceptual vistas of the agonal democratic landscape. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the collective works of Max Weber – which were left 
unfinished and appeared disparate at time of his death – have been read and interpreted 
differently over the years.  While Weber’s work had always been seen as relatively important in 
Germany, and some of his seminal insights were circulating and influencing a subset of 
important American academics for decades following his death, it was not until the 1950s that 
Weber’s lasting legacy began to crystalize, with the international proliferation of his work, 
understood as a cohesive body.  Within English speaking academia, awareness and recognition of 
Weber as a central sociological figure was heralded by Talcott Parsons, and as we explored 
previously, it is Parsons’ particular reading and interpretation of Weber that dominated his early 
reception across Anglo-academe. The first substantial challenge to Parsons’ account of Weber – 
which had heavily emphasized an understanding and presentation of Weber’s writings in the 
context of a unified theoretical perspective in the ‘grand theory’ tradition – came through the 
work of Reinhard Bendix. Bendix’s 1960 Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, was one of the 
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first significant challenges to Parsons’ Weber – presenting a characterization of Weberian thought 
far more focused on a thematic of historical sociology.   
Habermas, like Wolfgang Schluchter, rejects the more narrow readings of Weber’s work 
and aligns more with Reinhard Bendix’s ‘recovery’ of Weber, which sought to broaden the 
understanding of Weber’s work across his various explorations of society, politics, religion and 
economics. That said, Habermas’ Weber, though aligned with Bendix’s and Schluchter’s 
readings, remains distinctive.  In the first volume of The Theory of Communicative Action, 
Habermas introduces Weber in terms of an overarching project exploring “…the process of 
disenchantment in the history of religion…” understood in terms of the “…necessary internal 
conditions for the appearance of Occidental rationalism.” (Habermas, 1984:143) This 
perspective, Habermas contends, was not new, so much as a return to a previous, or even 
original, more holistic way of approaching Weber’s writings. As Habermas explains: 
Weber left his work behind in a fragmentary state; nevertheless, using his theory of rationalization 
as a guideline, it is possible to reconstruct his project as a whole. This was once the dominant 
perspective of interpretation in the largely philosophical discussions of the twenties; it was then 
displaced by a strictly sociological interpretation oriented to Economy and Society; in the most 
recent Weber research, it has once again come to the fore. (143) 
 
This vision of a cohesive, though incomplete, project stretching across the body of Weber’s 
writings must not be confused with a Parsons-like attempt to form and fit Weber’s writings into a 
grand theoretical model. Although Habermas spends a significant amount of time engaging with 
Parsons in the second volume of The Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas, 1987), his 
own understanding of Weber is far more aligned with Bendix’s ‘recovery’ as well as other ‘post-
Parsons’ accounts.  Indeed, to a significant extent, the Weber Habermas presents and builds upon 
owes something to the work of Wolfgang Schluchter.  Again, as we explored in Chapter 2, as a 
Weberian scholar, Schluchter challenged much of the dominant framing of Weber’s work, 
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emphasizing, alongside his sociological contributions, a political-philosophical dimension in the 
corpus of that work.  That said, Habermas – here writing in the 1980s – though not aligned with 
a Parsons reading of Weber, was also not focused on the ongoing project of ‘recovering’ Weber 
from the dominant Parsons-inspired interpretation. Rather, Habermas aims to use a broader 
reading of Weber’s overarching project as the starting point for his own distinctive understanding 
of society and social action. To that end, Habermas approaches Weber in terms of reconstructing 
what he describes as an incomplete and, at times, contradictory, but still crucial exploration of 
the different forms, functions and features of modern western rationality – culminating in a 
conception of practical rationality. 
 Approaching Weber in terms of an overarching project to understand the rise and 
particularities of Occidental rationalism, Habermas positions Weber in terms of both a longer 
tradition of examining the rationalization of societies, and a break with earlier currents of 
thought. Specifically, Habermas points out that: 
The theory of rationalization does not belong to that speculative heritage from which sociology as 
a science had to free itself. As sociology developed in the wakes of the Scottish moral philosophy 
and early socialism, with its own lines of questioning and its own theoretical approaches, as a 
discipline concerned with the original and development of modern society, it found the theme of 
societal rationalization already at hand. This theme had been dealt with in the eighteenth century 
by philosophy of history and had been taken up and transformed in the nineteenth century by 
evolutionary theories of society. (145) 
 
In terms of this first heritage – the philosophy of history in the eighteenth century – Habermas 
draws on the works of Nicolas de Condorcet to outline its core features. In this early exploration 
of rationalism and rationalization, philosophers like Condorcet were not so much interested in, as 
they were enamored with, the (re)emergent42 sciences – mathematics, chemistry, biology, 
 
42 Here I say both ‘emergent’ and ‘re-emergent’ in recognition of the fact that, outside a Eurocentric account of 
history, many of the scientific discoveries of the day were in fact re-discoveries – having already been made 
centuries prior in various parts of the Middle East and Asia, as well as in ancient Greece, Rome and Egypt prior to 




physics, etc...  Rationalization, it was argued, was part and parcel of the proliferation and 
supremacy of scientific thought and methodology, and Condorcet, as emblematic of his time and 
discipline, approached the question of rationalization of society guided by four primary 
assumptions/beliefs: 
1. That the concept of perfection – as an aspirational ideal – can and should be shifted away from 
the Aristotelian understanding of telos, and reinterpreted according to the model of scientific 
progress – there are no inherent limits that fetter the scope of human understanding outside the 
resistance of nature. (146) 
 
2. That part of the inherent resistance of nature to human understanding (scientific knowledge) finds 
form by way of the inherited religious, philosophical, moral and political opinions of humankind. 
(146) 
 
3. Science, and specifically scientific knowledge, serves as the guidepost for the moral perfection of 
human beings. (147) 
 
4. Scientific progress not only drives individual human moral progress (as noted in point four) but 
also society progress and the improvement of humanity of civilizational scale. (148) 
 
This reification and near fetishization of scientific methodology and thought remained dominant 
until it was revisited and revised through the developmental theories of the nineteenth century.43 
Here, post-Darwin, the frame shifted from the theoretical progress of science - understood to 
encompass the moral and social development of mankind – to the natural evolution of the 
species. (151) Yet still, the analytical frame remained firmly on the side of ‘science = progress,’ 
with little to no consideration of any potential problems of pitfalls with the mass proliferation of 
‘scientific rationality’ across every dimension of human sociation.   Habermas sums up this shift 
as follows: 
They questioned neither the rationalism nor the universalism of the Enlightenment and were thus 
not yet sensitive to the dangers of Eurocentrism; they repeated the naturalistic fallacies of the 
philosophy of history, albeit less blatantly, for they at least suggested interpreting theoretical 
statements about evolutionary advances in the sense of value judgements about practical-moral 
 
43 Habermas identifies Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), English philosopher, biologist, and early sociologist, as one of 
the exemplars of this shift. Spencer and others in this current, worked to move away from the philosophy of history 
position, towards a new ‘civilizational development as evolution’ perspective – deeply intertwined with the broader 
project of applying Darwinian insights into the emerging social sciences. 
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progress; on the other hand, they were more strongly oriented in a social-scientific direction and 
filled in the gaps left open by the philosophy of history – with its rather idealistic meant talk of 
historical laws – with a concept of evolution inspired by biology and having, so it seemed, the 
status of empirical science. (153) 
 
Habermas’s Weber begins here, as a response and challenge to the implicit fault lines in the 
evolutionary retelling of the philosophical equation of rationalization (science) with perfection. 
Specifically, Habermas argues that Weber’s project was framed against four main currents in the 
nineteenth century developmental theory, specifically a challenge to: evolutionary determinism, 
ethical naturalism, universalism, and at its core, the uncritical understanding of rationalism 
itself.  
 
Context and Character of Occidental Rationalism 
 
According to Habermas, there is a central thread that runs across the entirety of Weber’s 
works - an interest in the ‘universal-historical problem’ of how the particular form and functions 
of western modern (Occidental) rationalism emerged, and why it did not – at least to the same 
degree and in the same historical moment – emerge elsewhere.  From this perspective, Weber’s 
diverse explorations - world religions, the economic organization of societies, typologies of 
social actions, and even, following Schluchter, the political-philosophical explorations of various 
ethical-moral orientations to value systems – all form part of a wider preoccupation and 
exploration of ‘rationalism’ as the central feature of what would come to called ‘modernity.’ 
While Habermas concedes that certain inconsistencies and tensions emerge across the various 
threads of Weber’s work in terms of a comprehensive understanding of rationalism; he argues 
that one can, nevertheless, (re)construct a cohesive picture from Weber’s writings.  With intense 
analytic rigour and care, Habermas does just this – presenting an overarching view of his 
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Weber’s theory of modern rationalism.  Through a two-axis tripartite categorization marking 
culture, society, and personality dimensions alongside cognitive, evaluative and expressive 
elements - Habermas reconstructs, through Weber, a persuasive account of the latter’s 
understanding of modern rationalism.  This insightful interpretation of Weber as a scholar of 















In the center of this framework is the societal dimension – the most classically sociological 
component and the one on which some narrower readings of Weber focus.  According to 
Habermas, Weber’s understanding of society – very much like that of Marx – comes down to an 
interplay between capitalist enterprise/economics and the organized formal structures of the 
Figure 4.1 – Habermas’ classification of the forms of Manifestation of Occidental Rationalism 
through the emergence of Modernity in Weberian thought 
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state.44 Between and throughout them is the organizing and mediating force of the law.  To this 
frame, Habermas adds Weber’s interest in social scientific enterprise, religious associations, and 
the affiliated nuclear family unit, as well as, somewhat unexpectedly, the field of artistic 
enterprise.45  Though a key part – or explanandum as Habermas describes it – of Weber’s 
analysis, Habermas does not spend much time on Weber’s central consideration of the ‘society’ 
element in the first volume of A Theory of Communicative Action, instead focusing on the 
surrounding levels of culture and personality.46  
 The second level of analysis of rationalization in Weber’s work, according to Habermas, 
happens at the level of culture. It is here, Habermas argues, that we can locate Weber’s interests 
in the growing division and independence between law and morality – what Weber describes as 
the autonomy of law – and the rise of a rational-legal framework of justification.  Specifically, 
Habermas suggests that: 
…Weber uses the term “rationalization” also to designate the growing autonomy of law and 
morality, that is, the detachment  of moral-practical insights, of ethical and legal doctrines, of 
basic principles, of maxims and decision rules, from the world-views in which they were at first 
embedded. (162) 
 
This a key point for Habermas, who points out that this insight extends beyond the notion of 
‘value’ to the ‘techniques of such realizing values.’ Again, Habermas draws on Weber’s less well-
 
44 Habermas is careful to point out that, while aligned structurally, there are important substantive differences 
between Weber’s and Marx’s understanding of society – especially vis a vis increasing rationalization.  Where Marx 
equates rationalization with the expansion of empirical knowledge and improvements in techniques and technologies 
of production ultimately embodied as productive forces fettered by unequal relations of production; Weber sees state 
structures and capitalist enterprise as sub-systems of purposeful-rational action which serve to propagate and expand 
Occidental rationalism on a societal level. (Habermas, 1984: 144) 
 
45 Potentially as a result of his early association with the Frankfurt school, and specifically the work of his elder 
colleagues there, Habermas draws some interesting parallels with this dimension of Weber’s work and the later – 
very focused analysis – of the likes of Theodor Adorno. (160) 
 
46 This overt focus in first volume of Habermas’ The Theory of Communicative Action is juxtaposed to his later 
emphasis in the subsequent volume; wherein he spends significant time unpacking concepts of ‘society’ with a 
strong emphasis on Parson’s reading of Weber. 
171 
 
known discussions of art and aesthetics to demonstrate his analysis at the level of the cultural 
extends beyond the explicit juridical/ethical divide which most scholars of Weber focus on.  
Here, Habermas draws attention to Weber’s investigation into autonomous art – alongside 
science and law – as a form of the manifestation of cultural rationalization.  For Habermas, this 
is best summarized in terms of the exploration of the effects independent aesthetic values have 
on the technical mastery and production of art. Ultimately, for Habermas, Weber’s analysis at the 
level of culture is pivotal because it grounds his own focus on value spheres, and the interplay 
across and between them.   It is also through his reading of this level of Weber’s analysis that 
Habermas introduces the three other typological elements of his reading of Weber: cognitive, 
evaluative and expressive. In summarizing his Weber’s understanding of cultural rationalization, 
Habermas explains: 
The cultural rationalization from which the structures of consciousness typical of modern 
societies emerge embraces cognitive, aesthetic-expressive, and moral-evaluative elements of all 
religious tradition. With science and technology, with autonomous art and the values of 
expressive self-presentation, with universal legal and moral representations, there emerges a 
differentiation of three value spheres, each of which follows its own logic. In the process, not 
only do the “inner logics” of the cognitive, expressive, and moral elements of culture come into 
consciousness but also the tension between these spheres grows along with their differentiation. 
(163-164) 
 
According to Habermas, this is the starting point for Weber’s diagnosis of the modern western 
world – the rationalization of value spheres – that is the development of values towards 
conscious endeavor and their sublimation by an overarching logic of knowledge. (164) 
 The third dimension of Weber’s analysis, following Habermas’ categorization and 
reading, occurs at the level of personality.  This is where Weber explores the methodical conduct 
of life – and at the level where his seminal insights on the motivational typology of social action 
– traditional, affective, and rational – occurs. For Habermas, this is where many of the key 
insights of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism are foundational, providing Weber 
172 
 
with an understanding of “…the correlate in personality of a religiously anchored, principled, 
universalistic ethic of conviction47 which had taken hold of the strata that bore capitalism.” (164) 
While, as noted, for Weber, the explicit ‘explanandum’ is focused at the level of society, in 
Habermas’s interpretation, much of Weber’s most celebrated insights actually relate to either the 
more abstracted (above) level of culture, or the more practically embodied (below) level of 
personality.  In this way, we can see that Habermas’ Weber is distinguishable from others in so 
far as the focus of analysis – and indeed potentially the drivers for societal rationalization – occur 
above and below the level of society.  Perhaps more so than Weber himself, Habermas aims to 
demonstrate that society systems and structures that manifest occidental rationalism – scientific 
enterprise, formal legal education and jurisprudence, state institutions, or capitalist economic 
entities – are heavily conditioned and reinforced by the forces of cultural rationalization of value 
spheres on the one side, and the rationalization of the methodical conduct of everyday life on the 
other.  
 
A New Type of Social Action  
 
Moving forward from his reading of Weber in terms of the overarching project of 
mapping the processes and manifestations of Occidental rationalism as a historical/progressive 
trajectory, Habermas identifies certain gaps in and perceived limitations of Weber’s approach to 
rational social action, and famously proposes an alternative typology – one centered on the 
character and context of communication. According to Habermas, Weber’s study of the 
 
47 Weber’s notion of an ethic of conviction – in its explicitly political dimensions – following Schlucter’s reading of 
Weber was explored in detail in Chapter 2.  Here Habermas is deploying the term more generally in terms of the 
underpinning values Weber relates between Protestant ethics and what became the underpinning – seemingly 
autonomous – value system of Capitalism.  
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rationalization of modern societies and their associated types of social action, while insightful in 
many ways, is ultimately flawed from the outset by what he describes as a prejudice in Weber’s 
writing towards a particular and narrow understanding of action.  Weber, Habermas argues, 
predisposes his own analysis to find Zweckrationalitat (instrumental or purposeful rational social 
action) as the most dominant form of social action precisely because of how he defines social 
action itself.  The issue here, according to Habermas, is an understanding of social action which 
privileges direct interventions in the objective world. (274) By focusing on such direct 
interventions, Habermas argues that Weber prejudices his own findings, setting the stage for 
Zweckrationalitat – with its focus on means/ends calculations – to arise as the single most 
important form of modern social action.  Habermas illustrates this issue through a diagram which 












Of course, Habermas is not arguing that Zweckrationalitat is Weber’s preferred or normatively 
Figure 4.2 – ‘Official’ Weberian Typology of Action 
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desired form of social action – but that the key role it plays in terms of the rationalization of 
modern societies may be overstated and skewed based on how narrowly Weber is defining social 
action itself.   
As an alternative, Habermas proposes to shift the focus from ‘direct interventions’ to 
communicative actions.  He contends that, from a sociological point of view, this makes sense as 
the necessity for members of a society to coordinate and cooperate requires a certain baseline of 
communication.  From this perspective, one can argue that any society, assuming the need for 
coordinated action, requires as a baseline a certain level of effective communication in order to 
function. (274)  Based on this important shift in focus and understanding, Habermas presents an 












Here Habermas makes two important moves.  First, he fundamentally distinguishes between 
actions oriented towards success and those oriented towards reaching understanding. Second, he 
Figure 4.3 – Habermas’ Alternative Typology of Action 
175 
 
classifies purely instrumental actions as non-social. This leaves us with one non-social action 
(Weber’s Zweckrationalitat ) and two new types of social action: strategic action and 
communicative action.    
 According to Habermas the essential quality of Zweckrationalitat (instrumental action) is 
that ‘success’ is understood in terms of  “…the appearance in the world of a desired state, which 
can, in a given situation, be causally produced through goal-oriented action or omission.” (285) 
The effects of this action are made up of the results of this action or omission to act – both 
foreseen and unintended. In contrast, strategic action is characterized by success-oriented actions 
where success is defined in terms of influencing the decisions of rational opponents.  As 
Habermas explains: 
Instrumental actions can be connected with and subordinate to social interactions of a different 
type – for example, as the ‘task elements’ of social roles; strategic actions are social by 
themselves. (285 - emphasis added) 
 
In contrast to these two types of action, Habermas also introduces the concept of communicative 
social action – which takes as its objective ‘genuine understanding’ or “…a rationally motivated 
agreement among participants that is measured against criticisable validity claims.” (75) Of note 
here is that Habermas is introducing a type of rational activity that is not reducible to a 
means/ends calculation as is the case with success-oriented actions (both social and nonsocial). 
Furthermore, Habermas is clear that he does not present the concept of communicative action as 
a purely ‘analytic’ category – but rather as type of ‘real’ and embodied social action.  As he 
explains: 
In identifying strategic action and communicative action as types, I am assuming that concrete 
actions can be classified from these points of view. I do not want to use the terms “strategic” and 
“communicative” only to designate two analytic aspects under which the same action could be 
described – on the one hand as a reciprocal influencing of one another by opponents acting in a 
purposive-rational manner and, on the other hand as a process of reaching understanding among 
members of a life-world. Rather, social actions can be distinguished according to whether the 
participants adopt either a success-oriented attitude or one oriented to reaching understanding. 
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(286 – emphasis added) 
 
 
In a sense, Habermas is here presenting his own oppositional couplet essential to understanding 
social action, and by consequence, the social.  Though not offered up, explicitly, in the same way 
as Mouffe or Schmitt propose that the friend/enemy or friend/adversary distinctions constitute 
the ontological core of the political;  Habermas does, none the less, present a core antithetical 
distinction  – between strategic social action oriented towards success, and communicative 
social action oriented towards understanding – which, for him, lies at the heart of the social. 
Moreover, as Habermas focuses not on the social, but on social action, his (somewhat) 
ontological account remains much more closely relatable to what we can describe as its ontic 
foundations.  Whereas Schmitt and Mouffe begin at the level of the ontological, that is to say the 
political, and then extrapolate, to varying degrees, back towards politics or the ontic;  Habermas 
offers a core dichotomy whereby all social actions or sociation – the ontic – can be categorized 
in terms of the mutually exclusive categorization of strategic or communicative; and only then, 
and much less explicitly, extrapolates towards a broader ‘essence’ of the social.   
 
Ontological and Ontic Dimensions in Habermas 
 
 
Despite the fact that Habermas clearly does not begin his project with the emphasis on 
borrowed Heideggerian upon which Mouffe depends, we can, nonetheless, examine the very 
different balance Habermas achieves in terms of considering the social in both its ontic and 
ontological dimensions. Focusing first on the parallels between Habermas’ account of the social 
and Mouffe’s account of the political, both ground their understandings in a core antithetical 
opposition.  For Mouffe, the essence of the political is found in the distinction between friends 
and enemies – following Schmitt – and her normative project revolves around transfiguring that 
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core antithetical couplet into a distinction between friends and true, but respected, adversaries. 
For Habermas, the exploration and understanding of the social is framed in terms of a revised 
typology of social action – building on Weber – which centers of two mutually exclusive forms 
of social action – genuine communicative social action focused on reaching mutual 
understanding and strategy social action focused on achieving a desired outcome. 
Though Mouffe is more explicit, both Habermas and Mouffe present these 
understandings in terms of historically contingent ontological accounts – that is to say 
descriptions of the essential character or ‘essence’ of the social and the political, with the 
important philosophical caveat that such essential characters are the outcomes of historically 
contingent processes, practices and power dynamics.  For both, the social and the political have 
developed progressively over time and ultimately could be other than they are.  That said, the 
degree to which both theorists – and more broadly the agonal school of political 
theory/philosophy vis a vis most sociological thinkers – consider and account for this 
acknowledged historical contingency varies considerably.  For Mouffe, the historical 
contingency of the political is chiefly acknowledged in reference to her previous work – as 
explored in Chapter 1 – in terms of her and Laclau’s account of a post-Marxist radical left in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.  For Habermas, the historical contingency of the social – and 
also the political – is captured in his varied explorations of progressive development of systems 
and their embedded interactions with and effects on various dimensions of lifeworlds. 
For Habermas, the lifeworld represents the indirect context “…of what is said, discussed, 
[or] addressed…” (Habermas, 1987: 131) in any given situation. It is defined by and through its 
‘taken for grantedness’ and is “…given to the experiencing subject as unquestionable.” (130) It 
is, accordingly to Habermas, akin to the idea of Durkheim’s conscience collective – and any 
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attempt to describe or analyze it, which must always be from within it, can only be accomplished 
in terms of reconstructions. In contrast however, Habermas describes systems/subsystems as 
semi-autonomous spheres which both develop in the context of lifeworlds and which can limit, 
constrain or change them. Habermas writes extensively on the changes brought to the lifeworld 
by the introduction of various logics of dominant subsystems – most notably the logic of profit 
under capitalism and efficiency under bureacracy. But considered here more abstractly, the 
dichotomy between system and lifeworld can also be viewed as Habermas’ complex explanation 
of what most agonal democratic theorists’ shorthand in terms of a ‘historically contingent’ 
ontological account. In this way, Habermas’ critical theoretical trajectory can be read in terms of 
an ongoing historical, and problematic, trend: 
 
…the systemic imperatives of autonomous subsystems penetrate into the lifeworld and, through 
monetization and bureaucratization, force an assimilation of communicative action to formally 
organized domains of action – even in areas where the action coordinating mechanism of 
reaching understanding is functionally necessary. (403)  
 
This is not to say that the lifeworld and system map directly to notions of ontological and ontic, 
but rather that the notion of a historical contingency of any ontological account is, for Habermas, 
understandable – in part – through the joining of a systems conception and a lifeworld conception 
of society. (117)   
How then to understand the ontological and ontic dimensions of Habermas’s work? For 
both Habermas and Mouffe – again with Mouffe being far more explicit – the historically 
contingent ontological essence of the social and the political is juxtaposed to its more embodied, 
experienced and messy ontic dimensions.   Adapting the Heideggerian distinction to her own 
purposes, Mouffe notes that vis a vis the ontological essence of the political, one must always 
keep in mind the far ‘messier’ reality of everyday politics.  Habermas, I argue, implies a similar 
understanding.  While he rigorously outlines a new typology of social action built in the spirit of 
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Weber – he is clear to distinguish these ‘ideal types’ from the actual experiences in society.   
Unlike Mouffe however, Habermas makes this ontic/ontological distinction clear less through an 
explicit acknowledgement, and more through the logical implications of how he organizes his 
intellectual projects.  In dividing his works between an exploration of these categories and ideal 
typologies – as for example laid out in The Theory of Communicative Action Volumes 1 & 2 – 
and a more pragmatic consideration of how a society should organize itself to privilege one of 
those types – as, for example, his exploration of the procedural conditions of possibility for 
genuine communicative action in discourses on democracy and justice in Between Facts and 
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy; Habermas not only 
implicitly acknowledges this ontic/ontological dichotomy, he operates between and across it.  
From this perspective, one can read Habermas as providing a normative social theory that 
much more evenly addresses its ontic and ontological dimensions.   While agonal theorists 
broadly, and Mouffe specifically, identify and caveat the ontic as politics; Habermas’ approach 
moves between an exploration of the essential character of the social, and a procedural account 
of how a society could build and maintain the conditions of possibility for a desired outcome. 
Habermas offers both i) a clearer articulation of the historically contingent nature of his 
ontological account of the social, and ii) a more robust consideration of the ontic dimensions 
associated with those ontological suppositions. 
 I contend that this particular reading of Habermas not only offers a useful way of 
understanding two quite different parts of his work, but also provides an interesting juxtaposition 
and comparison when considered alongside the dominant agnostic approach – which 
acknowledges but does not substantively engage with the ontic dimensions of politics.   It is, 
however, important here not, as some do, to conflate the distinction between ontological/ontic 
180 
 
Figure 4.4 – Communicative vs Strategic Social Action 
and theoretical/empirical.  Habermas, for example, remains firmly rooted in a theoretical 
tradition.   However, a theoretical approach can – and I would argue in Habermas’ case does – 
separately and distinctively address both ontological and ontic dimensions of a given subject. 
This error, I argue, is particularly prominent in certain critiques of Mouffe and the agonistic 
school – as we will explore through the work of Lois McNay later in this chapter.  
 
Strategic vs Communicative  
 
 Let us now return to Habermas’ exploration of the social – in its more ontological 
dimensions - as characterized in terms of a Weber-inspired, but distinctive, typology of rational 
social action. Habermas continues to build on his key premise – that “…social actions can be 
distinguished according to whether the participants adopt either a success-oriented attitude or one 
oriented to reaching understanding” (286) - throughout the first volume of The Theory of 
Communicative Action. To do this, Habermas dives deep into linguistic theory and maps a range 
of sub-categorizations and classifications of various linguistically mediated speech acts.48 While 
the linguistic dimensions of Habermas’ work are not immediately relevant, it is worth noting his 
final mapping of linguistically mediate social actions.  While retaining the core dichotomy, 
Habermas does expand on the sub-types of strategic (success oriented) social actions – providing 
a mapping wherein social action genuinely oriented to understanding is juxtaposed to a wider 
range of normatively less desirable types, as shown immediately below: 
 
 
48 Here Habermas owes a debt to J.L. Austin’s theory of speech acts, which formed an important part of the 
philosopher’s approach – ordinary language philosophy. Habermas acknowledges this fact at several points in the 
first volume of The Theory of Communicative Action (95, 277, 288-291,294), however he also is clear that he does 
not feel bound by the formal parameters of Austin’s theoretical framework (319-320).  What one could, using the 




















Of particular note here is Habermas’ distinction between concealed and open strategic action, 
and beneath it, the acknowledgement of both conscious and unconscious deception. For 
Habermas, this is a key dimension of a communication centered framework, because it identifies 
both individually driven strategic/deceptive speech acts, as well as ‘systemically distorted’ 
speech acts. While manipulation is a somewhat obvious category to distinguish from openly 
strategic action, systemically distorted communication is more nuanced.  For Habermas, 
Based on Habermas’ diagram “Figure 18” in The Theory of Communicative Action. 
(Habermas, 1984: 333) 
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communication can become systemically distorted when all participants believe they are striving 
for genuine understanding, but “…at least one of the parties is deceiving himself about the fact 
that he is acting with an attitude oriented to success and is only keeping up the appearance of 
communicative action.” (332)  This is particularly important from the perspective of this project 
because it implies a new category of alongside the typical constructions of agreement/consensus 
and conflict (be it antagonistic or agonistic).  By introducing systemically distorted 
communication as a form of unconscious concealed strategic action, Habermas implies a social 
and/or political category of disagreement constituted not through intentional conflict or contest, 
but by and through unconscious self-deception that disrupts and distorts the rational potential of 
genuine speech acts to generate mutual understanding. While more likely to produce something 
akin to antagonism (with its socially and politically destructive connotations) than agonism 
(premised on mutual respect and ultimately posited as productive), this third type of discord 
introduced by Habermas more closely resembles the notion of diastréfo̱ (διαστρέφω) – distortion, 
perversion or contortion. In this instance, the distortion or perversion of speech acts at the 
expense of any possibility of mutual understanding. It is this possibility, I would argue, that leads 
Habermas, in his later works, to approach the question of democracy and justice from the 
perspective of the procedural conditions of possibility that maximize opportunities for genuine 
communicative action.  For if, alongside intentional strategic action, one must guard against 
diastréfo̱ - the systemic distortion of communication through unconscious deception – then the 
solution can no longer rest solely in an actively and consciously embraced ethos (be it social or 
political), but also in a procedural or situational bulwark against those contexts in which such 
unconscious deceptions are possible.  
 Again, we see here a fundamental difference between how Habermas builds his 
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theoretical foundations – what we could consider his ontological exploration of the social, albeit 
heavily caveated and contingent – and how Mouffe and other agonal theorists’ approach their 
consideration of the essence of the political.   Habermas, while remaining at an abstracted and 
theoretical level in line with an ontological explanation of the social, presents his account of the 
core categorizations that define the social in terms of a typology of social action, which 
maintains, concurrently, a heavy grounding in what we could call the ontic dimensions of social 
– what I have previously referred to as sociation.  Of course, Habermas does not, explicitly, 
couch his work in these terms.  But it can be read as an alternative formation to most radical 
agonal democratic theorists – which more carefully balances the abstract and the grounded, or in 
Mouffe’s borrowed Heideggerian terminology – between the ontological and ontic dimensions of 
the social or political.  
 Why then does this matter?   Why not, as Mouffe explicitly notes, simply acknowledge 
and set aside the messy question of the ontic (be it politics or sociation), and focus, in the first 
instance, on the greater question of the core ontological essence of the political or, following my 
own argument, the social?  The risk, so some critics argue, is that  
such a philosophical emphasis leads inevitably to a neglect – be it benign or pernicious – of the 
messy, complicated, and ambiguous real experiences of inequality, exploitation, 
disenfranchisement, domination, and even resistance. Fettered by a desire to maintain alignment 
with a particular ontological account of the political, agonal theorists stand accused of ignoring 
or redefining anything that troubles their initial formulation. In effect, the critique goes, any real 
engagement with the political is subsumed within an ever-growing commitment to protect 
foundational ontological assumptions – ultimately sabotaging any chance of radical democratic 
theorists have of meeting their own ambitious normative commitments.  Furthermore, I argue, it 
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is this over-emphasis on the ontological that may, inadvertently, contribute to the common 
tendency to ignore or diminish everything outside a narrow construction of ‘the political’; 
including, more specifically, to obscure, reduce or ignore the necessary underpinning societal 
conditions of possibility for agonal democracy in terms of both their ontological (the social) and 
ontic (sociation) dimensions. 
 
Misgivings about the ‘Misguided’ Search for the Political 
 
Despite sharing some the concerns that have been leveled against agonal democratic 
theorists, specifically that their approach has over-emphasized the ontological at the expense of 
the ontic; it is important to distinguish certain of these shared worries from the more totalizing 
versions of critiques of this nature. Although there remain certain similarities between the 
(hopefully sympathetic and constructive) critique I am forwarding throughout this project, and 
those who fundamentally call into question what they describe as the ‘philosophical turn’ which 
underpins much if not all of agonistic democratic theory – there remain important and 
fundamental differences as well.  To this end, in the second section of this chapter I examine the 
charge of ‘social weightlessness’ – and the critique of radical democratic theory’s central 
political-philosophical character. Chief among these, is the thorough (albeit somewhat merciless) 
critique forwarded by Lois McNay – whose arguments we will explore as both emblematic and 
extremis of such critiques.  
Like me, McNay – a professor of political theory at Oxford University – takes significant 
issue with the treatment of ‘the social’ in both Mouffe’s work specifically, and agonal theory 
more broadly. Building on a more general critique of a certain ‘philosophical bent’ in some 
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political theory, McNay argues that, though well intentioned, agonal theorists broadly – and 
Mouffe specifically - fail to live up to their normative critical commitments because their various 
starting points in some exploration of the ontological dimensions of ‘the political’ ultimately 
alienate their work from the real lived experiences of those struggling within or against real 
established systems of inequal power relations.  As she contends: 
At the most general level, the ontological turn represents the leftist version of the widespread 
preoccupation amongst democratic theorists with capturing the essence of political being, 
defining its sovereign and autonomous logic and, on that basis, formulating comprehensive 
models of democracy… … The problem is that radical democrats frequently fail then to make the 
next theoretical move, namely to think through how these ontological political dynamics are 
played out in the social realm and, in particular, in asymmetrical relations of power. (McNay, 
2014: 11-12)  
 
McNay goes on to argue, very much in line with the arguments forwarded herein, that this 
philosophically imbued agonal turn leads many radical democratic theorists in general, and 
Mouffe specifically, to conceptually ‘gut’ the social in their paradigms.   Specifically, McNay 
argues that: 
The problem is that insufficient thought is given to the ways in which this quasi-transcendental 
logic is imbricated within concrete existence and this tacitly transforms what is supposed to be a 
circular relationship between the social and the political realms into a conceptual hierarchy where 
the latter is accorded an unexplained and unjustified priority over the former. (15)  
 
On the face of it, McNay’s critique quite similar to the one being explored here.  She begins with 
a deep discomfort with the way in which many theorists of agonal democracy seem to 
concurrently establish a conceptual hierarchy in which ‘the political’ supersedes ‘the social’ and 
wherein the latter is collapsed into ‘the dark background of mere givenness.’ (15 – attributed to 
Ranciere) That said, McNay’s critique varies significantly from the one I am forwarding here 
both in detail and proposed solution.  This comes down to two essential elements of McNay’s 
argument:  1) how she considers the progressive capacities and potential of normative critical 
‘theory’ vis à vis the  tacit, but clear, valuation she places on the conceptual vis à vis the 
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embodied; and 2) how she understands the distinction between the ontological and ontic (as 
presupposed in much agonal democratic theory) and its relationship to how she understands the 
political and the social spheres. Let us consider each in turn. 
 
Ideal vs Actual - the Progressive Potential of ‘Radical Theory’ 
 
 
The first element of McNay’s argument, which fundamentally diverges from the position 
being forwarded here, is her overall perspective on the inherent progressive capacities and 
potential – or lack thereof - of normative critical ‘theory’ generally, and the form it takes in most 
agonal democratic theories more specifically.  For McNay, noting contemporary justice theorists 
like Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, the guiding principle of normative critical theory is to 
‘produce an account of society which aims to unmask domination’ and in so doing lays bare 
historically obscured contradictions and draws attention to emancipatory potential.49 (7) 
According to McNay, recent political theory, including normative critical political theory, can be 
characterized by a certain philosophical turn.  This turn, which she argues is a reaction and 
countermeasure to the dominant themes of identify politics and recognition with which political 
theory (especially democratic and justice theory) have been preoccupied with for several 
decades, aims to shift conversation away from a trajectory seen to lead invariably to moral 
relativism, and instead re-center political thinking on certain key philosophical/ontological 
 
49 The original definition of ‘critical theory’ (kritische theorie) – as coined by Max Horkheimer in the now famous 
1937 essay that set out the foundation of what would be called the Frankfurt School – was at once broader and 
narrower.  At the time, the original aim of kritische theorie was to analyse, lay bear, and ultimately free humanity 
from, the myriad of structural conditions that invisibly dominated them. That said, Horkheimer’s account of critical 
theory – generally now considered the ‘united’ approach of the Frankfurt School – was also considerably more 
narrow in terms of its philosophical and methodological commitments to Marxism.  That said, the so-called unity of 
the Frankfurt School will be discussed later in the chapter, specifically with regards to Jürgen Habermas.  While one 
of the original members of the Frankfurt School – Habermas’ take on the normative and methodological frameworks 




questions – namely the search for the essential character of the political. As McNay suggests: 
Political theory nowadays has pulled away from the social sciences and has established itself as a 
separate, even ascendant, form of inquiry, namely a philosophy of politics whose fundamental 
task is, in the first instance, to isolate and capture the very essence of political being… …It is also 
seen as the most compelling way of moving beyond the limiting preoccupation of a previous 
phase of democratic theory with pluralism and the politics of identity, issues which are often held 
to terminate in the dead-end of ethical relativism. (2-3) 
 
This philosophical turn, however, brings with it certain inherent risks according to McNay. The 
primary risk of such theoretical engagement, for McNay, is the slip into ungrounded the pleasant 
fictions of ‘ideal theory’ – where abstraction becomes an obstacle to engaging with or reflecting 
anything relevant to real world. Ideal theory, as McNay defines it, are those theoretical positions 
which rely on idealizations to the exclusion or extreme marginalization of actual lived 
experience. (9) Interestingly, McNay is careful not to argue that agonal theorists explicitly 
operate in the space of ideal theory. Indeed, she meticulously notes the ways in which agonal 
democratic theorists distinguish themselves from such ideal theoretical perspectives.  However, 
for McNay, it is precisely agonal theorists’ critical normative objectives – to contribute to real 
change in the world of today – that leaves them open to the charge of social weightlessness, the 
claim that the ideal is prioritized at the expense of the actual.  
Though McNay positions her critique as partial and constructive, she implies a more 
totalizing argument against the emancipatory potential of theoretically grounded positions. 
Explicitly, McNay argues that problem is not necessarily a philosophical/ontological starting 
point, but instead that: 
The ideas of emancipatory action that are derived from style of reasoning are conceptually 
lopsided – in so far as they fail to go beyond a persistent reiteration of supposedly essential 
political dynamics and consequently have little sense of how these connect to embodied social 
existence and to issues of oppression and disempowerment that supposedly lie at the heart of the 
radical democratic agenda. (12) 
 
Yet despite the caveats, as McNay progresses in both her general critique of agonal democratic 
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theory, and her more directed critique of Chantal Mouffe, it becomes difficult not to interpret her 
position as being that any ontological starting point – and even, as noted above, the very 
deployment of the ontic/ontological distinction – inevitably leads to prioritization of the ideal 
(ontological) over the actual or embodied (ontic), and therefore open to the charge of social 
weightlessness. Indeed, the critique appears to extend beyond radical democratic theory – agonal 
or otherwise – to any form of ‘critical’ theory that seeks to forward normative commitments in 
the real world. For McNay, to the extent it is possible, it would seem that the only way to 
counteract the inherent limitations of theoretical grounded perspectives, would be to supplement 
– or as she at points implies, replace – such perspectives with a study focused on the lived 
experiences and embodied actions of real people surviving and thriving in a context of 
domination and struggle.  
 
Ontological/Ontic and Political/Social 
 
 
There is little doubt that McNay’s critique, if taken in its lighter form, raises an important 
question for agonal political theory, and indeed any ‘critical’ theoretical work aiming to forward 
emancipatory outcomes. The risk of letting philosophical or ontological frameworks overwhelm 
or obscure the real lived/embodied experiences of the very people whose emancipation is 
ostensibly being sought, remains as true a risk today as it was for Marx.50 However, there is a 
significant difference between identifying the risk of ideal theory, and suggesting (however 
obliquely) that all critical theory is inherently incapable of fulfilling its emancipatory normative 
commitments unless it takes a methodological turn towards the embodied experiences of 
dominated/struggling people.  This brings us to the second essential distinction between the 
 
50 Marx famously tried to solve the critical disjuncture between what is theoretical work suggested people should 
believe, feel or do and what they often did or claim with his concept of false consciousness.  
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constructive critique of agonal democratic theory being forwarded in this project and McNay’s - 
specifically how McNay reads Mouffe’s distinction between the ontological and the ontic, the 
relative worth she puts on them, as well as their constitution and character in the context of 
agonal democracy. 
As we discussed in Chapter 1, Mouffe is quite aware of the central role conceptualization 
plays in her work, but cautions the reader not to be misled and assume that she is unaware or 
disinterested in the real-world struggles against oppression.  As Mouffe describers it: 
Politics refers to the ‘ontic’ level while ‘the political’ has to do with the ‘ontological’ one.  This 
means that the ontics has to do with the manifold practices of conventional politics, while the 
ontological concerns the very way in which [political] society is instituted. (Mouffe, 2005a: 8) 
 
In this way, Mouffe attempts to bracket the exploration of the day to day ‘experience’ of politics, 
in order to begin with the ontological exploration of the essential character or ‘essence’ of the 
political sphere.  For her part, McNay has significant concerns with this bracketing on several 
levels.  By bracketing the lived experiences and manifold practices that make up the real 
everyday struggles of the dominated in the context of vastly unbalanced power dynamics, 
McNay argues that Mouffe – and agonal theorists generally – risk becoming detached and out of 
touch with those experiences, ultimately becoming irrelevant to the actual participants who 
might forward a radical democratic agenda. However, here, we begin with McNay’s reading of 
Mouffe’s adaptation of the famous Hegelian distinction.   For McNay, the issue of ontological vs 
ontic is not only tied to the issue of political vs social – it is one and the same.  In McNay’s 
reading of Mouffe, the ontic dimension of the political – what Mouffe calls politics – is equated 
to the social, or social action. Specifically, McNay proposes that: 
Mouffe’s agonist paradigm means that the intrinsic connection that is held to exist between the 
ontological and the ontic, the political and the social, turns out in fact to be a hierarchy of the 
former over the latter. The absolute priority granted to the supposedly necessary logic of the 
political over the inert realm of the social closes off issues of empowerment that are crucial to an 





In conflating the issue of ontic vs ontological and political vs social, McNay’s critique of 
Mouffe’s neglect of the social, itself acts to rob the social of any independent conceptual weight 
– beyond the embodied practices of politics under the political.  While this rescues the social 
from the inert sediment of the political where Mouffe has exiled it, the equation of the social 
with the ontic dimension of the political ignores the ways in which the concept of the social 
extends beyond, around and outside the confines of the political – and in so doing exposes either 
a deep distrust in, or complete lack of awareness of, nearly the entire body of sociology as a 
discipline.    
One of McNay’s key objectives is to recover and reprioritize the messiness and 
complexity of embodied social action from what she sees as Mouffe’s over reliance on a 
philosophically grounded underpinning logic of determination of the political. Again, in ways 
that, at first, seem deeply congruent with the arguments put forward here, McNay argues that 
agonal theorists generally, and Mouffe specifically, inadvertently obscure the importance of 
emotion, passion, pain and confusion that permeate the lived experience of counter-hegemonic 
activism.  Specifically, she charges that: 
Time and again, an investigation of the social conditions necessary to realize effective agonistic 
agency is passed over in favour of a reassertion of what is held to be the ‘necessary’ logic of the 
political. (85) 
 
Here, I completely agree with McNay, agonal theorists generally – and Mouffe specifically – 
absolutely ‘pass over,’ reduce, or completely ignore the question of what the necessary social 
conditions of possibility might be for a contemporary, viable, and stable radical democratic order 
premised on the ethos of political agon.   The difference however is in how McNay understands 
such overlooked social conditions, and more broadly, how she characterizes the social writ large.  
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Focused on recovering the ‘messy’ complexity of embodied action – McNay contends that 
agonal democratic theorists’ focus on the ontological question of ‘what is the political,’ blinds 
them to the importance of exploring the ontic dimensions of real action and activities – which 
she calls social. In this way, why McNay succeeds at reprioritizing the ontic dimensions of the 
political, she concurrently repeats Mouffe’s misstep, only in reverse.  While Mouffe, it can be 
argued (as both McNay and I do), appears to ignore the ontic dimensions of the political once she 
brackets them at the onset of her account of agonal democracy, McNay cedes the ontological 
entirely to the abstract conception of ‘the political’ and reduces ‘the social’ to its purely ontic 
dimensions – which are understood as undistinguishable from politics.  For McNay, this is not 
accidental – but rather an explicit attempt to refocus democratic ‘theory’ towards lived 
experiences.  As she contends: 
[In] the light of the theoretical discontinuities that mark Mouffe’s work, one might ask whether 
the distinction between the ontological and the ontic is in fact a helpful way of thinking through 
the parameters of radical democracy. For radical democrats, as we saw at the outset, the 
delineation of the ontological category of the political is not intended as a straightforwardly 
transcendental move. Although the realm of the political is irreducible to the ontic realm of the 
social, it is also inseparable from it in so far as it is inextricably tied to the critique of domination.  
(95 – emphasis added) 
 
For McNay, in her own account, the political represents an ontological category, while the social 
an ontic one.  The problem here – beyond a significant deviation or misunderstanding of how 
Mouffe has characterized ontic vs ontological – is that this move effectively eliminates a 
meaningful category of the social altogether.  While McNay’s view could, if taken on by her 
agonal theorist colleagues, help refocus work on the lived experiences and standpoints of 
individual embedded in democratic action – it effectively defines the social in terms of the 
practice of politics.  
Many, especially scholars in fields like political science, may find little issue with 
McNay’s solution. Her critique does open a space for the exploration of embodied action and 
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lived experiences under unequal power dynamics that most agonal theories have yet to 
meaningfully examine. However, from a sociological perspective, it also assumes a great deal 
about the depth and range of potential types of social action. How then to proceed?  If we agree, 
as I have noted that I do, with parts of McNay’s critique – mostly that there is a risk in over-
prioritizing the ontological at the expense of the ontic; and if we reject , as I very much do, the 
notion that social can be adequately understood in terms of the ontic dimension of the political, 
we are left with a critical gap in need of addressing in most agonal democratic theory.  Here, as 
before, I contend that this fascinating sub-set of political theory committed to an emancipatory 
radical democratic order premised on the ethos of political agon can be strengthened and 
improved through engagement with alternative theoretical insights that take more seriously the 
complexity and depth of the social.  
As discussed above, I propose that Habermas’ exploration of the essential composition of 
the social – through a typology of social action – in The Theory of Communicative Action, offers 
an example of a thoroughly theoretical approach that better balances ontological and ontic 
considerations. Further, in his later work on deliberative democracy, Habermas builds on The 
Theory of Communicative Action, presenting a balanced approach to democracy/justice in terms 
of both a more ‘pure’ exploration of ontological essence and a ‘messier’ consideration of ontic 
implications. Re-reading Habermas’s famous response to John Rawls through his procedural 
account of deliberative democracy presents us with an opportunity to reconsider the classically 
antagonistic relationship between deliberative and agonistic democratic perspectives, and 





Political Consensus: Abstract, Deliberative, or Problematic 
 
As discussed at the outset of this project, agonal democratic theory first emerged in the 
context of a response and challenge to the central and privileged position ‘consensus’ occupies in 
the mainstream of theories on democracy and justice. (Habermas, 1998 & 1999; Rawls, 1999 & 
1996; Giddens, 2000; and Beck, 1997)  More specifically, like much of the contemporary work 
on the social and political conditions of possibility for just society over the last half century – 
most agonal democratic theory is conceived in the context of the decades-long discourse orbiting 
the work of John Rawls.  Between Rawls’ seminal  A Theory of Justice, and his later reworking 
of key ideas in Political Liberalism (Rawls, 1999 & 1996), it would not be an exaggeration to 
say that nearly every significant contribution to the question of how to imagine/foster a ‘just 
society’ did so, to some extent, in support of, or contrast to, these works. Representing this 
visually, one can categorize most of these works into six general categories of responses/critiques 
of Rawls’ core arguments: communitarian, libertarian, deliberative, feminist, dis/ability, and 


























Of course, this is far from an exhaustive list. Within and around these categorizations, one could 
add a myriad of more specific, distinctive, and insightful positions. However, in general terms, 
the above illustrates a high-level conceptual map of the central groupings of such critiques. In 
terms of the radical/agonal democratic position, much like the deliberative democratic critique – 
which through the work of Habermas remains the most famous and well developed set of debates 
with Rawls’ core concepts – their challenge takes issue with the conceptions of consensus in both 
Rawls’ original arguments in A Theory of Justice, and later in his reworked conception under 
Political Liberalism. 
 Building on his understanding of the social in terms of the key antithetical distinction 
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between strategic social action oriented towards success, and communicative social action 
oriented towards understanding; Habermas famously challenges Rawls first on the abstracted 
conception of deliberation through the thought experiment of the original position under the veil 
of ignorance, and then on the substantive constraints imposed on real deliberation to achieve 
overlapping consensus under conditions of reasonable pluralism (Habermas, 1998 & 1999).  For 
Habermas, Rawls is fundamentally wrong to consider reasoned debate, genuine understanding, 
and agreement in terms of a theoretical exercise.  Instead, Habermas insists that – following his 
arguments in The Theory of Communicative Action – democracy and justice depend on the real, 
assured social and political context which promote and secure genuine communicative action 
while guarding against the various forms of strategic action.  Furthermore, Habermas also 
reproaches Rawls for suggesting certain substantive limits on the topics of deliberation within a 
‘well ordered’ society.  Whereas Rawls believes that matters which can be imagined as the result 
of consensus in the original position under the veil of ignorance, Habermas argues that 
constraints on deliberation should be limited to its form, and not its content.  The radical 
democratic critique, in contrast, goes further.  Mouffe and other agonal democratic theorists 
fundamentally reject the assumption that consensus is a viable or desirable aspiration or outcome 
of a truly pluralistic society at all – regardless of whether it is theoretically imagined via Rawls 
or procedurally enabled via Habermas.  
As explored in Chapter 1, Mouffe explains agonal democratic theory’s rejection of Rawls, 
and a myriad of other adjacent visions of justice and democracy – including Habermas’ 
deliberative account, in terms of an alternative ontological account of the political. Specifically, 
the fundamental understanding that consensus, real or abstracted, is deeply problematic in terms 
of either an aspirational or achievable outcome of any functional political order. Indeed, while 
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the degree of rejection varies across agonal theorists, for Mouffe, the goal of consensus is 
antithetical to the very essence of the political. That said, while Mouffe (and other agonal 
democratic theorists) clearly articulate their rejection of what they read as Rawls’ ‘ontological’ 
orientation towards consensus as an aspiration of the political, few engage as thoroughly with 
Habermas’ more procedural account of the necessary conditions of possibility – the rules of 
engagement – for a system of open discourse in which genuine understanding, and by 
consequence agreement, amongst participants is the objective.  As discussed above, Habermas’ 
procedural account of deliberative democracy is built on his theory of communicative action as 
the cornerstone of all social action. In this way, Habermas’ portrayal of ‘deliberative politics’ is 
very much an extension on the key assumptions and implications brought forward by his 
framework for understanding social action in terms of the dichotomy between actions oriented 
towards success and actions oriented towards understanding.  The further development of the 
typology of social action to juxtapose genuine communicative action to the various forms of 
strategic action – most notably consciously deceptive strategic action (manipulation) and 
unconsciously deceptive strategic action (systemically distorted communication) –  ultimately 
underpins certain necessary assumptions and normative orientations in Habermas’ understanding 
(implied and explicit) of democracy, conflict and the political itself.  
A deeper exploration of the distinctions between Rawls’ conceptualization and approach to 
consensus and the Habermasian deliberative alternative offers a further opportunity to consider – 
through a marked (though perhaps less so than one might expect) contrast with the radical/agonal 
democratic alternative – some of the key underpinning assumptions and requirements regarding 
the social conditions of possibility for the common objective of just and fair democratic society. 
To this end, let us briefly return to the core conceptualizations of John Rawls.  As discussed in 
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Chapter 1, Rawls’ huge influences on the question of how to imagine/organize a just society are 
centred around two seminal works:  A Theory of Justice, and some two decades later, Political 
Liberalism. These two texts should really be read together, as bookends to the first part of an 
ongoing conversation that has rekindled contemporary moral philosophy’s engagement with 
questions of the political and justice. As previously noted, Rawls and Mouffe (as well as the 
majority of agonal democratic theorists) share a common normative orientation towards justice. 
What distinguishes the positions is not the desired outcome, but instead the ontological 
understanding of the importance, desirability, and feasibility of consensus within the various 
positions. However, the radical democratic positions share with Rawls another interesting 
characteristic. In very much the same way as Mouffe, Rawls attempts to bracket the 
practical/embodied issue of politics, in favour of a theoretical investigation centred on the 
political. Though not explicitly discussed as the distinction between ontological and ontic – as 
Mouffe describes it – Rawls is quite clear that his work is not meant to answer all relevant 
political questions. As he notes in his famous response to Habermas:  
Of the two main differences between Habermas’s position and mine, the first is that his is 
comprehensive while mine is an account of the political and is limited to that. The first 
difference is the more fundamental as it sets the stage for and frames the second. This concerns 
the contrasts between our devices of representation, as I call them: his is the ideal discourse 
situation as part of his theory of communicative action, and mine is the original position. These 
have different aims and roles, as well as distinctive features serving different purposes (Rawls, 
1996: 373 – emphasis added) 
 
The ‘original position’ to which Rawls refers above was at the center of his original conceptual 
framework in a Theory of Justice. Built in the tradition of social contract theorists like Jean 
Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Hobbes51 - Rawls’ first attempt to articulate his own ‘purely 
 
51 Here it is interesting to note that, much like Ferdinand Tönnies, Rawls can be seen to be continuing the classical 
social contract project begun by theorists like Hobbes. Though by no means a text intended to supplement and 
support Hobbesian political theory – Rawls’ A Theory of Justice does share certain essential characteristics with 
regards to the nature of a ‘stable’ social contract.  
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political’ theory of justice focused on what he described as a thought experiment. In this thought 
experiment, readers were invited to imagine a first, or original, moment in which all members of 
society gathered to discuss and agree on the fundamental organizing principles of society – the 
principles of justice. However, in this fictitious moment of discussion and debate, where all 
members of society (in the grand and ahistorical sense) set forth the essential tenets of a 
foundational social contract, Rawls asked us to further imagine that all such participants were 
limited by a veil of ignorance. (Rawls, 1973: 17-22) Under this veil of ignorance, Rawls’ 
collection of all members of society are simultaneously aware of the intricacies of their social 
and political contexts (again articulated in an ahistorical and culturally neutral manner) but are 
rendered unaware of the specific positions they occupy within such societies.  For Rawls, at its 
basic level, this allows for a hypothetical original position in which humans – understood 
fundamentally as rational, autonomous and self-interested liberal subjects – can agree on the core 
foundational principles that should organize a just and fair society, without bias towards what 
they, in particular, stand to gain or lose by virtue of individual privilege or peril within such a 
society.   
Though sometimes obscured when being discussed by both his supporters and critics, 
Rawls’ initial ‘original position’ is – again, in the tradition of social contract theory - a 
justification framework. Although he describes this in terms of imagining what would be agreed 
to as common principles, in actuality the exercise is one of testing proposed principles against 
this hypothetical original position. To state it plainly, Rawls’ initial proposition in A Theory of 
Justice, is that we can consider those potential principles of justice as reasonable, fair and 
acceptable in so far as we can imagine that all members of our current society would – under the 
thought experiment of an original position – agree to those principles without reference to their 
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own selfish gains or losses.52  This is where the ‘first fundamental difference’ with Habermas 
emerges.  For Habermas, Rawls’ attempt to find a system of justification for principles of justice 
with moral philosophy fundamentally misunderstands and oversteps the basic structure of 
constitutional democracy guided by the rule of law. In a challenge that one cannot help but hear 
the future echoes of the agonistic critique, Habermas argues that: 
From the perspective of the theory of justice, the act of founding the democratic constitution 
cannot be repeated under the institutional conditions of an already constituted just society, and the 
process of realizing the system of basic rights cannot be assured on an ongoing basis… …They 
cannot reignite the radical democratic embers of the original position in the civic life of their 
society, for from their perspective all of the essential discourses of legitimation have already 
taken place within the theory; and they find the results of the theory already sedimented in the 
constitution. Because the citizens cannot conceive of the constitution as a project, the public use 
of reason does not actually have the significance of a present exercise of political autonomy but 
merely promotes the nonviolent preservation of political stability. (Habermas, 1999: 69-70) 
                                                                                                              
Here Habermas is arguing that Rawls, in relegating the agreement of core principles of justice to 
a thought experiment meant to justify their contemporary validity, robs democracy of its core 
‘action’ component.  In his own words, the citizenry in Rawls’ account “…cannot reignite the 
radical democratic embers of the original position in the civic life of their society…” (69)  That 
is to say, that the essential element of reasoned debate and ‘radical democratic energy’ are lost in 
Rawls because he relegates active engagement with those principles to an abstracted ahistorical 
moment.  Here is it hard not to hear some whispers of an agonistic sensibility – as Habermas is 
clearly chastising Rawls for robbing the political of the productive energy born of debate and 
rhetorical contest. Indeed, Habermas seems to be implying that without the ongoing engagement 
of the citizenry to call into question, debate and potentially change the institutional character of a 
 
52 It is interesting to note that originally Rawls deploys ‘hypothetical consensus’ as an ontological component of 
justification, as opposed to an essential or desired outcome of ‘the political.’ Indeed, the practical content of those 
principles – how they are applied day to day and debated and interpreted – is set aside. Where Mouffe takes offence, 
is in the idea that this abstracted consensus could constrain the right and proper content of political debate, in so far 
as those principles or claims that could not be immediately imagined as agreeable to all under Rawls’ proposed 
thought experiment, would be robbed of legitimacy in a near a priori manner. For Mouffe, and most agonal 
democratic theorists, it is essential that space be left open for any positions to be brought/fought forward in order to 
avoid (near invisible) closures and exclusions under the context of pluralism.  
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society – up to and including its core underpinning principles – democracy, and perhaps the 
political itself, is robbed of it creative energies.  
This is not, by any means, to suggest that Habermas is making a pitch for democracy 
built on an ethos of political agon, for he is clear in his prioritization and aspirations towards 
some level of stable political agreement. However, one cannot help but note the essential 
elements of his challenges to Rawls – that radical democratic embers cannot be relit, that 
essential debate and discourse is considered settled, that assumed principles become sedimented, 
and that democratic effervescence is replaced with the mere preservation of political stability.   
What is even more interesting to note, in terms of the project at hand – to consider the social 
conditions of possibility for agonal democracy – is the conceptualization of both the political and 
the social implied in Habermas’ position. For Habermas, one of the fundamental challenges with 
Rawls approach is that he tries to isolate the public sphere – what we could also call the political 
sphere - in terms of a discrete set of values that can be considered without reference to other 
parts of society. Much like Mouffe in this way, Rawls attempts to bracket many of the most 
complex social dynamics with which society struggles but framing his approach as ‘limited to an 
account of the political.’  For Habermas, this is an untenable position. As he explains: 
Rawls treats the political value sphere, which is distinguished in modern societies from other 
cultural value spheres, as something given… …For only with reference to political values, 
whatever they may be, can he split the moral person into the public identity of the citizen and the 
nonpublic identity of a private person shaped by his or her individual conception of the good. 
These two identities then constitute the reference points for two domains, the one constituted by 
rights of political participation and communication, the other protected by basic liberal rights. 
(70) 
 
Habermas rejects what he describes as this ‘a priori boundary’ between public and private life, 
and argues it conflicts with both the intuition that popular sovereignty and human rights are 
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inextricably tied, as well as historical experience to date.53 In contrast, Habermas contends that 
public and private spheres must be thought as intermingling – and that “…the boundaries 
between the private and public autonomy of citizens are in flux and that such differentiations 
must be subjected to the political will-formation of the citizens.” (71) 
 
Politics as Deliberative 
 
Again, in a way that seems much closer to the radical democratic position than one might 
intuitively expect, Habermas challenges Rawls willingness to bracket the messy realities of the 
so-called private sphere. Much like Mouffe, Habermas is concerned that by limiting the field of 
legitimacy in political discourse, Rawls, albeit unintentionally, risks suppressing the essential, 
real, and lively debates and discourses necessary for a vibrant democratic order. Of course, this is 
not to minimize the important distinctions between Habermas’s proposed solution to the various 
limitations he sees in Rawls work, and the radical/agonal democratic challenge. For Habermas, 
the centre of any just society is a robust and healthy system of engaged citizens discussing and 
deliberating on any and all necessary issues.  Habermas’s deliberative account of democracy is a 
 
53 It is interesting to note that Habermas’ position here is based both on intellectual orientation and lived 
experiences. Having spent his early childhood under the Nazis regime in Germany, Habermas experienced firsthand 
the radical disjuncture between different values spheres, and the rise to dominance of one pathological political 
ideology. As a member of Hitlerjugend (youth Nazis), Habermas saw how the domination of different value spheres 
by a ‘common’ political sphere could distort and poison a nation. During the 1980s, Habermas’ membership in the 
Hitlerjugend became the subject of a historical and academic debate, with Ernst Nolte publicly noting that he 
believed Habermas to have been an ‘enthusiastic’ leader of the Hitler Youth’ in an interview in Panorama (January 
19189). This however corresponds neither to Habermas’ public position, nor his academic writings. In his response 
letter to the editor, Habermas noted that not only had he not been an enthusiast of Hitlerjugend mentality, his cleft 
palate (or birth defect in the parlance of the days) made him an unlikely candidate for advancement within the 
movement. This view is supported, to the extent possible, by malicious notations and drawings found in Habermas’ 
own schoolbooks – wherein the youth is ridiculed on account of his ‘weaknesses.’  Despite all this, Habermas has, 
on several occasions, admitted that it was exceedingly difficult not to, to some extent, fall under the sway of the 
constant Nazis propaganda, and awareness and caution persists as a current across much of his work. (Doohm, 2016: 
17,18 & 32) 
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deeply procedural one, which emphasizes the conditions of possibility necessary for genuine 
communication between all involved parties.  This deliberative approach is in turn built on 
Habermas’ sociological and philosophical account of social action – as discussed in the previous 
sections – in which social actions are either oriented towards understanding (communication) or 
success (strategic). This dichotomy – while not presented as a core antithetical ‘essence’ – does 
represent, for Habermas, the two primary opposing and mutually exclusive motivations for real 
and objective social actions. 
It is on this basis that Habermas challenges the Rawlsian approach, proposing instead a 
system that focuses on the necessary procedural conditions of possibility for deliberation, over 
the abstracted notions of the social contract theory inspired hypothetical-consensus-as-
justification, or the generalized idea of an overlapping consensus between citizens holding 
radically different views – what we described in Chapter one in terms of a sort of ‘thick’ modus 
vivendi.  The deliberative theory of politics and democracy – also sometimes described as a 
procedural account of democracy – focuses on the institutional conditions of possibility to 
encourage, support, and ensure genuine communicative action from participants. Habermas 
describes this approach in terms of setting out the “…ideal process for deliberation and decision 
making.” (Habermas, 1998: 296) Specifically he contends: 
Democratic procedure, which establishes a network of pragmatic considerations, compromises, 
and discourses of self-understanding and of justice, grounds the presumption that reasonable or 
fair results are obtained insofar as the flow of relevant information and its proper handling have 
not been obstructed. According to this view, practical reason no longer resides in universal human 
rights, or in the ethical substance of a specific community, but in the rules of discourse and forms 
of argument that borrow their normative content from the validity basis of action oriented to 
reaching understanding. In the final analysis, this normative content arises from the structure of 
linguistic communications and the communicative mode of sociation. (297) 
 
Of note here is the absence of the concept of consensus in Habermas’s account of deliberative 
democracy. Though consensus is implied throughout as a desirable outcome, the stated objective 
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is to set up the conditions of possibility, or rules of engagement, to both promote (in the soft 
sense) and regulate (in the stricter sense) genuine communicative action - social action oriented 
towards reaching real and uncoerced understanding - as the only legitimate form of political 
discourse.  In this way, deliberative democracy can be seen to share more in common with the 
radical/agonal approach then many first assume. Both Mouffe and Habermas share a significant 
concern that the various forms of abstracted consensus proposed by Rawls would serve to limit 
the real debates that make up the political. While Mouffe believes that the political is defined 
through ongoing genuine conflict, Habermas defines its essential nature in terms of process 
through which conflict plays out in its non-violent form – debate, deliberation, and discourse.  
That having been said, there are, of course, several important distinctions between 
Habermas’ and Mouffe’s understanding of the political well beyond their orientation towards the 
feasibility and desirability of lasting consensus. Unlike Mouffe, Habermas is hypersensitive to 
the various ways ‘the political’ – what he describes as the public political life-world – depends 
upon and interacts with other value spheres. This is relevant to our current project for a few 
distinct reasons. First, Habermas very clearly rejects the ‘purely political’ approach favoured – 
albeit differently – by both Mouffe and Rawls. Second, and closely related, Habermas grounds 
his deliberative democratic theory on the understanding that not only are there other valid and 
equal realms of human sociation outside the purely political, but that the political depends upon 
those other spheres of human activity. Indeed, Habermas explicitly makes this point, arguing 
that: 
According to discourse theory, the success of deliberative politics depends not on a collectively 
acting citizenry but on the institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of 
communication, as well as on the interplay of institutionalized deliberative processes with 
informally developed public options. (298 – emphasis added) 
 
Thus, while Mouffe describes the social in terms of a collection of sedimentary “…practices that 
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conceal the originary acts of their contingent political institution and which are taken for 
granted…” (Mouffe, 2005a: 17), Habermas conceives the social in terms of a range of quasi-
sovereign spheres which surround and feed a formal public political life-world with the 
necessary normatively conditioned participants through a myriad of informal processes of will-
formation and opinion-formation.  Following this view, deliberative democratic theory is able to 
focus near exclusively on the procedural ‘rules of engagement’ for political public discourse in 
part because it brackets out the notion of social conditions of possibility and leaves them aside. 
Of course, for Habermas, this is a matter of referring – directly or indirectly – to his decades of 
other sociological work exploring the ways in which modern capitalist societies have allowed the 
economic logics to permeate other spheres of society, and to what effect.  However, in terms of 
deliberative democracy, Habermas is far from coy when he describes the procedural approach’s 
dependence on a wider concept of social solidarity: 
Democratically constituted opinion- and will-formation depends on the supply of informal public 
opinions that, ideally, develop in structures of an unsubverted political public sphere. The 
informal public sphere must, for its part, enjoy the support of a societal basis in which equal 
rights of citizenship have become socially effective. Only in an egalitarian public of citizens that 
has emerged from the confines of class and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social 
stratification and exploitation can the potential of an unleashed cultural pluralism fully develop – 
a potential that no doubt abounds just as much in conflicts as in meaning-generating forms of life.  
But in a secularized society that has learned to deal with its complexity consciously and 
deliberatively, the communicative mastery of these conflicts constitutes the sole source of 
solidarity among strangers – strangers who renounce violence and, in the cooperative regulation 
of their common life, also concede on another the right to remain strangers. (Habermas, 1998: 
308) 
 
Once again, we should take note of the absence of ‘consensus’ as a formative element of 
the deliberative approach. Indeed, Habermas’s claim that the potential of cultural pluralism 
“…no doubt abounds just as much in conflicts as in meaning-generating forms of life” (308) 
certainly seem to suggest less of a divide between deliberative and radical/agonal accounts of 
politics or the political.  Though by no means suggesting the two approaches are completely 
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compatible, there are sufficient resonances for certain conceptions and propositions to work 
across the divide. While agonal democratic theorists are rightly skeptical of how rules that 
govern discourse could ever be discrete from and neutral regarding the very real conflicts and 
inequalities both theoretical approaches acknowledge, we can nonetheless consider the ways in 
which the more in-depth consideration of non-political spheres, as well as the potentially 
complementary notion of a binary opposition between communicative and strategic social action, 
might help further clarify and advance a radical democratic vision based on the recognition of 
the immutable and necessary character of real political agon.  
 
Theorizing the Social alongside the Political    
 
 Having explored a range of Habermas’ views on social action, democracy, and the 
interplay between the social and the political; we return to the question of if and how all or part 
of the conceptual elements examined can be adapted in such a way as to strengthen an account of 
the social in a radical account of agonal democracy. Specifically, I contend that Habermas offers 
potential insights to agonal theorists generally, and Mouffe specifically, in three areas: i) a means 
to re-conceptualize the social not as a mere sediment or product of political contest, but as an 
equal and co-constituting sphere of human action;  ii) a mixed sociological/philosophical 
approach that more fully synthetizes the ontological/ontic divide, and guards against the critique 
of social weightlessness; and iii) an implied new categorization of conflict that exists in a liminal 
space between antagonistic and agonistic – what I have noted above as diastréfo̱ (διαστρέφω): 
the systemic distortion, perversion or contortion of understanding leading to unconscious 
deception - and which may further nuance the friend vs enemy/adversary binary opposition upon 
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which Mouffe and Schmitt depend.    
 That said, it would be intellectually reckless to proceed without acknowledging that 
agonal theorists generally, and Mouffe specifically, are by no means unaware of the corpus of 
Habermas’s contributions. Indeed, casting our attention back to Laclau and Mouffe’s earliest 
invocation of radical agonal politics – the introduction of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
frames their very enterprise, at least in part, against the backdrop of Habermasian theory.  As 
Laclau and Mouffe explain: 
There is another way in which the theoretical perspective developed in this book can contribute to 
restoring the centrality of the political – by bringing to the fore the shortcomings of what is 
currently presented as the most promising and sophisticated vision of a progressive politics: the 
model of ‘deliberative democracy’ which has been put forward by Habermas and his followers. It 
is useful to contrast our approach with theirs, because some similarities do actually exist between 
the conception of radical democracy we advocate and the one they defend… …There are, 
however, important points of divergence between our view and theirs which hinge on the 
theoretical framework that informs our respective conceptions…(Laclau and Mouffe, 2000: xvii) 
 
Most notably, Laclau and Mouffe, and later Mouffe, reject and/or take issue with Habermas and 
his followers in three principal ways.  First, they argue that the central role that antagonism plays 
in their vision of politics forecloses any possibility of a final moment of agreement/consensus.  
(xvii) Here, correctly or not, it is assumed that the end point of Habermasian deliberative 
democracy is stable and ongoing consensus or reconciliation – the elimination or sublimation of 
ongoing political conflict. Secondly, Mouffe argues in both On the Political and Return of the 
Political, that Habermas’ philosophical orientation and approach to liberal democracy is both 
problematically universalistic and distinctively un-political.  (Mouffe, 2005a & 2005b)  For 
Mouffe, Habermasian deliberative democracy is fundamentally flawed in so far as it is founded 
on the political-philosophical claim that liberal democracy holds a universal and privileged 
position as the only rationally justifiable framework for human organization and the progress of 
civilization. Thirdly, Mouffe suggests that the basic principle of deliberative democracy – that 
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core decisions can and should be made by procedurally regulated deliberation amongst citizens – 
cannot be realized in the way that Habermas proposes it.  Despite claims to the contrary amongst 
Habermasians, Mouffe and Laclau, and later Mouffe alone, contend that there can be no 
reasonable deliberation without defining the content and character of the implied limits of such 
‘reasonableness,’ and as a result, the exclusion of those positions not deemed ‘reasonable.’  For 
Mouffe, following Schmitt, it is precisely that ‘grammatical power’ that best characterizes the 
functioning of hegemonic domination – not only the political control of what can and cannot be 
debated, but the very definition of what ‘every reasonable’ topic of debate could potentially be. 
  Concurrently, it is important to note the near antithetical positions Habermas and Schmitt 
have come to represent in the contemporary study of politics and political, as well as the direct, 
and decidedly antagonistic, perspective Habermas has with regards to both the work, and the 
person, of Carl Schmitt. “Habermas criticizes Schmitt frequently and vehemently” (Howard, 
2015: 531) and expresses a deep concern with the left’s infatuation with and cooptation of the 
Nazis jurist’s romanticizing of violent political conflict and historically problematic critiques of 
liberal democracy. With this in mind, and before exploring what selected adaptations of 
Habermas’ perspective might offer a radical agonal democratic project, let us consider in turn the 
key areas agonal theorists disagree with Habermasians, as well the outline of Habermas’ deep 
discomfort and distrust of the contemporary appropriation of Carl Schmitt.  
 
Necessary and Unnecessary Antagonisms – Mouffe’s critiques of Habermas 
 
  Though spread across nearly all of Mouffe’s writing, and echoed in many other agonal 
theorists’ works, these three broad critiques are best characterized as exclamatory as opposed to 
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deeply explored.  Whether by virtue of a widespread familiarity assumed on behalf of any reader, 
or the scope and complexity of Habermas’ many writings, Mouffe and most agonal theorists tend 
to present these critiques in relatively succinct manners, rarely diving more deeply into the 
complex detail of Habermas’ various works.54  As such, each of these critiques can be 
summarized relatively quickly.  
 As noted above, the first ‘fundamental distinction’ identified between deliberative 
democracy and radical agonal democracy is articulated by Laclau and Mouffe in the introduction 
of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. While both acknowledge certain points of similarity 
between the two projects, they are explicit in pointing out certain fundamental differences. 
Specifically, Mouffe and Laclau argue that Habermasian deliberative democracy is 
fundamentally incompatible with a vision of radical (agonal) democracy because of its 
orientation to political conflict and difference. Specifically, they suggest that: 
The central role that the notion of antagonism plays in our work forecloses any possibility of a 
final reconciliation, of any kind of rational consensus, of a fully inclusive ‘we.’ For us, a non-
exclusive public sphere of rational argument is a conceptual impossibility. Conflict and division, 
in our view are neither disturbances that unfortunately cannot be eliminated nor empirical 
impediments that render impossible the full realization of a harmony that we cannot attain 
because we will never be able to leave our particularities completely aside in order to act in 
accordance with our rational self – a harmony which should nonetheless constitute the ideal 
towards which we strive. Indeed, we maintain that without conflict and division, a pluralist 
democratic politics would be impossible. (Laclau & Mouffe, 2000: xvii) 
 
The crux of this argument, which we explored in Chapter 1, is that Habermasian models of 
deliberative democracy form part of the broader collection of consensus focused political 
theories which, according to Mouffe and other agonal theorists, fundamentally misunderstands 
 
54 Taking Mouffe’s writing as an exemplar, Habermas appears in the majority of her works. However, the depth with 
which his arguments are engaged with remains somewhat shallow.  For example, in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy Laclau and Mouffe note the key differences between their project and Habermas’ in the introduction – but 
do not return to explore those statements at any point later in the book.  Similarly, while Mouffe engages with 
Habermas in On the Political, The Return of the Political, The Democratic Paradox, Agonistics: Thinking the World 
Politically, and For a Left Populism, this engagement is limited to some 40 pages – typically in sections of no more 
than 2-3 pages - across nearly 600 pages of writing.  
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the essence of democracy and politics, and, at extremis, represents the destruction of the political 
itself. Here Laclau and Mouffe argue that consensus as an ideal, and the associated relegation of 
conflict and difference to the position of obstacles, represents a fundamental error in terms of 
understanding democracy and the political.  Mouffe expands on this critique in her later work, 
The Democratic Paradox, where she again briefly considers the Habermasian model of 
deliberative democracy through the work of Seyla Benhabib.  Here, Mouffe argues that 
deliberative democracy cannot help but be at odds with the notion of pluralism.  As she explains: 
Because it postulates the availability of a consensus without exclusion, the model of deliberative 
democracy is unable to envisage liberal-democratic pluralism in an adequate way. Indeed, one 
could indicate how, in both Rawls and Habermas – to take two best-known representatives of that 
trend – the very conditions for the creation of consensus is the elimination of pluralism from the 
public sphere. (Mouffe, 2009: 49) 
 
The issue, according to Mouffe, is that deliberative democracy theorists generally, and 
Habermasians specifically, assume that obstacles to establishing the conditions of possibility for 
genuine communicative action (social action oriented towards mutual understanding) are, in 
principle, potentially surmountable. While practically they may not ever all be managed or 
removed, they are not, by definition, necessary limitations.  More specifically, Mouffe argues 
that: 
Habermasians do not deny that there will, of course, be obstacles to the realization of the ideal 
discourse, but these obstacles are conceived of as empirical. They are due to the fact that it is 
unlikely, given the practical and empirical limitations of social life, that we will ever be 
completely able to leave all our particular interests aside in order to coincide with our universal 
rational self. This is why the ideal speech situation is presented as a regulative idea. (48)  
 
In this formulation, Habermas and his followers are at fundamental odds with any radical 
agonistic vision of democracy, in so far as they seek to negate or expel conflict from within the 
political. An ontological impossibility according to Mouffe. 
 The second major critique of Habermas from an agonal perspective is that the 
formulation of a procedurally guaranteed forum for open deliberation and political debate that 
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can be secured outside of, or away from, perpetual forces of hegemonic domination. Although 
closely connected with the first critique – relating to the ideal of consensus – this second remains 
independent and is focused on the very idea that a non-exclusionary political public sphere of 
rational will formation is even possible. The argument here is that Habermas’ focus on will-
formation is inherently problematic, and ignores both the ontological essence of the political, as 
well as the empirical realities of the exercise of hegemonic power.  As Mouffe contends in On 
the Political: 
There is another aspect which reveals the anti-political nature of Habermas’ approach. His 
discourse-theoretical understanding of democracy requires ascribing an epistemic function to 
democratic will-formation and, as he admits himself, ‘the democratic procedure no longer draws 
its legitimizing force only, indeed not even predominantly, from political participation and the 
expression of political will, but rather from the general accessibility of a deliberative process 
whose structure grounds an expectation of rationally acceptable results.’ (Mouffe, 2005a: 87) 
 
The problem here, argues Mouffe, is that we are left with certain fundamental questions 
unanswered: “What are those ‘rationally acceptable results’? Who will decide on the limits to be 
imposed on the expression of political will? What are going to be grounds for exclusion?” (87) 
Not unpredictably, Mouffe turns to Schmitt for the answer, quoting the latter “Caesar dominus et 
supra grammaticam, Caesar is also lord over grammar” (87) to argue that it is only through the 
hegemonic use of power that notions of ‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’ come to be defined. As 
described above, for Mouffe, as well as most other agonal democratic theorists, “…a non-
exclusive public sphere of rational argument is a conceptual impossibility.” (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2000: xvii) 
 This brings us to the third core critique that Mouffe makes of Habermasian inspired 
deliberative democratic theory: that Habermas, both implicitly and explicitly, champions a 
universalistic vision of liberal democracy that positions it as the only rationally justifiable option 
for the organization and regulation of human civilization. This critique is particularly important, 
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as one of the central themes across all agonal democratic theorists is the rejection of 
universalizing claims for western democracy, in favour of contingently formulated critical 
normativity that postulates variously formulated positions for the pursuit of radical democracy 
based instead on its emancipatory potential. Habermas, Mouffe argues, belongs to the previous 
tradition of moral philosophy that still seeks to find a universal justification for the liberal 
democratic ideal. Mouffe makes her rejection of this position quite clear: 
One of the most sophisticated defenders of the moral superiority and universal validity of liberal 
constitutional democracy is Jürgen Habermas, whose work I will use to illustrate this type of 
reasoning. Habermas’ ambition since Between Facts and Norms has been to resolve the long-
disputed issue concerning the nature of the Western constitutional state marked by the articulation 
of the rule of law and the defence of human rights with democracy understood as popular 
sovereignty. (Mouffe 2005a: 83)  
 
The tension Habermas aims to resolve according to Mouffe lies between the primacy of private 
autonomy as guaranteed by human rights – which Mouffe associates with liberals following 
Locke – and the primacy of political autonomy via democratic self-legislation – which Mouffe 
associates with democrats and republicans following Rousseau.  The resolution Habermas 
proposes, in its simplest terms, is that these elements are best understood as co-originating in the 
liberal democratic model.  However, Mouffe believes this leads to a fundamental flaw in 
Habermas thinking, as she explains: 
Clearly if liberal constitutional democracy is such a remarkable rational achievement – the 
reconciliation of the rule of law and human rights within democratic participation – on what 
grounds could one ‘rationally’ object to its implementation? … …The implication is obvious that 
all societies should adopt liberal democratic institutions which are the only legitimate way to 
organize human coexistence. This is corroborated by Habermas when, taking up again the 
question of co-originality, but this time from the point of view of the mode of political 
legitimation and putting the emphasis on the legal system he asks: ‘What basic rights must free 
and equal citizens mutually accord one another if they want to regulate their common life 
legitimately by means of positive law?’ His answer of is, of course, that legitimacy can be 
obtained only through human rights which institutionalize the communicative conditions for a 
reasonable will formation. (85) 
 
The critique of ‘universalism’ here is far from abstract, and Mouffe is far from restrained in 
considering its furthest reaching implications. If liberal democracy is universally ‘best,’ and no 
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reasonable alternative to Western democracy is viable, Mouffe argues that the choice left to non-
western societies is between cultural and physical extermination.55 (86) 
 To be sure, Habermas and Habermasians do not concede on many of these points. That 
said, the goal here is not to validate or dispute the agonal challenges to deliberative democracy, 
but rather to identify their core content and character. The question that is relevant to the project 
at hand, is whether the manner and substantive nature of these differences truly ‘forecloses’ all 
possibility of contribution across the two perspectives?  Against Mouffe, most agonal theorists, 
and likely Habermas himself, I contend that the gulf between the deliberative democratic and 
radical agonistic democratic positions is not as great as has been described; and there remain a 
myriad of incipient agonistic currents within the deliberative model, and its underpinning 
framework for understanding social action, which can be of use in addressing several weaknesses 
in the agonal account of democracy, the political and especially the social.  
 
Between Habermas and Schmitt 
 
 
Notwithstanding the above, and before turning our attention to the potential contributions 
a creative adaptation of certain elements of Habermas’ work might be able to make for a radical 
accounts of democracy premised on an ethos of agonism which do not ignore or obscure a robust 
concept of the social, it is important to also briefly consider the not insignificant distance 
between Habermas and Schmitt – philosophically, intellectually and politically. While one could 
certainly argue that, to this point, each of the alternative contributors suggested in this project – 
Weber, Simmel, and especially Tönnies – all had an antagonistic relationship with the work and 
political leanings of Carl Schmitt; Habermas has, at times, especially in the late 1980s and early 
 
55 Footnote to comment on Mouffe’s rather extreme claim here 
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1990s, been represented as a sort of antithetical opposite to Schmitt’s seductive polemics, his 
political-philosophical attack on liberal democracy, and its contemporary appropriation by left-
leaning scholars. As noted above, Habermas has, throughout his career, been a vocal critique of 
both Schmitt, and his contemporary re-deployment.  While Habermas addresses Schmitt directly 
very little in most of his seminal works56, some have argued that much of his later political and 
democratic work can be understood as – in part – an ongoing defense against and rejection of 
Carl Schmitt’s core diagnosis of liberal democracy and its many implications. (Johnson, 1998: 
26-27) 
This is not to say that Habermas was reluctant to critique Schmitt, his post-war apologist 
and followers, nor the more contemporary reception and infatuation his critique of liberal 
democracy generated amongst left leaning political theorist – including, most notably for us, 
Chantal Mouffe. Although the majority of Habermas’ comments regarding Schmitt have been 
made in talks given over the years (predominantly in German), one notable exception is found in 
The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historian’s Debate. (Habermas, 1989) 
Originally published in 1985, in this book Habermas takes on the question of German 
nationalism/patriotism under the long shadow of Nazism and Germany’s role in the second world 
war. At the time, then German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, was advocating for Germany to ‘put the 
past behind it.’ The political goal here was to reposition Germany as a future facing political and 
economic leader in a quickly globalizing world, and included significant symbolic gestures of 
‘repositioning’ Germany’s past, most notably including U.S. President Ronald Reagan honouring 
 
56 For example, in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas briefly mentions his explicit rejection of Schmitt in terms 
of i) the basis of law within a constitutional democracy (Habermas, 1998: 152-153), ii) his understanding of the 
demos under parliamentary democracy (184-186), and iii) his Nazis era project to establish the head of state as 
‘guardian of the constitution’ to replace the quasi-independent constitutional court (240-243). However, on the 
whole, Schmitt is invoked – at least directly – relatively little.  
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Germany’s fallen soldiers at a military cemetery.  Several writings at the time also sought to 
‘minimize’ and ‘recast’ Germany’s Nazis heritage, instead emphasizing Germany’s role in 
protecting the West against an encroaching communist Russia. (Matustik, 2001: 133-137) 
Habermas addresses Schmitt most directly here, in his fifth chapter entitled - The Horrors of 
Autonomy: Carl Schmitt in English. Focusing neither on Schmitt’s Nazi pedigree, nor his post-
war apologist politics; Habermas instead takes aim at Schmitt’s core philosophical foundations.  
As his opens the chapter: 
In 1932, Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political [Der Begriff des Politischen] appeared, a famous 
work in which Schmitt takes issue in passing with Harold Laski’s pluralistic theory of the state, 
among others. The author was familiar, of course, with the pertinent definitions of Max Weber. 
But he was no social scientist and had no interest in an analytic concept of political power. Like a 
traditional philosopher, Schmitt inquired into the “nature” of the political. From an Aristotelian 
standpoint, to be sure, the answer Schmitt offered reads more like an answer to the question of 
the nature of the strategic. (Habermas, 1989: 128 – emphasis added) 
 
Habermas goes on, with his characteristic systematic rigour, to catalogue the various reasons 
why Schmitt – talented though he might be – is ultimately a deeply problematic figure peddling a 
dangerous and questionable understanding of democracy and politics through a combination of 
romanticism and polemic panache. He does concede both Schmitt’s competence as a 
constitutional jurist, and his seductive writing style. As he notes: “Thus, in the expressionistic 
style of his time, Carl Schmitt constructs a dramatic concept of the political in the light of which 
everything normally understood by the word must seem banal.” (129) Habermas continues to 
work through Schmitt’s core claims regarding the nature of the political and democracy, clearly 
articulating that they align with the latter’s political support for first Italian and later German 
fascist regimes. He argues that, beneath Schmitt’s “polemical discussions of Romanticism” 
(137), there is concealed a troubling, albeit inconsistent, fascination with what Habermas 
describes as the ‘aesthetics of violence.’  
 More broadly, Habermas’ entire political project can be – and has been – conceived as 
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antithetical to Schmitt’s.  While, as Pauline Johnson puts it, “Schmitt has no interest in the 
redemption of the idea of public reason supposedly betrayed in the flawed institutions of liberal 
democratic societies,” (Johnson, 1998: 19) Habermas’ procedural account of public reason 
rejects the premise that democratic deliberation is inherently at odds with pluralism. As Johnson 
succinctly summarizes at the close of her article Carl Schmitt, Jürgen Habermas and the Crisis 
of Politic: 
Habermas’s theory of discursive democracy refuses, then, to accept Schmitt’s characterization of 
the dilemma confronting a modern defense of the idea of public reason. Schmitt, we have seen, 
thinks that any such undertaking embarks on the futile attempt to square the circle between rival 
claims of assertive particular individuality and an aspiration toward democratically achieved 
social solidarity. On Schmitt’s viewpoint, a conception of public reason appears, at best, as a mere 
pragmatic ideology bent on hammering out agreement between self-interested parties but 
incapable of yielding any value ideas worth defending. To Habermas, by contrast, the idea of 
public reason, grasped as a discursive process geared to promotion of mutual understanding, must 
be defended as the site in which the legacy of treasured Enlightenment ideals – of enlargement of 
understanding through ongoing self-reflection and dialogue – continues to enacted and 
reproduced… …Habermas does not simply seek to uncover the peculiar telos and governing 
norms of discursive rationality as an alternative to a hegemonic purposive rational action. His 
claims go much further: he proposes to reconstruct and defend the normative primacy of this 
mode of interaction. (27) 
 
In this way, and notwithstanding the real antagonisms that existed between Schmitt and the likes 
of Weber, Simmel and Tönnies, it seems that Habermas represents – politically, philosophically 
and intellectually – an antithetical opposition to the Schmittian project along with its attempted 
taming and redeployment amongst radical democratic scholars.  
 
Deliberate/Deliberative Adaptations - What Habermas can offer Agonal Democratic Theory 
 
 
 Given the breadth and scope of the antagonism between Habermas’ and Schmitt’s views 
of democracy and politics, one might rightly ask to what extent, and by what means, could one 
productively bring into conversation elements of Habermas’ work with radical democratic 
theories explicitly aligned with elements of Schmitt’s perspective? On what basis would one 
even attempt the creative adaptation of notions like communicative action or deliberative 
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democracy, given the fundamental philosophical differences Habermas has with the likes of 
Schmitt, and, though to a lesser extent, the modern transfiguration of his works by Mouffe and 
other radical agonal theorists?  The answer, perhaps with a degree of metaphoric tongue in 
rhetorical cheek, can be taken concurrently from the normative commitments of both – albeit 
quite different – political projects. At the very heart of agonistic democratic theory is the claim 
that true and meaningful conflict both need not be destructive, and indeed lies at the very centre 
of the essence of the political. Simultaneously, deliberative democratic theory is predominantly 
based on Habermas’ underpinning framework for both understanding social action, and the 
normative primacy of ‘genuine communicative action focused on reaching real understanding.’  
Cleverness aside, one could rightly reverse the above question and ask how any serious 
proponent of either a deliberative model of democracy focused on the ideal speech situation, or a 
radical democratic theorist champion the essential and productive qualities of real 
conflict/contest could resist the potential for the creative adaptation of either position to facilitate 
a more genuine engagement between and across these two very different approaches to thinking 
about democracy, politics and the political.  Indeed, I contend that, on both sides, the tendency to 
focus on the key points of dissention, and the relatively cursory manner in which this tends to be 
done, have contributed to a significant missed opportunity to cross-pollinate these two theoretical 
models.  
 That said, the goal here is not entirely symmetrical.  While there may well be many 
opportunities for Habermas and his followers to more fully engage with the radical democratic 
critique, ultimately the project at hand is to explore, adapt and potentially deploy certain 
conceptual tools and theoretical insights from Habermas to strengthen and render more robust 
the agonal democratic project. In this regard, this chapter concludes with a consideration of three 
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key ways that a more generous engagement with elements of Habermasian thinking could 
support Mouffe’s project, without compromising her core agnostic commitments.  Specifically 
here we will consider i) the space between the ontological and the ontic – and the ways in which 
Habermas’ methodology may help Mouffe and other agonal theorist, bolster their work against 
the charge of social weightlessness; ii) the notion assumed primary of ‘consensus’ in the 
deliberative model, and the opportunities presented by recasting this in terms of more contingent 
‘agreement’; and iii) the notion of antagonistic conflict, and the transformative potential of 
bringing such a conceptualization in conversation with Habermas’ distinction between 
intentional and unintentional strategic action.  
 Beginning with the distinction between, to use Mouffe borrowed Heideggerian 
terminology, the ontic and ontological – I propose that Habermas offers agonal democratic 
theorists a potential defense and path forward from the risk of over-prioritizing the theoretical 
philosophical consideration of the ‘essence’ of the political, at the expense of meaningful 
consideration of the practical lived experiences of politics. As we observed with McNay’s 
critique, there is a very real danger in focusing exclusively on the ‘ontological’ question of how 
to understand the essential qualities of the political, especially when and where that begins to 
overshadow, contradict, or obscure claims of real experiences of domination that fail to align 
with the broader philosophical framework. (McNay, 2014: 11-12) Unlike McNay, whose solution 
to equate the question of the political to the ‘ontological’ and the social with the ‘ontic’, while 
expedient, problematically reduces the social to the ‘active’ wing of the political; Habermas 
synergistic oscillation between political theory, philosophy and sociology offers a more robust 
and productive approach.  As I pointed out in the earlier discussion of Habermas, part of this 
approach is methodological, with Habermas first offering a detailed treatise on this 
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understanding of the rationalization of modern societies and both the lived reality and normative 
primacy of communicative social action.  Based on this foundation, Habermas’ procedural 
account of deliberative politics and democracy moves away from Rawlsian abstractions and 
thought experiment, to propose practical conceptual framework for establishing real world 
environments where ideal speech actions can be encouraged, and strategic actions (both 
intentional and unintentional) can be identified, regulated and mitigated.  
 From an agonal democratic perspective, without skirting the very real and fundamental 
differences between radical visions of democracy and deliberative ones, Habermas’ procedural 
approach offers certain avenues for consideration.  Notwithstanding Mouffe’s, and others’ deep 
distrust of that any regulated public sphere can be enacted in the absence of the exercise of 
excluding hegemonic power, the double of movement of sociological account of communicative 
action and then conditions of possibility for practical political outcomes could be mirrored 
following the radical democratic paradigm.  This would mean reversing the Habermasian 
paradigm and beginning with Mouffe’s core aspirational outcome – an ethos of agonal 
democracy that understands and praises the centrality of real and genuine conflict, but which 
seeks the overcoming one’s cherished opponent, as opposed to the full destruction of a 
dehumanized enemy. From this base, the question becomes, what are the practical conditions for 
the resolution of real and genuine conflict, that conform to the preceding ethos? 
 Again, it is here that we can see where – since the very beginning of the agonal (re)turn – 
it has always been acknowledged that the position bears some similarities to the deliberative 
model.  In the absence of descending to a Schmitt-like fetishization of an aesthetic of violence, 
one must assume that radical democratic theorists remain predominantly committed to various 
forms of communicative action, though not to the Habermasian understanding thereof. Rather 
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than repeating the critique of Habermasian proceduralism as being inherently exclusionary – 
which may well be the case – agonal democratic theorists could turn their attention to the types 
of genuine communicative political contest they do seem as viable expressions of an ethos of 
political agon. Presumably here a broader discursive approach could engage with notions of 
protest, resistance, and domination alongside traditional questions of political debate, 
deliberation, voting and democratic participation. In short, if nothing else, a more detailed and 
productive engagement with the mechanics of Habermas’ procedural account could well be a 
path to dispelling the impression that radical democratic theorists ontological preoccupation with 
the essence of the political has eclipsed any meaningful consideration of more practical ‘ontic’ 
experiences of politics. 
 The second contribution that a more nuanced engagement with Habermas might offer 
agonal democratic theorists, closely related to the first, is the reading of Habermasian 
deliberative democratic theorists as being centered on a notion of consensus. While there are a 
range of views here, it is safe to agree that – for the most part – Habermas and various 
Habermasians, do theorize a normative value to the idea of stable society through ongoing 
agreement over the basic structure, rules, and issues of a modern democracy.  Procedural 
accounts of deliberative democracy certainly strongly imply, if not outright decree, that the 
desired outcome of a public sphere that enables ideal speech acts oriented towards genuine 
understanding is ‘reasonable and lasting agreement’ amongst rational participants.  That having 
been said, equating this with consensus – especially in a way that parallels Rawls’ use of the term 
– is neither accurate, nor productive.  As discussed above, Habermas describes the role of public 
reason in terms of  “…a network of pragmatic considerations, compromises, and discourses of 
self-understanding and of justice…” (Habermas, 1998: 297)  Habermas is explicit that public 
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reason – in terms of the reasonable debate amongst informed citizens – cannot, as Rawls 
abstracts, recreate the constitutive radical energies of political foundation, but instead serve as a 
mechanism for some level of  political stability. Furthermore, even if stability is read as 
consensus, unlike Rawls, Habermas explicitly rejects this as the normative basis for deliberation 
in the public sphere.  It is, in contrast, the normative primary of ‘genuine communicative social 
action oriented towards understanding’ that provides validity basis for Habermas. (297) 
 What this means, or could mean, for Mouffe or other radical agonal democratic theorists, 
is that there is no inherent disconnect between Habermas’ normative foundation – action oriented 
towards understanding – and the agonal foundation of the primacy of genuine, but not 
destructive, conflict. Indeed, while understanding could lead to consensus; in the broadest sense, 
genuine conflict (agonal or antagonistic) would also depend on real understanding between 
positions. It seems unlikely, for example, that the kind of agonistic contest between true 
adversaries – though not devolving into enmity – could exist in the context of misunderstanding 
or ignorance.  From this perspective, Mouffe’s friend/adversary distinction would depend just as 
much on communicative action – albeit likely defined in much broader terms than Habermas is 
comfortable with – as would any goal of stability, agreement, or consensus.  
 This brings us to the third area where a more generous/nuanced reading of Habermas 
could offer agonal democratic theorists productive conceptual tools: the foundational typology of 
social action, as divided between communicative and strategic actions. Interestingly enough, and 
perhaps due to the tendency of agonal political theorists to ignore, obscure or completely 
disregard the notion of the social, neither Mouffe nor many of her agonal counterparts engage 
with Habermas’ foundational work in The Theory of Communicative Action.  As such, there is 
little work considering the implications Habermas’s Weber-inspired alternative typology of social 
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action would have on their primary interest – conflict. Obviously, at the core of most agonal 
democratic theory, there is distinction made between antagonistic and agonistic conflict/contest. 
While the conceptualization of productive conflict opens an interesting space for radical 
democratic theorists vis-a-vis  consensus focused paradigms, it should not foreclose additional 
analysis of how conflict operates, and whether or not there might be more variations or sub-types 
worth considering.  Of course, this is not to position Habermas as a conflict theorist, or even a 
sociologist who spends any marked time on the idea that conflict could be socially or politically 
productive. Born just over a decade after the end of World War I, and just under a decade before 
the start of World War II, Habermas’ attention to and orientation towards ‘political conflict’ was 
no doubt affected the horrors he witnessed in his youth. Habermas grew up on the heels of the 
first modern Great Depression, and at the start of the rise of the Nationalist Socialist Party in 
Germany (Müller-Doohm, 2016: 12-13) Surrounded by such events – to this day, widely seen as 
pivotal turning points in the modern age - it is difficult to overestimate the effect this historical 
context played in Habermas intellectual development.  That having been said, agonal democratic 
theorists could – considering Habermas’ core dichotomy between communicative and strategic 
action – refocus some attention on what Habermas’ foundational assumptions mean for 
understanding social and political conflict.  
 Specifically of note here is the sub-distinction Habermas makes between concealed/open 
strategic action, and most importantly between conscious and unconscious deception.  For 
Mouffe, as with many agonal theorists, strategic action is not a difficult concept to accept.  
Indeed, drawing from the likes of Nietzsche and Machiavelli, most agonal theorists assume – 
with the centrality of conflict in their understanding of politics and the political – the existence, 
and perhaps inevitability, of strategic actors and actions. However, while agonal theorists may 
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not generally dwell on genuine principled actors to the same extent – they are nonetheless a 
necessary counterpoint to strategic action. In fact, at its core, agonal democratic theory demands 
a conception of the ethical actor – be it under  Gesinnungsethik (an ethic of conviction) or 
Verantwortungsethik (an ethic of responsibility) – in order for the idea of productive conflict to 
have any meaning at all. In short, the dichotomy between conscious deception (open or 
concealed) and genuine (communicative or otherwise) action is, at least, firmly implied in agonal 
democratic theory.  What is considered far less, is what Habermas describes as unconscious 
deception – or the systemic distortion of communication.  
  Exploring this idea offers, yet another, opportunity for agonal democratic theorists 
generally, and Mouffe specifically, to revisit their anemic vision of the social as well as enhance 
their understanding of the political. Taken seriously, the conceptualization of a form of 
systemically distorted social action – wherein social actors believe themselves to be oriented 
towards genuine understanding but are in fact oriented more towards outcome/success – opens 
the possibility of unnecessary or misguided antagonisms at both the level of sociation and 
politics. It also brings into focus a potential dimension of Mouffe’s aspirational relation of 
‘adversaries’ under an ethos of political agon – the absence of systemic distortions to 
understanding. Brought forward as a type of conflict, one could read this to imply a third type of 
conflict existing between and across antagonistic (between enemies seeking to destroy one 
another) and agonistic (between adversaries seeking to overcome each other) – diastréfo̱ or 
distorted conflict (between misguided/misunderstanding individuals seeking either).   
While it would be dramatic to conclude this chapter with the claim that Habermas is a 
long-lost agonal theorist waiting to be reclaimed, not even the most creative of adaptations, nor 
most open of re-readings, can make this so.  That said, in a similar way to how I have proposed 
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that the classical sociological insights of seminal thinkers like Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies 
and Georg Simmel can be selectively leveraged to supplement and build renewed accounts of 
agonal democratic politics that take seriously their underlying social conditions of possibility; so 
too can a more rigorous and productive engagement Jürgen Habermas – both in terms of his 
sociological foundations and contemporary political theory – offer agonal theorist new 
opportunities to both address limitations in their foundational assumptions, and more broadly 







































The world, as ever, is changing.  The recent promise of a ‘third way’ ushering in a 
cosmopolitan vision of global democratic consensus has given way to a new wave of populist 
leaders, polarized political partisanship, and a noticeable dearth of civility across the world stage.  
John Rawls’ now famous presupposition of a ‘reasonably well-ordered society’ underpinning A 
Theory of Justice, has, in just under a half century, transformed into a deeply divided and 
divisive global political and social climate.  The question of how the modern western democratic 
project, once assumed stable, can better thrive; has been reduced to a question of whether it will 
be able to survive. If anything, the first two decades of the new millennium have unequivocally 
demonstrated the dangers of the intellectual and moral complacency underpinning conceptually 
thin accounts of consensus  – and made even more urgent the calls for a radical reimagining and 
re-energizing of fundamental democratic ideals and institutions.  
At the heart of the agonal democratic project, is a core philosophical understanding that 
conflict lies at the heart of ‘the political’ and that any attempts to mitigate, suppress or eliminate 
such conflict can, at best, lead to a uncontrolled and dangerous build of dissenting energies, or, at 
worst, lead to a complete dissolution of the political by way of a totalizing homogeneity.   
Alongside this ontological understanding of the political, radical democratic theorists hold a core 
normative commitment – to improve democratic institutions to address inequality, domination 
and suffering.  However, this re-centering of the political has come at a cost.  As agonal theorists 
have successfully brought to the fore their vision couched through their account of the political, 
most have done so at the expense of the social.  Historically contingent ontological accounts of 
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the essential character of political interaction have, to a large extent, brought with them a 
reduction of the social to the sediment of contest and conflicts fought within the political, to a 
sort of post-political remainder robbed of any value, creative vitality or effervescence. But for 
this anemic account of the social, agonal democratic theorists could well be viewed as natural 
allies to a range of critical sociologists – from those exploring social movements, to those 
mapping the internal confines of democratic institutions - holding many of the same normative 
goals.  Given the current global political climate, which can best be described as a new crisis of 
legitimacy for western democratic orders, the possibilities embedded in agonal democratic theory 
are too important to abandon.   
 
It is within this context that I have brought this project forward, with the overarching 
objective of injecting radical democratic accounts with selected critical sociological insights to 
better consider and map what such accounts might offer both disciplines were they to take 
seriously their own obscured assumptions and necessary foundations vis a vis a more robust 
understanding of the social.   By challenging the predominant logic of determinism in agonal 
democratic theory – under which the social is understood to be byproduct of political struggle – 
and by exploring and expanding nascent assumptions and conceptions of the social within and 
around such accounts, I have begun to ask a distinctive, hitherto ignored, and deeply sociological 
question.  Specifically: what are the underlying social conditions of possibility for a radically 
emancipatory democratic order premised on the ideal of political agon? 
 
To do this, I have argued, one must both map and disrupt some of the underpinning 
conceptual foundations within agonal democratic thought.  However, rather than a traditional 
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process of simply tearing down perceived weaknesses through analytic or comparative critique, I 
have undertaking to introduce, through the creative adaptation of selected classical and 
contemporary sociological insights, alternative understandings and conceptual vocabularies 
through which to reimagine and transform elements therein while supporting, and potentially 
advancing, the normative aims and underlying commitments of the agonal democratic project. 
Exploring the work of Chantal Mouffe as the exemplar of the agonal democratic field, I 
wondered aloud what might happen to Mouffe’s objective - of transforming the political from a 
field defined by the distinction between friend and enemy (to be destroyed), into an agonal vision 
based on the distinction between friend vs adversary (to be overcome) – were one to replace 
Schmitt’s proto-fascist and deeply real-politic understanding of the political and the social with a 
more nuanced account of both?   Thus, into this vision I introduced a new conceptual vocabulary 
through certain selected classical insights from Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, 
and finally some more contemporary alternatives from Jürgen Habermas.   
 
First, through Max Weber, I introduced an alternative understanding of the political, at 
once compatible with Schmitt’s view while offering a more sophisticated and nuanced 
articulation of the interplay between power and responsibility. In place of Schmitt’s seductively 
totalizing account of the political as eternal struggle between the antithetical categories of friend 
and enemy, Weber offers an acknowledgement of the political as defined through ongoing 
conflict by and for the means of power, but one in which such constant struggle is founded on a 
necessary diversity amongst fundamental values. To this, through the important work of 
Weberian scholar Wolfgang Schluchter, I also introduced a conceptual framework for 
understanding ethical values within the sphere of the political. Notably through the exploration 
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of Weber’s understanding of value collision and the ultimate primacy of an ethic of responsibility 
(verantwortungsethik) over an ethic of conviction (gesinnungsethik). Ultimately offering Mouffe 
an account of the political more than a little compatible with her agonistic sensibilities, but one 
in which values and ethics find an intellectual purchase in contrast to their conspicuous absence 
in Schmitt’s near completely amoral account.  
 
Next, I introduced a potential conceptualization of ‘the social’ through a rereading of 
Ferdinand Tönnies’ seminal Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Rejecting a nostalgic reading in 
favor of approaching Tönnies as a dialectic thinker focused on a tension between organic and 
mechanical affirmative social relations,’ and through the lens of his Hobbesian scholarship, I 
proposed a reading that emphasized the underlying conditions of possibility for a stable political 
order.  This not only offered an important contrast to Schmitt vis a vis his minimalist and narrow 
account of social solidarity, but provided a way to re-read the notions of gemeinschaft and 
gesellschaft in terms of an ideal typology introduced – at least in part – to build upon and 
complicate Hobbes famous ‘purely political’ account of society in Leviathan.  Noting certain 
limitations in the way in which Tönnies, much like Schmitt, understood conflict – at a 
fundamental level – as destructive, I proceeded offer a conceptual nudge to Tönnies by way of 
selected insights from Georg Simmel, ultimately proposing a conceptualization of the social 
understood through both i) a core antithetical distinction between familiar and unfamiliar, and ii) 
a liminal third intermediary position of strangership between them.   This notion of liminality 
further allowed a reconsideration of Mouffe’s desired transformation of Schmitt’s enemy into 






I proposed an understanding of the social, wherein Mouffe/Schmitt’s ‘core antithetical 
distinction’ between friend and enemy/adversary could be joined with a complimentary core 
tension between familiar/unfamiliar.  
 Finally, this project looked to reconsider the relationship between agonal democratic 
theories and the famous deliberative/procedural account forwarded by Jürgen Habermas.  
Exploring Habermas in terms of both a direct continuation of the classical sociological traditions 
introduced via Tönnies, Simmel, and most explicitly Weber; and as a contemporary democratic 
theorist, who alongside agonal thinkers, first articulated a position in terms of critical response 
and rebuke of Rawls.  First, looking at how Habermas builds upon and expands Weber’s famous 
account of social action under ever more rationalized society; I proposed the distinction between 
Genuine Communicative Social Action and Strategic Action (both intentional and unconscious) 
as a useful frame for further expanding a complimentary account of the social dimensions of the 
agonal democratic project, both in terms of its ontological (the social) and ontic (sociation) 
dimensions.  Moving to re-consider the classically antagonistic relationship between agonal 
visions of democracy and Habermas’ procedurally focused deliberative account; I challenged the 
traditional reading of Habermas as a consensus focused thinker, instead positing a latent agonal 
current running throughout his later works.  Ultimately, through Habermas, I proposed that both 
his theory of communicative action and his deliberative democratic theory – when considered in 
tandem – not only offer agonal democratic theorists generally, and Mouffe specifically, a sizeable 
new conceptual vocabulary, but also an example of a theoretical perspective that better manages 




Where then does this leave us? Taken together, I would propose that the critical adaptation of key 
insights from classical and contemporary sociological thinkers provides a new framework for the 
re-invigoration of the critical project of reimaging a democratic order premised on the ideal of 
political agon.  These contributions offer a way to move from a one dimensional ‘purely 
political’ account of agonal democracy that focuses nearly entirely on the ontological, to a four 
dimensional account of the conditions of possibility for a radical democracy premised on the 
ideal of agonal context in terms of the political and the social, in both their ontic and ontological 









Far from reducing the importance of agonal democratic thought generally, or Mouffe’s work 
specifically, the introduction of these alternative insights aims to provide a deeper and more 
stable conceptual framework through which build on what has become the most urgent social 
and political question of our times.  No longer a question of simply how to challenge a 
mainstream interpretation of a relatively stable political order, but instead how to triage, rescue 
and recover a basic level of legitimacy and functionality in a rapidly unravelling socio-political 
context.  That those who have most recently articulated agonal values as a pivotal part to 
understanding and evolving democratic politics have initially done so with an (over)emphasis on 
political philosophy, cannot be allowed to act as an excuse for critical sociologists to ignore its 
core critical and normative potential. By expanding the conceptual vocabulary through which an 
agonal vision articulated, this project aims to both strengthen existing accounts and facilitate 
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